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PREFACE
The Wizard of Oz has long held a special place in the cultural mythology of American gay
men. It is the story of a young girl who leaves the small (and perceived as ordinary, if even dull,
and confining) town of her birth to go off to a magical, colorful, dangerous place in which she
discovers who she really is, makes new and interesting friends (who seem like they could be gay),
and embarks upon a life-changing adventure (Michel 2018). The story has often been viewed as a
metaphor for the lives of gay men, particularly since the 1950s, many of whom are often first to
leave their homes and the confines of the closet in order to seek out liberation and adventure
elsewhere. This narrative is not necessarily universal, and while this research will not take a
position on the debate surrounding the appropriateness of the mythology outside of the American
gay male community, it is noted that the story depicted in the 1939 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer film
can have certain metaphorical value here. In the history of each state that currently recognizes the
rights of same-sex couples to marry, there was a time when that state did not. For almost all of
those states, there was also a time when same-sex couples were legally sanctioned – up to and
including execution – for the “crime” of consensual homosexual sex. Metaphorically speaking, the
journey of same-sex couples is like Dorothy’s journey in The Wizard of Oz. The long journey on
the road of progress leading to equality is filled with dangers and adversaries. Allies are gained
along the way. And the destination – a condition of equal recognition and protection for their
relationship under the laws of their country – is far more beautiful than the bleakness of the
journey’s origin would have suggested possible.
Recently, as part of my research for this dissertation, I took a literal journey of my own.
Not a journey to a mythical land, but a journey thousands of miles away from home to the only
place in all of Asia to legalize same-sex marriage: Taiwan. While there I made many discoveries,

xvii
but none so interesting as a small Taoist temple in an ordinary looking high-rise office building in
a working-class neighborhood in the Zhonghe District of Taipei. Tucked away among various
ordinary looking offices and businesses, the temple is perhaps not more than a thousand square
feet in total – smaller than my Atlanta apartment. Without a gracious local friend to act as a guide,
I would never have been able to find it. What makes it worthy of my having sought it out in the
first place, and indeed what makes it unique among all the temples in all of Taiwan, is that it is the
only temple on the entire island dedicated to Tu’er Shen (兔神) or the “Rabbit God.” Tu’er Shen
is the Chinese deity who manages affairs of life, love, and sex between homosexual people. His
temple is the only known temple dedicated to the protection and prosperity of homosexuals
anywhere in the world. When I enter the temple, I witness dozens of young lesbian, gay, bisexual
(LGB) Taiwanese – and a few foreigners like myself – praying, making offerings, burning incense
to Tu’er Shen asking for his blessings in all matters – but especially matters of love and sex, or
simply watching this unique cultural phenomenon. For a small donation, I am permitted to throw
two jiaobei, or moon-shaped blocks used to communicate yes or no answers from the deity to the
questioner. The answer I receive to my question is most favorable. Roughly 9000 LGB Taiwanese
come from all over the island each year to pray at this temple, for better jobs, more understanding
families, success in life or work, but most of all for love.1

1

Gold 2015.
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1

INTRODUCTION

It is perhaps fitting that the world’s only temple dedicated solely to the worship of a patron
deity for homosexuals sits in the capital city of the first country in Asia to legalize same-sex
marriage. The Taiwanese Legislative Yuan legalized same-sex marriage in 2019, nearly two years
after the Taiwanese Constitutional Court ruled that laws defining marriage as being only between
one man and one woman violated Articles 7, 22, and 23 of Taiwan’s Constitution.2 That Taiwan
was the first country in Asia to adopt same-sex marriage may have come as a bit of a surprise,
especially to those outside the region. While it is true that Taiwan is host to Asia’s largest annual
LGB Pride Parade, there are richer, more secular, and more self-expressive countries in the region.3
Taiwan is also not Asia’s most modern country – as currently understood under the tenants of
modernization theory. In fact, Taiwan is not even East Asia’s most modern country, that distinction
goes to Japan. To begin to understand why Taiwan, out of all possibilities, was the first to legalize
same-sex marriage in Asia and not Japan, it will be necessary to examine the political and social
conditions that led to legalization. That will be the chief goal of this dissertation. But, to
successfully do that, we need some context around the case.
But, before going forward, it is necessary for me to recognize an inherent challenge to studies
in LGB equality. First, the exclusion of transgendered persons from this policy analysis should not
be construed as a dismissal of the validity of rights claims made by the trans community, nor of
the significant threats and challenges that community faces. Because this dissertation is concerned
with marriage rights and the recognition of the validity of consensual same-sex sexual
relationships, an attempt to include trans rights claims in this analysis would be concept stretching

2
3

chapters.

The Constitution Project, 2020.
Based on World Values Survey (WVS) and other data. This will be discussed at more length in subsequent
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and potentially hinder analysis, as many trans activists are fighting for the right to simply exist in
safety as themselves – analogous perhaps to gay rights movements in their earliest stages long
before concerns like marriage equality become salient. Second, it is true that LGB persons around
the world make rights claims that have nothing to do with marriage – equal opportunity in
employment or hate crime protection or inclusive education might be three good examples. But
conceptually, it is better again to focus specifically on marriage as the reasons for same-sex
marriage legalization are at the heart of the research question of this dissertation. This should not
be taken as an assertion that marriage rights are the most important rights claim the LGB
community could make or that marriage rights claims are more important than any of the examples
given. Finally, because of the inherent patriarchy – to varying degrees – present in the countries
studied, it is possible that at some points the gay male experience of identity formation is being
universalized for the entire LGB. Where possible, I have taken care to minimize the risk of this,
but I recognize that other scholars may find me less successful than they might hope and welcome
their input in future as part of the ongoing dialectic that keeps social science research relevant.
1.1

The Puzzle
In 2000, The Netherlands became the world's first country to legalize same-sex marriage.

Since then, twenty-seven additional countries have followed the Netherlands’ example. As of
2020: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador,
Finland, France, Germany, Greenland, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, the United Kingdom (except for
Northern Ireland), the United States, and Uruguay have all legalized same-sex marriage. 4 In
addition, several local and state jurisdictions in Mexico have extended the right, and Israel

4

See Appendix A for more details on SSM legalization by country.

3
recognizes the validity of same-sex marriages performed in other countries and territories, though
it has yet to legalize domestically conducted same-sex marriage for its own citizens. Figure 1.1, a
map created by the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA),
illustrates the spread of countries that either legalized or criminalized same-sex relationships as of
2020. Even though there are a far greater number of countries in the world that either criminalize
same-sex relationships to varying degrees, ranging from the imposition of fines to the sentencing
of death, or offer no recognition at all, it is hard not to notice the remarkable amount of progress
made in the last twenty years.
This presents researchers of human rights norms in general, and LGB rights in particular,
with quite a puzzle. Same-sex relationships that far more often than not have been the subject of
the harshest legal sanction since the very birth of what we would recognize as the modern state in
1648 now, suddenly, find perhaps the ultimate legal recognition in the form of same-sex marriage
rights. Solving this puzzle involves not only discovering why same-sex marriage receives this
recognition when and where it has since the start of the 21st Century but also in figuring out why
modernization theory does not offer as compelling an explanation for the phenomenon as does a
theory which incorporates mobilization capacity of social movements and the work of
transnational advocacy networks.

4

Figure 1-1: Recognition and Criminalization of Same-Sex Relationships as of 2020
1.2

The Question
That so much progress for same-sex couples would be possible in such a compressed span

of time is remarkable. The question predicated on this puzzle that this dissertation will seek to
answer is as follows: why have some countries legalized same-sex marriage while others have not?
In other words, why Taiwan and not Japan? Why Colombia and not Mexico?
This question has been examined by other scholars to be sure – and many of their works will
be discussed in the following pages and chapters. However, cross-regional, mixed-method studies
at the country level of analysis have rarely been conducted. The hypothesis that I will be testing in
this dissertation, employing a country-based, cross-regional, mixed-method approach, is that
certain conditions within a given country or territory – 1) minimal level of emancipative and

5
secular values, 2) LGB mobilization capacity, 3) and opportunities for Transnational Advocacy
Networks (TANs) to engage and support local actors – increase the likelihood that same-sex
marriage will be legalized. These conditions allow for organizations and/or actors within a social
movement to engage in contentions politics through existing opportunity structures in order to put
pressure on elites to recognize their rights claims. Represented visually, the progression from norm
rejection to norm adoption begins with the presence of these social and political conditions needed
to make the legalization of same-sex marriage more likely (see Figure 1-2).

Figure 1-2: The General Hypothesis Visualized

Put another way, if a country has a population that tends to respect emancipative and secular
values; and if LGB populations in that country have sufficient resources and support to mobilize
political influence, gather to organize, work to shape public opinion, and successfully utilize the
country’s political and/or judicial system in order to challenge existing barriers to equality; and if
TANs have opportunities to form linkages with domestic advocates in that country; that country
is more likely to adopt same-sex marriage. And, while the effects of modernization within that
country are certainly important, the conditions described above are more predictive of same-sex
marriage legalization than modernization alone.
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1.3

Definition of Terms
Before proceeding further, it will be helpful to define the key terms used up to this point.

These terms have already made an appearance in the hypothesis or the explanation of it and will
be important throughout the rest of this dissertation. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list
of definitions of independent variables used in testing the hypothesis – that will come in Chapter
3 on the research design of this dissertation.
Emancipative values are a subset of the World Values Survey (WVS) data collected
periodically since 1981. Emancipative values include a combination of two value orientations: a
liberating orientation, or an emphasis on freedom of choice; and an egalitarian orientation, or an
emphasis on equal freedom of choice or equality of opportunity (Welzel 2013, 67). Emancipative
values include the values of autonomy, choice, equality, and voice, and these are defined as
follows:
Autonomy: The degree to which respondents consider independence and
imagination to desirable traits in children but do not consider obedience to be as
desirable.
Choice: The degree to which respondents find the following acceptable: divorce,
abortion, homosexuality.
Equality: The degree to which respondents value basic gender equality in
education, employment, and politics.
Voice: The degree to which respondents value freedom of speech, accountability in
government, and autonomy in their personnel and professional lives (Welzel 2013,
66-68).

7
Secular values involve rational value orientations, or a demystification of traditional sources
of authority: religious authority, patrimonial (a form of governance in which all power flows
directly from the leader) or patriarchal (male domination) authority, state authority, authority of
conformity (group) norms. It should be noted that the term secular as it is used in the WVS and in
Welzel’s work on human empowerment means, “of or relating to the worldly or temporal; not
overtly or specifically religious; or not ecclesiastical or clerical” (Merriam Webster). Secular
values include agnosticism (or disbelief), defiance, skepticism, and relativism, and these are
defined as follows:
Disbelief: The degree to which respondents consider faith an important value in
children and the frequency of respondents’ attendance at religious services.
Defiance: The degree to which respondents are proud of their nationality, how
much emphasis respondents place on the approval of parents, and the degree to
which respondents feel that a greater respect for authority is needed.
Skepticism: The degree of confidence respondents have in the state’s coercive
institutions, including the courts, police, and military.
Relativism: The degree to which respondents feel that breaking conformity norms
is acceptable, including cheating on a transportation fare, accepting a bribe, and tax
evasion. In these cases, any value other than a value of 1 (never justified) on a 1-10
scale is considered to reflect a degree of relativism (Welzel 2013, 63-66).
A Social Movement is a loosely organized effort by a large and often diverse group of
independent actors aimed at achieving a social or political goal. Actors within social movements
seek to mobilize resources in order to affect that change and may often engage in contentious

8
politics to achieve their goals. Social movements progress through stages and are one-way nonelites can effect change or make demands of elites.
Mobilization Capacity is the ability of actors who are part of a social movement to gather
resources – which may include money, supporters, attention of the media, etc. – to help them
achieve a desired goal (Edwards and Gilham 2013). The freedoms (such as freedom of speech and
expression and freedom of association), education, and relative economic independence that comes
with democratization and the formation of inclusive economic and political institutions make
resource mobilization within social movements more likely (Tilly 2004).
Contentious Politics are “episodic, public, collective interaction[s] among makers of
claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a
party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the
claimants” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 5). Contentious politics occur when organizations,
or groups of actors, which are part of a social movement, advocate for policy change through
unconventional and sometimes confrontational means. Regular, scheduled, and/or common means
of political interaction open to populations, such as elections, petitioning, lobbying, or other
normal democratic processes are not considered part of contentious politics. Contentious politics,
whether it is violent or not, transgressive or contained, is always intended to be disruptive. Actors
engaged in contentious politics do so through selecting any number of actions from among
repertoires of contention, or “the means by which people engage in contentious collective action”
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 41). Demonstrations, public meetings, sit-ins, boycotts, strikes,
processions, and rallies are among the repertoires of contention.
Opportunity Structures refer broadly to the institutional and sociocultural factors that
shape a social movement’s options. Opportunity structures are created or closed off by the relative
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openness or closure of a political system to non-elites, the stability or lack thereof of political
alliances within the political system, the presence or absence of elite allies, and the propensity and
the degree to which the state is likely to respond to demands made through contentious politics
with repression or violence (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1999, 23-40). In democratic countries,
opportunity structures often include legislative bodies, bureaucracies, and courts.
Norms refer to expectations of behavior about which states or political elites within states
may disagree. A norm is an expectation of behavior which informs or constrains state action (Keck
and Sikkink 1998). The fight over the right to marriage for same-sex couples is one example of a
wider set of LGB rights norms, many of which are contested in most countries around the world,
which is to say in most of the countries of the world, LGB persons are not fully equal to
heterosexuals under the law. In general, norms can be shaped by any number of factors, and can
be influenced from outside the state or from within.
Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) include actors working internationally on an
issue, who are “bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of
information and services.” One of the things that makes TANs unique and effective is their ability
to “mobilize information strategically to help domestic actors within a social movement by
persuading or pressuring states and/or elites within those states to accept a norm” (Keck and
Sikkink 1998, 2-3). But TANs are also able to offer material or epistemological support to
domestic actors who may lack the resources or expertise needed to successfully advocate for their
rights. To do either of these things effectively, TANs must have opportunities to form partnerships
with domestic actors in order to offer their support.
Modernization refers to the process by which societies within a country become more
advanced. This is because of industrialization, urbanization, occupational specialization, and
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higher levels of wealth and education. Societies in modern countries also shift from traditional and
security-based value systems to postmodern, or “post-material” value systems which prioritize
individual liberty, expression, choice, and tolerance (Inglehart 1997, 2003, and 2004; World
Values Survey 2021).
1.4

The Process
To clearly demonstrate the validity of the hypothesis, this dissertation will be organized as

follows. Following this introductory Chapter will be the literature review of relevant published
research on values, resource mobilization, contentious politics, the role of TANs in the diffusion
of norms, and the opportunity structures used by social movements to press their claims to equality.
I will identify the relevance that cited research in each of these areas has to the legalization of
same-sex marriage, and where possible also identify any shortcomings or gaps in the literature
reviewed that this dissertation could address. In addition, a brief review of modernization theory
literature will be included to allow for the formation of the alternative hypothesis against which
this dissertation’s theory will be tested.
Following the literature review, in Chapter 3 I will lay out the research design of the
dissertation, explaining both the quantitative and qualitative methods and tools I will be using,
including the Robinson Country Intelligence Index (RCII). I will briefly explain the RCII and
detail the process by which I use the functionality of its Build Your Own Index (BYOI) tool to
construct both a Rainbow Index (RI), which incorporates data from various sources on
emancipative and secular values, mobilization capacity, and the presence of transnational
advocacy networks; and a Modernization Index (MI), which incorporates data on post-material
values, industrialization, wealth, urbanization, education, and modern communication. Within the
research design chapter, I will catalogue the results of the quantitative analysis, which will show
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that the RI constructed to test the hypothesis captures a single factor – which we will call
“friendliness to LGB equality” – and that this factor has a statistically significant predictive power
for determining the likelihood of same-sex marriage legalization at the country level. The
quantitative analysis will also show that variables used to create the MI and operationalize
modernization do not, when taken together, offer as powerful an explanation for same-sex
marriage legalization. Chapter 3 will also explain how cases are selected, as well as detail the use
of the qualitative methods employed in case study analysis, including elite interviews, process
tracing, and historical institutional analysis all aimed at further exploring the hypothesis.
Chapter 4 will explore the case of same-sex marriage legalization in Taiwan in greater detail,
based on field work conducted in Taipei in 2020, from February to April and from October to
December. Using data contained in the RI and MI on Taiwan as a guide, Chapter 4 will explain
how values, mobilization capacity, and opportunities presented to TANs to form partnerships with
local actors lead to a greater likelihood of same-sex marriage legalization. Chapter 4 will also
detail how modernization, while clearly important, does not offer as compelling an explanation for
Taiwan’s legalization of same-sex marriage. In Chapter 4, we will also identify additional country
or regional-level variables which may also influence the outcome; however, this dissertation will
not explore those additional variables in detail. These additional variables are identified as
opportunities for further research.
Chapters 5 and 6 will build on the information contained in Chapter 4 by engaging in
comparative, mini-case-study analysis in which legalizers will be compared with non-legalizers to
shed further light on the relationship between friendliness to LGB equality and same-sex marriage
legalization. This analyses will consist of comparisons between Taiwan and Japan in Chapter 5,
using the information in Chapter 4 to guide that comparison, followed an examination of the case-
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pair Colombia and Mexico in Chapter 6 to verify that the phenomenon is not confined to the Sinic
East. Colombia and Taiwan are the states which have legalized same-sex marriage at the countrylevel in each pair, whereas Mexico has legalized but the rights are still not fully enjoyed and Japan
has not. Chapters 5 and 6, though focused on comparative analysis, will proceed according to the
same format as Chapter 4, exploring the relationship between values, mobilization capacity, and
opportunities presented to TANs within each country and same-sex marriage legalization. As in
Chapter 4, additional variables of interest will be identified as potential avenues for future study
but will not be explored in detail here.
The qualitative analysis in each of these chapters is intended to show why some countries
legalize same-sex marriage and not others in a way that quantitative analysis alone cannot.
Because, while the quantitative analysis detailed in Chapter 3 shows that the RI is more predictive
of the likelihood of same-sex marriage legalization than the MI, the RI also predicts that Mexico
is more likely to legalize same-sex marriage than Colombia and Japan more likely than Taiwan.
This strongly suggests that are either some factors not included in the RI that are unique to the
regions or clusters these countries are in, or that some variables are doing more work in some
regions or clusters than in others. Therefore, deeper analysis is required. Finally, the dissertation
will conclude by considering the implications of the research and laying out areas for possible
future study.
It should be noted before proceeding to the argument that there is a trade-off between
richness of detail and detailed focus. Because of the comparative nature of this dissertation, there
will be claims made about the importance of critical junctures, institutional developments,
historical events, or cultural phenomena to the outcome of same-sex marriage legalization. While
some effort will be paid to due justification of these claims, those claims will be supported within
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the context of comparative analysis. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to delve deeply into
granular analysis of any single case – though there is certainly an opportunity to do so in future.
This dissertation should be read with this trade-off in mind.
1.5

The Argument
Referring to Figure 1.2, the argument made in this dissertation is as follows. LGB citizens

within a given country perceive themselves to be part of a marginalized or oppressed group or
community with a common identity who share a common experience of inequality. Consider this
a sort of pre-condition – if LGB persons within a given country have no shared sense of community
or no shared sense of inequality, or if persons engaging in same-sex sexual relationships do not
tend to even identify as LGB, mobilization is very likely not possible, or at least much more
difficult. So, this dissertation will proceed from the defensible assumption that a shared sense of
community is required for a social movement to be born. In states which have societies that have
embraced secular and emancipative values, it becomes more likely that those social movements
advocating for equal rights claims may begin to see some success. Those domestic LGB rights
actors begin to do this by mobilizing domestic resources and taking advantage of opportunities to
build relationships with domestic political allies as well as outside groups within TANs. This
allows those groups to engage in contentious politics drawing more effectively from their
repertoires of contention. Common repertoires of contention include but are not limited to creation
of associations and coalitions for the purpose of furthering specific claims, public meetings,
solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, sit-ins, petitions, statements to and in public
media, boycotts, and strikes. Repertoires of contention are a means to an end, and in most cases,
different actors will choose different means depending in their goals, available resources, and
amount of public and/or elite support. However, their choice of actions will also be influenced and
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constrained by the opportunity structures – or the character and institutional qualities of the
political and/or judicial systems – available to them.
At this point, it is appropriate to mention another pre-condition necessary to LGB rights, and
that is democratization. Or, more specifically, polyarchy, as defined by Robert Dahl (1956, 1986)
as the form of government in which power is invested in multiple elected officials who are chosen
by free, fair, open, and regular elections and in which all adults have universal suffrage, the ability
to run for public office if they desire and also enjoy basic civil rights and liberties. Without the
condition of polyarchy in government, actors cannot effect change or properly and effectively
advocate for human rights through contentious politics. Analysis will show, however, that while
regime type is very clearly significant for same-sex marriage legalization, polyarchy alone cannot
explain legalization of same-sex marriage. Therefore, this dissertation will also treat polyarchy as
a necessary but insufficient pre-condition for legalization of same-sex marriage.
Speaking of polyarchies, while the United States of America is not a case examined in the
body of this dissertation, the legalization of same-sex marriage in the United States provides a
clear and possibly more familiar illustration of how opportunity structures can dictate the way
legalization occurs from which we can launch our analysis. In the United States, federal systems
which allocate significant power to the states made it possible for many of states to criminalize
consensual homosexual sex. In 1980 in the United States - 11 years after the Stonewall Riots - 23
states and several territories still had sodomy laws which criminalized homosexual activity, most
of which with actual prison time possible upon conviction. In addition, there was still a great deal
of cultural resistance to the idea that LGB people should be treated equally.
For example, in 1986, 57% of US respondents to a Gallup poll indicated that they felt
homosexual sex should be illegal for both men and women, and only around 19% believed that
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homosexuality was an innate characteristic (Gallup 2020). Also, around the same time, the LGB
community found themselves with a distinct lack of allies among political elites at the national
level, and very few LGB persons who served in positions of authority were publicly out as such.
For these reasons, LGB rights advocates had to resort to transgressive contentious politics to put
public pressure on political elites while simultaneously using the judicial system to advance the
equal rights claims that had no chance of success legislatively or through executive order.
The American LGB social movement finally succeeded in overturning state sodomy laws in
2003 with the Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas that held that such laws violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. But it was not until
Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015 that activists finally succeeded in winning the right for same-sex
couples to marry. The American LGB social movement had much more success in the courts than
in Congress because American courts were in a much better position to advance LGB claims than
either legislatures or executives due to certain qualities of the opportunity structures in the US.
These qualities presented a particular set of opportunities which informed the kind of options
available from among the common repertoires of contestation already listed. And, while the
possibility of the US backsliding on same-sex marriage is outside the scope of this dissertation, at
the time of this writing it is entirely possible that, with the confirmation of conservative judge Amy
Coney Barrett, the United States will see the legalization of same-sex marriage reversed, precisely
because LGB rights activists have never been able to achieve equality through subsequent
legislation or executive action as of the writing of this dissertation. What the courts giveth the
courts can take away.
But the way in which same-sex marriage came to be legalized in the US – at least on the
surface – lends some support to the hypothesis at the heart of this dissertation. Beginning with the
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homophile movement of the 1950s, American LGB persons began to conceive of themselves as a
community with a shared identity and a shared struggle born out of a shared oppression. American
LGB persons formed a social movement to advance right claims of equality. Actors within that
social movement found themselves constrained by the nature of the political and judicial
opportunities available to them and so mobilized the resources necessary to pressure political and
judicial elites for change, often through disruptive, transgressive politics. Actors within the
American LGB social movement drew support and inspiration from similar actors making equality
claims in social movements in other countries, from LGB rights in Northern Europe to anticolonial movements in the developing world. As time went on and American LGB activists began
to have some domestic success in pressing their claims, well-attended annual events like Pride
gave US actors opportunities to form relationships with social movements in other countries as
well and draw strength and legitimacy from those partnerships. This support and legitimacy
allowed for more successful navigation of the American political and judicial system, the latter of
which finally allowing actors to realize success in the legalization of same-sex marriage.
As in the US, LGB persons in Colombia and Taiwan shared a sense of common community
and common struggles against inequality. LGB SMOs in Colombia and Taiwan chose tactics from
among their repertoires of contention that made sense given the opportunity structures available to
them. These opportunities were shaped by political and historical trends. LGB SMOs in Colombia
and Taiwan had opportunities to network within TANs to gain epistemic and material support.
Data analysis strongly suggests these factors are why Colombia and Taiwan both legalized samesex marriage. But qualitative analysis is necessary to explain why Colombia and Taiwan legalized
same-sex marriage while countries like Japan and Mexico, which both score higher in both the RI
and MI, have not – though many sub-national jurisdictions in Mexico have done so.

17
Both the RI and MI are meant to help quantify and visualize the factors of friendliness to
LGB rights and the effects of modernization. Variables in both the RI and MI have been selected
based first on the review of the literature in Chapter 2 and then narrowed based on quantitative
analysis detailed in Chapter 3. Both the RI and MI are used to score all countries with data available
on each of their constituent variables (a country must have data for each variable to be used in
either index) from 1-1000. There will be more detail on this process in the research design chapter,
but for now it will suffice to say that countries which perform well – or score closer to 1000 – in
the RI are the countries in which we would expect to see same-sex marriage more likely to be
legalized. Countries which score well in the MI are also more likely to legalize same-sex marriage,
but analysis confirms that the relationship between modernization and legalization is not as strong.
In both indexes, countries are also grouped into regions and developmental clusters, based on the
work of Christian Welzel.
A cursory examination of the country ranks and scores in the RI shows that it is indeed true
that countries which score well are more likely to have legalized same-sex marriage and typically
perform better than their neighbors or similarly developed countries which have not. Surprisingly,
however, this is not the case for Taiwan and Japan (see Figure 1-3) or for Colombia and Mexico
(see Figure 1-4). In both case pairs, the non-legalizing country is friendlier to LGB equality
according to the data in the RI, and Japan is the highest scoring non-legalizer and the only country
to score over 810 that has not legalized same-sex marriage. In the case of Colombia and Mexico,
both score very similarly in each variable in the RI, yet Colombia legalized first while Mexico still
has not. In addition, in both case pairs, the non-legalizer is more modern, according to the data in
the MI. This means that both modernization theory as operationalized in the MI and friendliness
to LGB equality as operationalized in the RI suggest that Japan and Mexico should have legalized
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first. As this dissertation will show in more detail later, it is this unexpected outcome combined
with the first adopter status of both Taiwan and Colombia that make the case-pairs of TaiwanJapan and Colombia-Mexico suitable and appropriate for studying the puzzle and question with
which this dissertation is concerned.

Figure 1-3: Japan and Taiwan Compared

Figure 1-4: Colombia and Mexico Compared
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1.6

Summary
Conditions which make same-sex marriage legalization more likely are – 1) a minimal

level of emancipative and secular values, 2) high LGB mobilization capacity, and 3) the presence
of opportunities for Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) to form partnerships with domestic
actors. These factors increase the likelihood that domestic social movement organizations (SMOs)
acting within their movement will use contentious politics to put pressure on elites through existing
opportunity structures – either legal or political – to accept the norm or LGB equality thus making
it more likely that same-sex marriage will be legalized. A review of literature touching on these
conditions as well as on same-sex marriage legalization will be used to identify independent
variables to operationalize these conditions. These variables will be used to construct an index, the
Rainbow Index (RI), to measure and visualize country performance in each of these variables,
scoring them on a scale of 1-1000 and then ranking them appropriately based on those scores to
determine each country’s friendliness to LGB equality. Likewise, the Modernization Index (MI)
will be created and used to test the alternative hypothesis that the effects of modernization, and not
friendliness to LGB equality, is more predictive of legalization.
Quantitative analysis will test the validity of the RI and its efficacy at predicting likelihood
of same-sex marriage legalization. The RI will also be used to help identify case pairings with
first-adopter countries. These case-pairs will be examined using qualitative analysis methods. Case
studies will explain why, even though quantitative analysis proves the RI is predictive of the
likelihood of same-sex marriage legalization, Colombia and Taiwan have legalized even though
the RI identified countries which should have been more likely to do so.
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2

LITERATURE REVIEW

same-sex marriage legalization, being a young phenomenon, is a newer area of study in
political science. Much of the literature that does exist is country or region specific, and there has
been little published work to-date to embark on cross-regional or global analysis of the topic. This
dissertation aims to fill this gap in the literature. This chapter reviews the state of the literature
relevant to both the hypothesis and to the alternative hypothesis, and will be drawing from diverse
areas of study, including queer studies, values and modernization, social movements and
contentious politics, resource mobilization, and transnational advocacy networks and norm
diffusion. This chapter will then discuss literature on opportunity structures and put the whole
picture together, based on the literature.
2.1

LGB Identity and Heteronormativity
For most of the history of the modern state, laws governing romantic relationships and

family life have operated according to the principle of heteronormativity. Heteronormativity is the
assumption that society and law should be arranged around heterosexual mores, gender roles, and
institutions. In a heteronormative world, it is assumed that men and women will be naturally
sexually attracted to one another and that they will want to marry and have children, thus ensuring
the continuation of their society and of that society’s values, norms, and customs as they are passed
on from parent to child. In a heteronormative world, those attracted to the same sex go against that
assumption, or against the “natural order” because they have an innate desire to behave sexually
and romantically in non-heteronormative ways. Either they may find themselves attracted to
members of the same sex occasionally or exclusively, or they may find themselves lacking in
sexual attraction at all. For either of these reasons, in a heteronormative world it is assumed that
these people, being non-heterosexual, are less likely, if at all, to (naturally) have children.
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Therefore, persons attracted to members of the same sex, or persons not sexually attracted to
anyone at all, may not contribute to the future survival of their society or its values, norms, and
customs because they will not pass those traditions on to the children they do not have. Therefore,
the notion of heteronormativity implicitly demands the association of heterosexuality with life and
of homosexuality with death – the death of institutions, of traditions, of the family, and of society
itself (Feit 2011). In 2004, senators in the United States debated adding the following language to
the Constitution:
“Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and
a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be
construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
any union other than the union of a man and a woman.” (Congress.gov).
The notion of heteronormativity is why debate around this issue would be given any
priority at all, or why, when asked, one of the sponsors of the above language would characterize
the “threat” posed by same-sex marriage (same-sex marriage) as an existential one comparable to
that posed by global terrorism (Feit 2011). same-sex marriage, in the eyes of its opponents,
threatens to undermine the very mechanism by which societies survive: the passing on of shared
values and history through procreation. In other words, for the sponsors of the Federal Marriage
Amendment (FMA) referenced above, it is as much of or more of an existential threat to American
civilization as Russian election interference, North Korean missiles, or al Qaeda sleeper-cells.
In a heteronormative world, heterosexuality is the expected norm and can often be the only
socially acceptable orientation for sexual, romantic, and familial aspects of life. Heterosexuality is
therefore often used as a social and political standard and is applied when judging the worth of an
individual and that individual’s eligibility for inclusion, acceptance, social status, legal rights, and
even employment (Corrales and Pecheny 2010). But, in modern societies sexual attraction can be
much more than simply what one does in the bedroom to whom or for whom. Table 2 on the
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following page demonstrates how sexual desire may inform sexual identity. In other words, in an
existence in which non-heterosexual people find themselves marginalized by heteronormativity,
their sexual desires can inform how they conceive of themselves – they may come to see
themselves as LGB. In a heteronormative society, the primary political concern for LGB persons
tends to be the ability to act on their sexual desires and express their sexual identities free from
persecution or discrimination, especially since those desires do not conform to heteronormative
notions (Corrales and Pecheny 2010).
In Latin American states, for example, this notion of heteronormativity has led to the dual
ideologies of machismo and marianismo. Machismo demands that men behave in traditionally
masculine ways: they are the authoritarian heads-of-household and have the luxury of sexual
freedom and sexual appetites, up to and including infidelity, but they are also expected to have
wives and children and provide financially for their families through sufficiently gainful
employment; while marianismo demands that women be sexually faithful to their husbands and
act as the spiritual and emotional guardians of the home and the nurturers and protectors of their
children (Tiano and Shea, 2021). These notions of gender roles, with some minor variations, are
not unique to Latin America. But they do put non-heterosexual people in the position of having to
defy those norms, and their desires are not recognized as equally valid and worthy of recognition,
they may find themselves socially, economically, and even politically penalized. The underlying
assumptions of heteronormativity that go with those gender norms are challenged by the public
demand that non-heterosexual sexual identities be socially and politically recognized as equally
valid as heterosexual ones (Corrales and Pecheny 2010).
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Table 2-1: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

Source: Corrales and Pecheney 2010: page 4.
It is important to understand this reality because it not only informs the struggle for equality for
LGB persons, but it also necessitates it. Same-sex desire has been documented in every human
society in every part of the planet and in every historical epoch. However, the notion of a sexual
identity – that a man might think of himself as gay and that “being gay” is part of who he is in a
fundamental and important way – is as far as we know a relatively recent phenomenon. In other
words, there is a difference between a same-sex sexual act and an embrace of an identity built at
least in part around the desire to engage in that act. One could even argue that the oppression itself
creates the need for identity and that as industrialization necessitated the migration of young people
away from their homes in the countryside and into cities, the bonds of kinship and the influence
of tradition came to have less of a hold over the decisions to act (or to avoid acting) on same-sex
desires that are indeed quite natural in the human animal.
So, those persons with a sexual attraction to someone of the same sex, either exclusively
or not, or for whom gender expression deviates from the heteronormative, are classified as LGB –
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and more importantly will tend to classify themselves as such – when those desires and forms of
gender expression transcend into a social and political identity. Men and women may behave in
ways that are contrary to heteronormative assumptions regarding “proper” sexual behavior and/or
gender roles, for example men who publicly identify as heterosexual may discretely have sex with
other men. If, and only if, an identity is formed around those non-heteronormative behaviors are
those men (and women) considered LGB. One of the ways in which that identity is created is
through the process of “coming out” publicly as LGB – itself a political act – which is enabled and
reinforced through the process of creating publications, community centers, web sites and other
aspects of LGB urban life which give and create meaning for LGB persons, and in participating in
Pride parades and demonstrations that provide much needed visibility (Friedman 2010; Josephson
and Marques 2017:241). This is referred to as “queer world making” (Josephson and Marques
2017). Heteronormativity and coming out are political in the poststructuralist sense of the word,
i.e. they are determined by the processes, regimes, or logics of language, knowledge, and power
inherent in conducting politics within any given society (Varela, Dhawan, and Engel 2011). It is
therefore necessary for these concepts to be considered as part of any analysis of LGB rights –
indeed the concepts are crucial to understanding the nature of the very formation of an LGB
identity that makes rights advocacy and acquisition possible. And this identity is very real. As
societies within industrializing or industrialized states began to embrace non-traditional, nonsecurity-oriented value systems, individuals were likely to begin to feel more comfortable acting
on those desires or accepting others who did.
2.2

Values and Modernization
What creates the necessary environment that allows for successful challenge of

heteronormative assumptions about marriage and relationships? As states industrialize, or
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modernize, the societies within tend to adopt new value systems. They turn away from the
traditional, religious, and security-oriented values of their forebears and embrace more secular,
rational, and self-expressive values (Inglehart and Welzel 2014). The work of the WVS, which
will be discussed later in this section, attempts to capture and measure this movement from the
traditional to the rational, the religious to the secular, and the security-oriented to the selfexpressive. The WVS grew out of observations made by modernization theory.
Modernization theory holds that there are five stages of growth for a society: traditional,
pre-conditions for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity, and mass consumption (Rostow 1960). In
a traditional society, economic activity is based on “pre-Newtonian science and technology” and
accompanying “pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world.” (Rostow 1960; 4). In
traditional societies, a very high proportion of resources need to be devoted to agriculture, and
because of this these societies typically also feature a closed, hierarchical social structure and a
great deal of importance placed on family. Once a society enters pre-conditions for take-of,
advances in society allow for technological revolutions in agriculture and improvements in
transportation and communication technologies allows for the building of an effective, centralized
state and for the challenging of existing hierarchical structures.
In addition, increased social mobility brings with it an abandonment of the fatalistic
worldview of traditional societies. When a society enters the take-off phase its political and
economic elites begin to regard growth and modernization as a national priority, as “serious, highorder political business.” During take-off, national savings rates rise, rates of urbanization and
industrialization increase, and the basic social, political, and economic structure of the society are
transformed in such a way to make sustained growth and advancement possible. During the drive
to maturity, investments in technological advancements allow for the escape from the cycle of
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Malthusian catastrophes when it becomes possible to for output to regularly outstrip demand.
Industrial processes diversify and become more complex and able to specialize in chosen industries
as a matter of political choice rather than necessity. During the stage of mass-consumption,
economies further diversify to include the production of durable consumer goods and services.

Figure 2-1: Stages of Modernization
Understanding modernization theory is important to understanding the role of development
of post-modern or empowering values. This is because the effects of modernization are not
confined to the merely economic. As states become industrialized and more prosperous, cultural
values within their societies shift. Analysis using WVS data has shown that economic development
is associated with shifts in values towards increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, and participatory
sets of principles (Inglehart 1971, Inglehart 1990, Inglehart and Baker 2000). Indeed, by the time
a state has reached Stage 5: Mass Consumption, the economic specialization of labor, increased
levels of education, and increased incomes are expected to lead to predictable outcomes like gender
equality and tolerance for sexual minorities (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2001).
However, while the transition from poverty and underdevelopment to prosperity and mass
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consumption does tend to correlate well with increased tolerance, secularism, rationalism, and free
expression as modernization theorists supposed, analysis also reveals that some cultural values can
be “sticky” and that change in these values is more path dependent, with societies holding on to
certain traditional values much longer and more doggedly than modernization theory would
otherwise predict. The WVS divides the world up into cultural zones (see Figure 2-2), and this is
because states with histories of Protestant or Orthodox or Islamic or Confucian traditions manifest
distinctive value systems within their societies that persist after controlling for the effects of
economic development and are much more tenacious in the face of modernization than would
otherwise be supposed.

Figure 2-2: World Values Survey Cultural Map (2020)
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It turns out that states within these cultural zones progress towards modernization occurs
along similar trajectories informed by these sticky value systems that persist through the stages of
modernization. Interestingly, within the parameters allowed by the sticky values within these
cultural zones, this relationship between modernization and tolerance goes both ways: while
modernization leads to greater tolerance for LGB persons, greater tolerance can be an excellent
predictor of future development in an ever-globalizing world in which artists, scientists,
innovators, and entrepreneurs with the freedom to travel find themselves attracted to more tolerant
environments (Florida 2012, 2014). It is therefore not so much a linear relationship as it is a cycle
of continuous development supported by increasing levels of tolerance.
Modernization theory also provides our alternative hypothesis, that a combination of three
factors; rational and expressive (or post-modern) values, a modern economy marked by high levels
of wealth and industrialization, and a modern society marked by high levels of urbanization as
well as high literacy rates and advanced means of communication; make same-sex marriage
legalization more likely. Indeed, Robert Inglehart observes that industrialization and the
accompanying urbanization, specialization, and increased levels of education, tends to have the
effect of making a country more modern, which is to say in the case of this dissertation more likely
to extend tolerance and equality to LGB persons (1997).
2.3

Human Empowerment
Building on the work of the WVS and modernization theorists, there is research that

attempts to quantify the concept of human empowerment as derived from emancipative values, or
the universal human desire for an existence “free from domination” and secular values, or the
willingness to question and/or demystify traditional sources of authority (Welzel 2013: 2). Since
the Industrial Revolution, individuals in industrialized and post-industrialized states experience
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improved living conditions due to economic development, and with those improved conditions
comes a transformation in their way of life. Life for these individuals transforms “from a source
of threats to a source of opportunities, shifting from a struggle to survive to a drive to thrive”
(Welzel 2013: 2). In such an environment, homosexuality and other “benign forms of norm
deviation” are more tolerated (Welzel 2013). This way of operationalizing values should not be
confused with the rational and expressive values of modernization theory, as those values are more
concerned with movement away from the priorities of security and tradition. Though, certainly
Welzel’s construction of values would not be out of place were it adopted by modernization
theorists as a substitute for rational and expressive values. Indeed, Welzel and Inglehart worked
closely together to create the WVS.
As emancipative and secular values continue to take hold as a state modernizes, they make
possible social movements aimed at achieving equal opportunity, but these values must be
combined with two other elements of human empowerment for true progress towards equality to
occur, action resources and civic entitlement. In the language of social movements that will be
discussed further on this chapter, we might think of these as elements of the opportunity structure.
Action resources enhance the individual’s ability to exercise freedom, while civic entitlement
empowers the individual institutionally (Welzel 2013). As existential threats fade with increased
levels of development, action resources such as knowledge, skills, information, networks of
exchange, equipment, tools, and income increase. Emancipative values, such as an emphasis on
freedom of choice and a desire for a more egalitarian society also emerge. Civic entitlements, such
as the right to vote, or the right to engage in collective action, complete the empowerment cycle
and, together with awakening emancipative values and action resources, form a self-sustaining
cycle of human empowerment (Welzel 2013).
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Table 2-2-2: Culture Zones
and
of Human Empowerment
Empowerment
HumanStages
Stages of
Culture Zones
Islamic East
Indic East
Sinic East

Suffering Stage
Low
Algeria, Iran, Iraq,
Bangladesh,
Vietnam
Azerbaijan

Orthodox East

Modicum-Low
Egypt, Jordan,
India, Malaysia
China
Albania, Armenia,
Belarus, Bosnia,
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan,

Struggling Stage
Modicum

Thriving Stage
Modicum High

Philippines,
South Korea, Taiwan Japan
Hong Kong
Macedonia, Moldova, Bulgaria
Romania
Cyprus, Greece,
Israel

Old West

Reformed West

New West
Returned West
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Zambia
Sub-Saharan Africa Nigeria, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda,
Guatemala, Venezuela Colombia, Mexico,
Latin America
Peru

Croatia, Latvia,
Lithuania

Estonia

Andorra, Austria,
Belgium, Estonia,
France, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg,
Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Iceland,
Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden,
Australia, Canada,
New Zealand,
Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland,

South Africa

Brazil, Chile,
Dominican Republic,
El Salvador

Argentina, Trinidad- Uruguay
Tobago

Like the values captured in the WVS, the processes of human empowerment can be
grouped in cultural zones (see Table 2-2). But, Welzel adds another dimension to his comparison
which is the stage of human empowerment a country finds itself in. As indicated earlier, this second
dimension has just as much to do with institutions as it does with values. It is this use of two
comparative dimensions that will inform the division of countries in both the RI and MI which
will be detailed later in Chapter 3.
It should be noted that the comparative study of values is not without its criticisms. Some
recent research suggests that comparing values across cultural groups is too problematic because
there are factors unique to each group that aren’t quantified in the WVS data (Alemán and Woods
2015). More traditional critiques include the observation that comparing different, opposing value
sets (material vs. post-material; traditional vs. rational-secular; survival vs. self-expressive, etc.) is
only valid within certain time frames for cultures that have recently emerged, meaning that, “the
equality-freedom orientation underlying the ideologies or political orientations selected for study
here, it may be argued, can surely not be generalized to ideologies that prevailed a thousand years
ago or to those that might prevail a thousand years hence” (Rokeach 1973, 186). Indeed, we cannot
even measure human values from 1900, when many early and mid-industrializers were busily
moving up the developmental ladder (Abramson 2011). Others argue that the transition to
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rationalism or emancipation or secularism is not a “sharp-edged sword” that cuts the past and
future apart from one another (Calista 184, Abramson 2011). However, critics also point out that
it is enough to be aware of the limitations in the data and to avoid drawing too deterministic a
conclusion, especially since it is clear both Inglehart and Welzel have clearly tapped into a
measurable phenomenon, even if the current best measure is imperfect (Abramson 2011, Alemán
and Woods 2015).
There are a few notable exceptions when it comes to same-sex marriage legalization that
strongly suggest relying on values alone to explain the phenomenon would be a mistake. For
example, in the Sinic East, Taiwan has made greater strides towards same-sex marriage than Japan
has, even though Japan is at a higher stage of human empowerment. In the Old West, Andorra,
Estonia, Italy, and Malta do not recognize same-sex marriage, but Austria, France, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain do. Switzerland does not recognize same-sex marriage, though
all the rest of the thriving states in the Reformed West do, and all states in the New West recognize
same-sex marriage. In Latin America, Colombia recognizes same-sex marriage though it is a lowmodicum struggling country, while Chile, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador – all of which
are further along on the Human Empowerment cycle – do not.
Failure in the United States to grant homosexuals equal marriage rights through legislation,
and the backlash to judicial decisions that have extended those rights despite higher levels of selfexpressive values, is due to the combination of several factors, including: America’s
fundamentalist strain of Protestantism, American religiosity, the presence of “social constituencies
threatened by declining status in capitalist economies who strike out against symbols of modernity
in a politics of resentment”, the power of corporate capitalism and corresponding weakness of the
American labor/social democracy movement, and nationalist rhetoric that equates survival of
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American culture and power with the survival of the heteronormative family (Adam 2003). In
contrast, the comparatively clearer success of gay rights movements in Canada at securing samesex marriage rights may be the result of a relatively weak religious right, low levels of conservative
religiosity, the existence of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a historical recognition
of “de facto” or common-law couples, an extensive welfare state, a strong labor movement, and
an acceptance of diversity (Rayside 2007). It is interesting that WVS data shows Canada as slightly
less secular than the United States but significantly farther along the survival vs. self-expression
axis.
In addition, a study of tolerance for homosexuals in 35 European states shows that
economic development leads to more tolerance among those who benefit most from that
development – high levels of economic inequality lead to reduced levels of social trust and
consequently intolerance (Anderson and Fetner 2008). Thus, there is at least some research to
suggest that economic inequality is at least as important a factor in predicting tolerance as
movement along the traditional vs. secular axis and the survival vs. self-expression axis in any
given country. It is certainly true that economic inequality may fluctuate over time within societies,
but other research has also borne out that when levels of economic inequality rise above a certain
point, the resulting concentration of wealth and accompanying political power and opportunity can
cause social and economic instability (Picketty 2013).
Therefore, based on the available literature, the values present within a state are not enough
to explain the outcome of same-sex marriage alone, but they do make it possible for LGB activists
to begin to mobilize for a number of reasons. First, a society that embraces emancipative and
secular values is more likely to produce individuals willing to challenge the state and demand
equality. Also, a society that embraces emancipative and secular values is more likely to produce
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those who might be sympathetic to the cause, especially at first when support is crucial. Third, as
the struggle for equality continues, the ability to mobilize public support for the cause of LGB
equality in general or same-sex marriage in particular (though, it could be any of number of
particular causes) can be a potent weapon as actors within the movement engage with elites. Also,
a shift in attitudes from rejection to acceptance can help cement long-term success of a social
movement in securing lasting change (Dietz et al. 1989; Johnston et al. 1994; Stern et al. 1999).
But, before any of this can happen, actors must mobilize, and social movements must be formed.
For that, they need a reason.
2.4

Mobilization Capacity and Social Movements
Identity is socially constructed: people draw their sense of identity from the groups and

social networks of which they are already are part and this identity allows for the creation of a
positive vision of themselves and of their group (Hirshman 2013). From these positive visions,
members of a group can form a desire to change the way the larger society perceives them, and in
cases in which members of the same group come to understand that they are excluded or persecuted
because of their identity, that group has a reason to organize into a movement (Hirshman 2013).
LGB rights movements have a history stretching back over a century to the founding of the
Scientific-Humanitarian Committee in Berlin in 1897 by Magnus Hirschfield, which was
organized to repeal a German law which criminalized homosexual sex between men (Adam,
Duyvendak, and Krouwel 1999). The modern LGB movement owes its genesis to the rise of the
New Left in the 1960s and 1970s, which grew out of the Civil Rights Movement in the United
States and nationalist anti-colonial movements in Africa and Asia, which included environmental
movements, feminist movements, student movements, and gay liberation movements in North
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America, Western Europe, Latin America, and even Japan, though at this time gay liberation
movements were virtually unknown in Africa and Asia (Adam, Duyvendak, and Krouwel 1999).
The status shared by members of the LGB community as that of pariahs and outcasts in
every sense imaginable – indeed collectively as an existential threat to the very survival of the
nation – as well as a shared sense of identity provided the conditions for gays and lesbians (and
later bisexuals and transgendered) to form social movements and advocate for more equal
treatment. However, the kind of identity politics necessary to create an LGB movement is the result
of modern forces previously alluded to or discussed: the rise of post-industrial capitalism and a
world-system that breaks traditional kinship bonds and atomizes communities (Pichardo 1997;
Adam, Duyvendak, and Krouwel 1999; Hirshman 2013). Nevertheless, shared identity is an
important first step to mobilization and movement formation. It is a precondition for the social
movement to emerge.
But a shared identity alone is not enough. To move individuals who identify as LGB to
cooperative action, there must be a crisis, a cause around which to rally that calls members to
action. For the modern LGB movement, this was The Stonewall Riots of 1969. For three days gay
men, lesbians, and transgendered persons rioted against the New York City police department. The
immediate cause was a raid conducted by the NYPD on a well-known gay bar, The Stonewall Inn.
These raids were not uncommon, and often they occurred without incident. Patrons and employees
could be jailed, their names and photographed published in local papers all but ensuring an end to
their lives as they knew them as many were not out. However, one can easily imagine the
simmering rage and festering desperation building up within members of the LGB community who
found themselves ostracized in every way and victimized by the very agents of the state that were
supposed to protect them. Same-sex attracted persons could not love one another openly – to do
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so risked economic ruin, physical harm, imprisonment, or even death. When LGB persons did find
themselves victims of a crime, for example getting mugged in a park while cruising for sex (more
common in the days of greater oppression when casual and anonymous sex was preferable) or
being attacked while coming out of a gay bar, they were unable to go to police for help. So, the
1969 raid on the Stonewall Inn was simply one act of oppression too many. This was the turning
point, or coalescence, of the modern LGB movement as we know it (see Figure 2-3). Indeed, New
York City’s first Gay Rights March was held on the anniversary of the start of the riots, June 28,
and this marks the date of many Pride demonstrations across the world to this day.5
The simplest way to explain social movements is to begin by understanding that not all
members of a community are members of the movement. Which is to say that big things come
from small beginnings. Actors within the movement are adherents; those who contribute resources
to help mobilize the movement are constituents; and those who watch from the sidelines are
bystanders (Edwards and Gillham 2013). The initial challenge for the nascent movement is to turn
bystanders into constituents and constituents into adherents, and indeed this remains a challenge
throughout the lifecycle of the movement. There are four stages to a social movement: 1)
emergence, 2) coalescence, 3) bureaucratization, and finally 4) decline, which can be brought
about by any one of several possible outcomes as a result of the movement, including success,
failure, cooptation, repression, and the movement going mainstream (see Figure 2-3) (Blumer
1969; Mauss 1975; Tilly 1978; and Christiansen 2009).

5
For more on the riots and their effect on LGBQ culture and identity, see Stonewall: The Riots That Sparked
the Gay Revolution by David Carter (2010); The Stonewall Reader edited by the New York Public Library (2019);
Stonewall: The Definitive Story of the LGBQ Rights Uprising that Changed America by Martin Duberman (2019); as
well as “Stonewall then and now” from the Harvard Gazette and “The Stonewall Riots (June 28, 1969)” from the
Georgetown University Law School series on A Brief History of Civil Rights in the United States.
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Figure 2-3: Lifecycle of Social Movements

During the emergence stage of a social movement, there will be widespread feelings of
discontent shared by members of the community, and there may even be sporadic, disorganized
action taken on the part of individuals, but the movement in this stage is unorganized and lacks
any formal goals, strategies, or tactics. However, there can also be social movement organizations
(SMOs) formed in this stage and they can be active on a small scale, but they lack a united sense
of purpose or the authority to speak for large segments of the population in any real sense (De la

Porta and Diani, 2006; Christiansen 2009; Hopper, 1950). Two examples of SMOs during the
emergence stage of a social movement for the LGB rights movement would be the Mattachine
Society6 and the Daughters of Bilitis7. Both organizations had some successes and were certainly
valuable to their adherents and constituents during the emergence stage of the movement, but
neither organization could offer anything capable of harnessing, channeling, or focusing the kind
of popular excitement that comes during the coalescent stage.

The Mattachine Society was a “homophile organization” founded by American communist Harry Hay who,
together with Dale Jennings and other founding members, was responsible for some of the early movement’s few
victories, including a legal victory while fighting police entrapment, common at the time, targeting homosexuals. For
more information, see Hay’s obituary here and Jennings’s obituary here.
7
Daughters of Bilitis was also a “homophile organization” and the first lesbian rights organization in the
United States. The group, founded by lovers Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon, made it their mission to educate lesbian
women and gay men about their rights and about the history of homosexuality. Lyon and Martin were the first samesex couple to be married in San Francisco after then mayor Gavin Newsom ordered the city to begin issuing marriage
licenses for same-sex couples. For more information, see the GLBT Archives here.
6
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During the coalescent stage of a social movement, the feelings of discontent present in the
emergence stage become more focused. Action, when taken, is no longer undertaken by
disorganized groups of individuals acting sporadically, but is the result of organized, purposeful
effort. This effort is made possible by new opportunities that present themselves to adherents of
the movement. For the LGB movement, The Stonewall Riots were the exogenous shock to the
system the movement needed – that event created an opening for contentious politics. For the first
time on a public scale, members of the movement stood up and fought back, so the narrative goes.
SMOs that take a leadership role during this stage do so because they are able to frame the struggle
for LGB equality in an optimistic way to suggest to both constituents and bystanders that change
is possible through collective action, thus converting bystanders to constituents and constituents
to adherents (Christiansen 2009; Tilly, McAdam, and Tarrow 2001). Successful framing of the
struggle allows for organized action to be taken. The first gay pride demonstration, called the
Christopher Street Liberation Day, was held in New York City on the anniversary of the Stonewall
Riots. Groups like the Gay Liberation Front (GLF) emerged to take leadership roles in the
coalescing movement, and their politics were caught up in and informed by the revolutionary
politics of the era (Hirshman 2013; Christiansen 2009).
Bureaucratization is a stage of social movement in which SMOs become more formalized,
with higher levels of organization and coalition-building strategies. SMOs in this stage have
professional staffs with specialized skills who are responsible for running the day-to-day
operations of the organizations. Social movements in the bureaucratization stage cannot simply
rely on mass rallies or inspirational leaders alone to make progress on their rights claims or
overcome the free rider problem to build memberships and constituencies. SMOs within
bureaucratizing social movements rely on trained employees to carry out the activities and business
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of the organizations, for many reasons. In the first case, the bureaucratization phase is often a time
when political power is greater than in the previous stages in that SMOs may have more regular
access to political elites willing to move legislation or regulations friendly to their agendas
forward. Additionally, SMOs of a movement in the bureaucratization stage often have access to
larger pools of resources, including money, then enthusiastic volunteers can be expected to manage
effectively. Movements that do not reach the bureaucratization phase often fade away or are
absorbed within other movements (Christensen 2009; De la Porta and Diani, 2006; Macionis,
2001; Hopper, 1950). The decline stage is less relevant to this research, but when studying
backsliding on LGB rights claims, it becomes necessary to examine the ways in which movements
can decline.
Another facet of the social movement literature known as resource mobilization theory
(RMT) holds that groups with a common grievance will seek to mobilize resources and act to
redress this grievance (Edwards and Gilham 2013). RMT holds that resources are unevenly
distributed in any society, and groups must overcome this inequality through one or more of four
means: self-production; aggregation; appropriation; and/or patronage (Edwards and Gilham 2011).
In response to structural and cultural marginalization, disadvantaged or persecuted groups must
identify strategies that they perceive will meet their needs while challenging structures that
constrain their freedom. These strategies typically include developing and mobilizing resources,
constructing alternative ideological frameworks, and creating organizations and institutions
capable of opposing existing institutions and the barriers they create – all aimed at achieving higher
levels of equality (Rimmerman 2015). While RMT is generally considered to have been supplanted
by the NSM and opportunity literatures, initial research does indicate that RMT may yet hold some
value for studying the LGB movement. In studying LGB movements with an added RMT
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component recognizes the importance of resources in social advocacy. The incorporation of an
RMT approach allows estimates of LGB populations, the presence of openly gay public officials
and candidates for public office and the number of gay bars and gay-oriented services in each
community to be used as indicators of the mobilizing potential of the LGB communities being
studied (Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996). The presence of gay bars in major urban areas are crucial
to mobilization, especially in the emergent and coalescent stages of the movement. This is because
LGB persons face a disadvantage in the development and mobilization of resources (and indeed
the creation of a common unifying identity) because the social pressure to hide their identity
frequently denies them the use of family, workplace or neighborhood as a venue for socialization
to group consciousness and mobilization – all options available to many other marginalized
groups. “To the degree that gay people – or at least gay men – have a functional equivalent of the
ghetto, the factory, or the church, it is the gay bar” (Sherrill 1993; Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996).
Research shows that gay bars, especially in a populous or capital city, are essential to SMOs in the
emergence and coalescence phases – or first and second phases – of a social movement (Altman
1982; D’Emilio 1983; Haeberle 1989; Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996; Hirshman 2012).
Part of the reason why is that the gay bar tends to be the first place to offer any kind of a
haven for LGB persons. As early as the 15th Century, the bar has been a relatively – and often only
– safe space for non-heterosexuals to gather. Social networks of men who sought out other male
sexual partners are documented in Italian cities, like Florence, as early as the 15 th Century. In
London, these early gay bars were called “molly houses” in the 1700s, and just like in Florence
they were places where mostly gay men could meet and openly discuss their lives and begin to
form what Benedict Anderson calls an imagined community, which is a necessary precursor for a
social movement. To quote an English historian about molly houses:
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Men referred to each other as sisters and using the female pronoun.
The mollies had ‘children’, sisters, and husbands. They created their
own kinships and family networks. There is a long tradition of
homosexuals creating a chosen family with whom they can be open
and vulnerable about identity and desire” (McKee 2020).
Gay bars are not simply places where LGB people go to get a drink and find
companionship. In a sense, gay bars have always been political, in that simply identifying as nonheterosexual and engaging in same-sex sexual activity is an act of defiance in a city or country that
criminalizes such relationships. Gay bars tend to be central to LGB life. Turning away from the
Colombia case for a moment, Glbtq, the world’s largest encyclopedia of LGB culture and history,
writes this about gay bars in the U.S.:
Historians have suggested that the formation of in-group solidarity,
centered on bar life, in the face of social hostility encouraged the
formation of a political consciousness around sexual difference
during the1950s and 1960s. Some bar owners of the time, such as
Dixie Fasnacht, owner of Dixie's Bar of Music in New Orleans, were
known for their support of their patrons, frequently dispatching
attorneys and bail money when they were harassed by police during
periodic “clean up” campaigns (Johnson and Sommers 2015).
In response to police harassment, early SMOs like the San Francisco Tavern Guild were formed
in the 1950s. In 1961, José Sarria, a drag performer at the Black Cat Cafe in North Beach,
California ran for a seat on the city's Board of Supervisors, with the Tavern Guild’s endorsement
and support. He thus becoming the first openly gay political candidate, over two decades before
Harvey Milk succeeded in being elected to the same municipal body – also with the support of San
Francisco gay bars (Hirshman 2012; Johnson and Sommers 2015). However, beginning in the
1980s as the LGB social movement began to bureaucratize, partly in response to the AIDS
epidemic, gay bars slowly declined in importance as institutions around which activism was
centered. That being the case, gay bars are still places where contacts can be made, support
networks can be formed, and money can be raised for any number of causes from HIV/AIDS
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related charities and NGOs to political campaigns for LGB or LGB candidates to funds for
individual LGB persons who have fallen on hard times.
Research conducted on anti-discrimination legislation in U.S. states and cities reveals that
gay bars and other LGB-oriented services matter. Gay bars serve as “alternate structures for the
generation of gay consciousness, community, and identity” and make it significantly more likely
that those municipalities will enact anti-discrimination ordinances or legislation (see Table 2-3, a
reproduction of Table 2 from Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996).
Table 2-3: Regression Models on Anti-Discrimination Ordinances and Gay Bars

Source: Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996
That same research shows that constituencies with anti-discrimination ordinances
protecting LGB persons, on average, had two-to-three times more such businesses than their
comparative communities that did not have such ordinances in place. In fact, those communities
were 47% more likely to enact anti-discrimination ordinances protected LGB citizens for each
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increase of 1 in the standard deviation (Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996). Put succinctly, visible
gay businesses make communities more tolerant, and bars are of particular importance. So, while
there is little cross-national research on the importance of gay bars in LGB politics outside of this
dissertation, the research that does exist clearly shows that these establishments are more than just
watering holes or places where people meet for romance, even if their influence wanes as the
movement bureaucratizes.
In addition, even though these establishments may no longer serve as the focal point for
SMOs once their movements have bureaucratized, many LGB persons believe that the gay bar’s
survival is essential to maintaining a distinct culture. Often located in what has been termed the
“gayborhood”, gay bars can serve as repositories for movement history, havens for nonheterosexual persons, and public signifiers of the culture. Gayborhoods – which arose out of the
need for LGB persons to escape discrimination and persecution for the relative safety of
community through proximity – are havens for queer culture so important in identity formation.
Some examples include Boystown in Chicago, The Castro in San Francisco, Darlinghurst in
Sydney, the Faubourg Marigny in the French Quarter of New Orleans, Eixample in Barcelona,
Ipanema in Rio De Janeiro, the Le Marais in Paris, Soho in London, West Hollywood in Los
Angeles, and the West Village in New York City (Heidemann 2015). All these gayborhoods have
considerable concentrations of gay bars. In the last Chapter, the Ximending District of Taipei is
one such gayborhood that continues to be a focal point of LGB activism and culture.
According to research, 56% of American LGB respondents believe the gayborhoods in
their cities should be preserved as a way of protecting a distinct LGB culture (Pew Research Center
2013). Returning to the case of Colombia, while there has not yet been much research conducted
exclusively on the role gay bars specifically played in Bogota in the run-up to same-sex marriage
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legalization, enough research on the importance of bars to LGB social movements and comparative
examples from other countries and sub-national constituencies make it a defensible supposition
that gay bars in Bogota played a similarly important role. Future case study research into this
specific topic should be conducted to confirm this later.
Gay bars, if big enough and successful enough, can even help draw international attention
to LGB SMOs and their struggles. Consider that the Stonewall Inn in New York City is a U.S.
federal landmark but is also a tourist destination for LGB travelers from around the world, which
can serve to increase international exposure for domestic rights advocates or causes. But, even in
the face of the existing research which makes a compelling case that gay bars are important to the
outcome, they are an inelegant proxy for LGBT community-building potential in the mobilization
process. And since most gay bars in the cases examined tend to cater to men, it is also possible
that this is an example of universalizing the male experience in LGB identity formation. These
limitations are recognized for want of a conceptually more inclusive operationalization.
Technology also provides a way for LGB citizens and activists to mobilize. Of particular
use to LGB activists in Latin America, and elsewhere, was the increased availability of the internet
since 2000, which allowed homosexuals to meet, converse, advocate, and build communities in
relative anonymity and across great distances (Friedman 2010). The ability to do these things
online shielded them from the public scorn, persecution, or even violence they sometimes faced in
the machismo/marianismo-dominated societies in which they lived, and Latin American LGB
activists made full use of this opportunity to publish newsletters and websites dedicated to gay and
lesbian issues, to LGB advocacy, and to the challenges individuals faced in coming out. (Friedman
2010). But, more than that, it allowed rights activists to add LGB concerns to the ongoing dialogues
with TANs in a way that might not have been possible through an in-person meeting or the
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attendance of conferences, particularly during early waves of liberalization in the region (Friedman
2010; Duarte 2012). The creation of these online communities often served as foundational for
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to gain the support networks needed to empower them to come out
more publicly and advocate more forcefully not just for LGB equality within heterosexual societies
but for greater equality within the LGB movement as well.
Once mobilized, the repertoires of contention that SMOs can employ beginning in the
coalescence stage can be either transgressive in nature – such as sit ins, demonstrations, or
boycotts; or they can be contained in nature – such as parades or public statements to the media
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Opp2009). The exact actions undertaken by an SMO will
depend largely on the kinds of resources they are able to mobilize, the opportunities for action, the
perceived threats the SMO can respond to, and the degree to which the SMO is able to frame itself
as a credible leader in the movement and the struggle in optimistic terms – collective action has a
purpose and is aimed at an achievable goal (see Figure 2-4 reproduced from McAdam, Tarrow,
and Tilly 2001). A counterfactual example of this principle would be to imagine an LGB group
trying to organize a “liberation parade” in 1959 instead of 1969. And, in this example, we can
safely assume this hypothetical parade would have failed to accomplish anything for the movement
because the framing, threat, and opportunity were not yet ripe for such an action. To put this
another way, “since social movements attempt to replace ‘a dominant belief system that legitimizes
the status quo with an alternative mobilizing belief system that supports collective action for
change’ (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982: 15), movement leaders proffer the symbols of revolt
to gain support and mark themselves off from opponents” (Tarrow, 1998: 106). In 1959, returning
to the above counterfactual, invoking the “symbols of revolt” in 1959 would have made no sense.
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Source: McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001
Figure 2-4: Social Movements and Contentious Politics
For example, the GLF adopted a manifesto that denounced racism, sexism, colonialism,
capitalism, fascism, and the institutionalization of the heteronormative nuclear family through
schools and the media, as well as socio-economically and politically enforced gender roles. This
would not have been possible in 1959, any more than a more assimilationist, less confrontational
homophile movement approach of the 1950s would have been appropriate in 1969. The GLF also
aligned themselves with the Black Panther Party and worked to provide shelter for homeless gay
youth (Halsall 2019; Fienberg 2006). Another example of an SMO operating during the gay rights
movement’s coalescent phase is the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP), which was one
of many early SMOs created as a response to the United States government’s failure to act in the
face of the early AIDS epidemic which disproportionately and devastatingly effected the gay and
bisexual male community. ACT UP’s methods included organizing mass “die ins” in which
members lay in the street, blocking traffic, in New York City and at the headquarters of the Food
and Drug Administration (see Figure 2-5). Ultimately, using this transgressive politics, ACT UP
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was successful in getting the pharmaceutical industry to lower drug prices and government
agencies to approve more and better treatments (National Public Radio, 2019; Halsall 2019).
However, it should be noted that SMOs like Lambda Legal, the Human Rights Campaign
(HRC), which emerged in its modern form in 1989 and which engaged in contained politics like
lobbying, research, education, and media outreach, had much more success and longevity than
these early radical SMOs. This suggests, at least, that there are limits to transgressive politics and
the contentious interactions that go along with them. Groups like the HRC became part of the “gay
establishment” – SMOs which were well-connected politically, well-funded, and which engaged
in more traditional, less confrontational politics as part of their advocacy (Faderman 2015;
Hirshman 2012). Ironically, the fact that these SMOs were so relatively well-funded and wellconnected put them in a position to offer financial and political support to liberal elites
campaigning for higher public office, and the LGB community, through SMOs like the HRC,
began to make political demands, like marriage equality, in exchange for their support (Faderman
2015; Hirshman 2012). But this status as “mainstream” also limited this organization’s options for
transgressive politics – the typical transgressive repertoires of contention were closed off as
different sets of opportunities for more traditional, contained forms of political activism presented
themselves.
Interviews conducted in Taiwan with activists and political elites alike confirmed that when
LGB SMOs adopted a less confrontational tone based less on rights demands and more on
spreading the message that LGB persons simply wanted to be part of “normal”, legally recognized
families they enjoyed more success. But this fact does not negate the importance of transgressive
politics in the fight for same-sex marriage legalization. Before a revolution, there are often smaller
revolts that make the revolution possible.
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Source: National Public Radio 2017.
Figure 2-5: Contentious Politics: Transgressive Politics
2.5

Transnational Advocacy and International Norms
Revolutionaries often need allies. Transnational advocacy – made easier in the internet age

– can provide domestic SMOs with resources they may not have access to within their own
opportunity structures. One example, shown in Figure 2-6, depicts the “boomerang pattern” found
in transnational advocacy, whereby SMOs (or NGOs) which find that their access to progress on
their claims through the political process is blocked can turn to potential allies outside of their own
state which will put pressure on their state to address these claims (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Much
like opportunity structures help dictate the menu of available strategies for activists within social
movements, whether domestic SMOs try to avail themselves of opportunities for outside
collaboration within TANs depends somewhat on the goals of the movement. For example,
national labor movements seeking to affect change within their own countries often held greater
affinity to capitalists within their own countries than they did for labor in others and this, combined
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with the fact that their desired policy outcomes required specific and definite action by domestic
elites, means that labor SMOs tend to be less likely to receive a great deal of support from TANs
(Collier and Collier 1991; Della Porta and Diani 1999). Labor movement success often – especially
in Latin America – tends to be determined largely by the degree to which they can institutionalize
their actions within domestic political systems, inevitably seeking support from political elites
within the state who in turn can mobilize labor support for their own ends (Collier and Collier
1991).

Figure 2-6: Boomerang Pattern

However, there are times when the strategically wise option is to create a more
cosmopolitan SMO from the start – sometimes called a transnational social movement
organization (TMSO). These organizations are cosmopolitan from the start, in part because their
goals are international in scope (Della Porta and Diani 1999; J. Smith 1998 and 2005). The modern
global environmentalist movement is an excellent example of a TMSO, partly because their policy
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goals cannot be confined to any one specific state – states cannot make meaningful progress on
reducing greenhouse gas emissions or curb the disastrous effects of global warming unilaterally.
(Della Porta and Diani 1999; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998). They need
help, and the increased political interaction across borders enabled by globalization and the
improvements in communication technology that drive globalization provides a better means of
getting that help early.
The various LGB SMOs in the Western countries of North America, Central and South
America, and Western Europe are somewhere between labor movements and the environmentalist
movement. North American and European LGB SMOs have long enjoyed the benefits of a robust
TAN capable of influencing policy (Kollman 2007; Paternotte and Kollman 2013). Irish LGB
SMOs like Yes Equality, for example, availed themselves of epistemic knowledge resources from
Freedom to Marry and the HRC in The United States (Healy, Sheehan, and Whelan 2016).
European institutions and TANs have continued to have a strong influence on the
internationalization (or Europeanization, in this case) of policies favorable to LGB rights and have
also worked through international and supernational organizations like the Council of Europe and
the European Union (EU) (Ayoub 2016). However, there success is also due in no small part
because of efficient transportation and communication networks between European states dating
back to the early twentieth century (Ayoub 2016; Ayoub and Patternotte 2014). This effect tends
to be even more important in states admitted during periods of EU enlargement after the Cold War
and in states which are only recently or nominally democratic (Ayoub 2015; Helfer and Voeten
2014).
In Latin America, however, there does not exist the kind of robust international network of
SMOS cooperating across borders for LGB rights as there does for gender equality or
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environmentalism (Diez 2015). While it is certain that domestic actors in the earliest radical gay
liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s adopted a common discourse and common methods
influenced by American and European gay liberation groups like the Gay Liberation Front, LGB
activists in the global South often must innovate their own strategies to achieving equality dictated
by differences in their opportunity structures (Diez 2015). In other words, European models of
transnational advocacy built on a strong and effective transnational network are not necessarily
instructive of progress in Latin America where gay rights are concerned (Diez 2015; Encarnación
2016). It should be noted that there is scholarly disagreement on this issue. Other scholars argue,
for example, that a state’s connectedness to international society – the degree to which it is socially
globalized and/or influenced by its neighbors – are significant determining factors in same-sex
marriage legalization in Latin America, in part because SMOs will have more fertile space in which
to act if activists within interconnected neighbor states have made more progress on their claims
(Corrales and Pecheny 2010; Kollman 2007; Kollman and Sagarzazu 2016).
These scholars argue that TANs are clearly important in the norm diffusion process. LGB
rights groups in Latin America have had so much success, particularly where same-sex marriage
is concerned, in part because they represent the “post-left left” in that they embrace globalization
and the opportunities afforded them to work with TANs. But that success has also materialized
because LGB groups have seized opportunities to work with political parties willing to advance
their agendas; and by engaging in a form of protest that minimizes negative externalities (the less
confrontational Pride March that has become less as protest and more a celebration); and by
moderating their message to avoid alienating heterosexuals who would otherwise be inclined to
support them (Corrales 2010). The move from confrontational protests to celebration, the
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cultivation of political allies, and the moderation of messaging has allowed them to take full
advantage of the political and material support available through TANs.
Opportunity structures, which will be discussed in the next section, can determine the
degree to which TANs can effectively operate within any country in which LGB SMOs are
working to advance equal rights claims. Data collected by Civicus suggests that states that are
more open to activism – in which rights to speak, associate, and assemble are recognized; in which
activists are free or relatively free from fear of persecution, intimidation, legal sanctioning, or even
violent repression; and in which elites not only tolerate criticism from SMOs and other civil society
actors but provide platforms for them to do so – tend to be states in which foreign SMOs will be
able to take advantage of opportunities by working through TANs to connect with and support
domestic LGB SMOs (Civicus 2020). This is called the “state of civil society.”

Source: Civicus 2020
Figure 2-7: The State of Civil Society (2020)
Ireland and Taiwan (both “Open” according to Civicus data) provide illustrative examples
that support this theory of the role of opportunity structures in same-sex marriage legalization, as
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in both cases domestic SMOs interacted with and received support from SMOs in the US, UK, and
Australia – and Taiwanese SMOs interacted with their Irish counterparts after their stunning
success in that country to secure same-sex marriage legalization by popular vote (Ireland is the
only country in which this has happened as of the writing of this dissertation, though there was a
non-binding referendum in Australia which was also successful). Within countries in which the
state of civil society is strong, well-attended Pride celebrations can serve as opportunities for
SMOs to network with their international counterparts, gain visibility and legitimately, and put
pressure on elites in a less confrontational, less transgressive way (Corrales 2010). Of course,
SMOs are constrained by history as much as they are by their present institutions. But these Pride
celebrations and festivals – if well attended – can provide the opportunities needed to connect with
TANs due to the international attention and support these larger Pride events often receive.
2.6

Historical Institutionalism
Ultimately, this dissertation will employ mini-case studies of representative cases to

examine in more detail the historical-institutional pathways to same-sex marriage legalization and
will do so using a historical institutional approach. A historical institutionalist approach “examines
how temporal processes and events influence the origin and transformation of institutions that
govern political and economic relations” (Fioretos, Falleti, and Sheingate 2016, 3). At the root of
historical institutionalism is the idea that institutions provide “the context in which political actors
define their strategies” (Stienmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992, 8). Historical institutionalism can
be used to “flesh out political opportunity structure” because it focuses on the ways in which policy
legacies can exert an influence over present political battles and the choices available to social
advocacy groups. It has been observed that, “Policy discussion never occurs on a blank slate.” For
example, understanding the difference in policy outcomes in the US and Canada, it is necessary to
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understand differences in the separation of powers, the role of the courts, federal structures, and in
political divisions created by policy legacies – such as the racialization of politics due to the legacy
of slavery in the US – in order to understand how different opportunity structures created by these
legacies allowed Canada to legalize same-sex marriage before the United States (Smith 2008: 8).
The value of historical-institutional analysis is that it may also reveal the presence of
certain critical junctures that exerted policy legacies over time, effecting the opportunities
available and determining the eventual success of LGB advocacy work where same-sex marriage
is concerned. Critical junctures are periods of significant change that produce “distinct legacies”,
or a transmitted effect, that influences future outcomes (Collier and Collier 1992, 29). Critical
junctures “generate [these] legacies that reproduce themselves without the enduring presence or
recurrence of the originating causes.” (Fioretos, Falleti, and Sheingate 2016). Critical junctures
can also be defined, similarly, as major episodes of institutional innovation that generate an
“enduring legacy.” (Collier and Munck 2017). As has already been explored, the institutions that
grew up simultaneously to defend the practice of chattel slavery in the United States are one such
critical juncture that exerted powerful legacies on the opportunities available to LGB advocates
over a century and a half later but also determined the character of the institutions policy makers
operated within, which in turn dictates the menu of response options available at the state level. It
is expected that these critical junctures will differ from country-to-country, though it is possible
that countries within regions or clusters – classifications which will be discussed in Chapter 3 –
may share common critical junctures.
2.7

Opportunity Structures and Democratization
Returning to the social movement literature for a moment, there is a rich subset of research

that is concerned with how social movements affect change through either political or legal
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opportunities. Political Opportunity structure refers broadly to the institutional and sociocultural
factors that shape a social movement’s options (Anderson 2009). Legal Opportunity suggests that
courts can serve as modes of social and political change when other political avenues are closed
to an advocacy group, and thus should be studied distinctly from political opportunity (Anderson
2009). In the political opportunity literature, actions of the activists are dependent on the existence
– or lack – of a specific political opportunity (Meyer 2004). According to this theory, “the context
in which a movement emerges inﬂuences its development and potential impact” (Meyer 2004:
125). Put another way, the strategies and tactics employed by activists, their wisdom, and
creativity, and the outcomes of their choices can only be evaluated by examining the structure of
the political institutions they must navigate to accomplish their objectives (Meyer 2004).
For example, the American Civil Rights Movement was empowered by the Supreme Court
decision in Brown v. Board of Education because that decision gave a new menu of options for
civil rights advocates. But, as the federal government became more responsive to the SMO’s initial
demands and political opportunity began to increase, different groups within the movement began
to make competing claims and support different tactics, including riots in urban centers which
“strained government and outsider sympathy” (Meyer 2004: 130). This is an example of how
interaction with institutions can shape the tactic chosen by different actors within a movement and
how the conduct of institutions can determine which tactic might be deemed as attractive or
potentially successful to activists. Returning to the Stonewall Riots as an example, the Riots were
able to act as a crystalizing force for the modern gay rights movement because domestic
institutions of the time had been so unresponsive, indeed hostile to the demands of rights
advocates.
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The importance of democratization – and of the presence of polyarchy – cannot be
overstated. As Encarnación observes, the most favorable environment for LGB rights – and samesex marriage in particular – are countries in which respect for civil and political liberties, the rule
of law, respect for civil society, and other democratic norms have taken hold (2014). Returning to
the case of the US, the homophile movement ushered in by the Mattachine Society and the
Daughters of Bilitis involved America’s earliest gay rights organizations challenging arrests of
gay men in public places where cruising for sexual partners were common on the grounds that
such arrests were an example of police entrapment8. These challenges were made calling upon the
language of equality and human rights and the earliest victories of the American LGB rights
movement were in the courts (Cervini 2020; Hirshman 2012). Fast-forward to 2013, and LGB
SMOs were still achieving victories in the courts that had long alluded them in Congress. That
year, in the case United States v. Windsor, the Court ruled the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated Fifth Amendment rights protected by the
Constitution (Cervini 2020; Supreme Court.gov 2013a). Simultaneously, the Court also ruled in
Hollingsworth v. Perry that same-sex marriages could resume in California, affirming lower court
decisions invalidating Proposition 8, which had previously outlawed same-sex marriage (Supreme
Court.gov 2013b). These decisions formed the precedent, along with 1967’s Loving v. Virginia
(which invalidated laws banning interracial marriage on the grounds that marriage is a fundamental
civil right) for the legalization of same-sex marriage in the United States with the Court’s ruling

8

A common practice at the time was for an attractive male police officer to go undercover into parks, public
bathrooms, beaches, or other areas where gay men gathered in search of anonymous sexual encounters. These police
would proposition gay men they encountered for sex, and when the victim of the entrapment began to touch the officer
in a sexual manner, the officer would reveal himself and arrest the victim. That victim was then charged with public
lewdness. Dale Jennings, the famous playwright and early LGB activist, was the first man to challenge these charges.
With the help of the Mattachine Society and the Citizens’ Committee to Outlaw Entrapment, Jennings was victorious
and his charge was vacated.
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in Obergefell v. Hodges. These victories required democratic institutions like independent
judiciaries capable of checking legislative or executive power.
While such institutions can serve to empower movements by providing them avenues to
engage in contentious politics, LGB SMOs can also be empowered by the counter-movements that
rise in response to their demands, as is in the case of the LGB rights movement in the United States
(and other states) and the various “pro-family” organizations that have proliferated since Stonewall
in response, like the Family Research Council. In fact, movement success at creating or exploiting
events that further their agenda will usually result in the mobilization of a countermovement to
defend the status quo or the “traditional” way of doing things, which will in turn give new
motivation and energy to the movement, particularly when governments enable both sides to act
and interact within the political sphere (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). These counter-movements
would be examples of previously discussed right-wing counter-movements. These countermovements can provide external pressure on competing activist groups within a movement to unify
in the face of a common foe. The more powerful, effective or extreme the countermovement, the
greater the unifying force put on the rights movement will be and the more they will seek out elite
allies within the corridors of domestic power.
However, there are cases in which a marginalized or significantly disadvantaged groups
may lack the access to the corridors of power necessary to take advantage of political opportunities
that might arise. In such cases, groups must avail themselves of the other strategies – which is
where contentious politics enters the process. The Stonewall Riots have been discussed, and these
were effective in advancing the claims of LGB SMOs in the US precisely because opportunity was
so severely limited. Again, the tactics employed are informed by opportunity. The US Supreme
Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick limited the legal opportunities of the LGB rights movement
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to advocate for the repeal of sodomy laws, and the conservative political union of Reagan-era
neoliberalism and resurgent traditionalist politics responding to pressures from New Left
movements in the previous decade limited LGB PO as well (Hillson 2011). Protests, ranging from
Pride parades to the shutting down of the offices of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) over
access to life-saving HIV medication are both examples of this strategy. Litigation in the courts,
to challenge other political institutions and force them to act, can be employed where political
opportunity is lacking but legal opportunity is not. Analysis of European cases yields the
conclusion that where social movements have poor political opportunity – for example in countries
in which the domestic LGB SMOs face an entrenched and hostile conservative government – thus
legal tactics may be employed to pressure governments otherwise unwilling or unable to respond
to political pressure (Hillson 2011).
As has just been illustrated, LGB SMOs at varying times will utilized both political and
legal opportunity structures to advance their claims. In the US, the LGB rights movement has been
successful because it has used the courts to do what it has failed to accomplish legislatively:
challenge the cultural notions of homosexuality as a disease or as criminal behavior or as a threat
to the family, thus putting pressure on elites to effect changes in the law, or “rules-shifts” by
availing themselves of broad-based cultural phenomena to challenge conventional understandings
(Post and Siegel 2007). After the US Supreme Court ruled in Bowers v. Hardwick that laws
criminalizing homosexual behavior were constitutional, gay rights groups became even more
politically engaged, leveraging shifts in popular culture and lower court decisions like in Hawaii’s
state Supreme Court to aid in their advocacy (Post and Siegel 2007).
Opportunity is also important in Latin America, with scholars finding that adoption of
same-sex marriage policies in Latin America is due to presence (or lack) of access to the policy-
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making process by socially progressive parties that are penetrated by activist networks (and a
limitation on veto-player power), and the framing of the issue in a larger equality narrative in a
space marked by political contestation, as in the cases of Argentina when compared to Chile, which
has no same-sex marriage benefits, and Mexico, which has them in some jurisdictions and not
others (Diez 2015). The proliferation of the same-sex marriage norm in Latin America is due to a
combination of several factors unique to the region: domestic modernization and institutional
factors, the decline of Catholicism, domestic constitutional reforms, and, as in the US, the
judicialization of politics which have all worked to influence tactics employed by activists and
determined the menu of options available to them for accomplishing their goals.
2.8

Alternative Explanations
Up to this point, this dissertation has demonstrated that there is considerable scholarly

research to suggest that values, the mobilization capacity of social movements, and robust TANs
are each important to determining how likely a state is to accede to claims of LGB equality and
grant demands to legalize same-sex marriage. There are alternative explanations. Urbanization
allows both for the breaking of traditional kinship bonds and for a rejection of traditional values
regarding love and sex (Anderson 1991; Newson, et al. 2005; Newson 2009). The urbanization
argument asserts that cultural changes seen in Western societies over the last 150+ years regarding
family, tolerance to homosexuality being no exception, are largely attributable to the increased
opportunities, representation, and technologies, particularly in communication, afforded in
economically developed states which underwent earlier industrialization and urbanization
(Newson and Richardson 2013). At first glance, the WVS seems as though it might lend credence
to this explanation – values being influenced by modernization that accompanies urbanization.
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There is also a suggested correlation between GDP per capita and tolerance for
homosexuality, indicating that wealthier states exhibit higher levels of tolerance for homosexuality
(Florida 2014). Here again, we see a continuation of the theme that is foundational to
modernization theory, that economic development leads to predictable social change. Florida sums
up this correlation between development and tolerance thus:
“… 60 percent of Americans, 80 percent of Canadians, and nearly 90
percent of Germans and Spaniards said society should accept homosexuality. The
least tolerant attitudes toward gay and lesbian people, according to the Pew survey,
were found in less developed nations in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and
Africa” (Florida 2014).
In addition, a study of tolerance for homosexuals in 35 European states shows that
economic development leads to more tolerance among those who benefit most from that
development – high levels of economic inequality can lead to reduced levels of social trust and
consequently intolerance (Anderson and Fetner 2008). Thus, economic inequality is considered by
some scholars to be at least as important a factor in predicting tolerance as movement along the
traditional vs. secular axis and the survival vs. self-expression axis in any given country. In both
the cases of GDP per capita and inequality, one common explanation for the success of LGB
movements is inclusive wealth. The work of Benedict Anderson also shows that industrialization
brings with it not just the opportunity to generate wealth but also opportunities for individuals to
create imagined communities in which persons feel a sense of common experience and common
struggle with large groups outside their families (1983).
Modernization Theory has already been identified as providing a potential alternative
explanation, and modernization theory concerns itself with urbanization and wealth generation, in
addition to other factors previously discussed. Thus, the literature identified in this subsection,
taken together with the literature on values and modernization, strongly suggests that the effects
of modernization may be a compelling predictor of same-sex marriage legalization. This makes
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modernization an ideal alternative hypothesis against which to test the hypothesis of this
dissertation.
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3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

A review of LGB-rights-relevant literature on heteronormativity and identity, values and
modernization, resource mobilization and social movements, transnational advocacy networks,
and opportunity structures and democracy reveal a potential, possibly cross-regional, answer to
the question at the heart of this dissertation of why some countries legalize same-sex marriage
while others do not. The hypothesis derived from the review of literature is that certain conditions
within a given country or territory – 1) minimal level of emancipative and secular values, 2) LGB
mobilization capacity, 3) and the presence of opportunities for Transnational Advocacy Networks
(TANs) to engage in contentious politics – increase the likelihood that domestic social advocacy
groups acting within a social movement will use contentious politics to put pressure on elites
through existing opportunity structures – either legal or political – to accept the right of same-sex
marriage, thus making it more likely that same-sex marriage will be legalized. This chapter will
detail how this hypothesis is tested, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This will include
information on what data has been collected and how, what methods are used to test the data, and
what the initial quantitative results – reported at the conclusion of this chapter – suggest as a way
forward for the qualitative analysis. The iterative approach to index building that aids in this
analysis will also be explored.
Analysis and testing of this hypothesis happens in two stages applying a mixed-methods
approach. In the first stage, data on variables identified as relevant in the literature review are
collected for quantitative analysis. In a process that will be detailed in this chapter, that data is fed
into the RCII to create the RI, which measures country friendliness to LGB equality, and the MI,
which measures the effects of modernization. These indices’ scores of 1-1000 for each country are
used to perform correlation analysis and factor analysis to determine whether each of the
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constituent variables tested loads highly. Factor analysis is then used to create variables
representing both friendliness to LGB rights and the effects of modernization, the concepts
captured by the created indices of the RI and MI, and these variables in turn are used in regression
analysis to quantitatively test both the hypothesis and the alternative. If analysis confirms the
validity of the hypothesis that the combination of values, mobilization capacity, and opportunities
for TANs offers a more complete explanation than modernization proved valid, RI scores will be
used to determine which countries are more likely to have legalized same-sex marriage first within
a set of defined regions and clusters. In cases in which the predicted first adopter and the actual
first adopter are different, potential case pairs are identified. For example, the RI predicts that
Japan should be the first legalizer in the Sinic East, even though Taiwan has that distinction. Since
Japan has not legalized same-sex marriage and Taiwan has, this is a potential case pair – and in
fact is one of the case-pairs this dissertation will examine.
Once case-pairs are identified, process tracing and historical institutional analysis following a
most similar systems design will be used to examine the process by which same-sex marriage is
legalized in each country case, drawing on existing scholarly research as well as news coverage
and historical accounts were applicable. As Taiwan is the first, and so far, only country in the Sinic
East to legalize same-sex marriage even though it was not predicted most likely to do so, firstperson elite interviews conducted during IRB-approved field work research are utilized to provide
insight on the variables that contributed to same-sex marriage legalization in Taiwan. The casepairs will then be used to further test the hypothesis by comparing variables identified as significant
in the Taiwan case, or by contrasting them in cases in which the variable may be unique (or
uniquely manifested) in Taiwan.
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This chapter will begin by explaining what the RCII is in some detail and how the RCII is
used to create the RI and the MI. This chapter will detail the regression and probability analysis
used to test the hypothesis and the alternative but also to test likelihood of legalization within
regions and clusters to further guide and justify case selection. The results of this quantitative
analysis will be reported in this chapter.
3.1

The Robinson Country Intelligence Index and BYOI

Source: Brown, et al. 2015
Figure 3-1: Robinson Country Intelligence Index GEOS Structure
The RCII is a holistic data analysis and visualization tool used to measure country
performance holistically along four dimensions, Governance, Economics, Operations, and Society
(or GEOS for short). The idea of using a GEOS structure to measure country performance is one
that has its roots in analysis conducted by the Western World’s first political scientist, Aristotle.
Governments create markets, those markets create institutions, and those institutions create
economic and social outcomes. The RCII was originally conceived as a risk-assessment index, the
Robinson Country Risk Index, but in the years since its inception it has grown to include a broader
array of analysis beyond risk. To quote the founder and director Dr. Chris Brown,
“it is worthwhile to strive to think integratively and holistically, use the significant
sources of data now available at the country level, and build a broad-based and
dynamic index with distinct, recallable macro-dimensions that cover major areas of
country risk as if the country is a living body” (Brown, et al. 2015, 251).
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This structural functionalist approach, combined with the dynamic functionality embedded
within the RCII, allows the user of the RCII to analyze any number of problems from any number
of perspectives – the RCII is not conceived to test a specific hypothesis. Rather, the RCII is meant
to be used by academics, business leaders, government officials, non-profit actors, researchers, or
students to examine whatever problem it is they are studying, provided that the problem lends itself
logically to country-level, data-driven analysis. To date, the RCII has been used both in and out of
the classroom in Georgia State University’s College of Arts and Sciences and Robinson College
of Business and in several masters-level theses and doctoral dissertations, primarily in the
Robinson College of Business. The RCII’s use as a “dynamic data-literacy tool” as part of an
adaptive Global Issues course at Georgia State University is also explained in an article9 in the
Journal of Political Science Education (Brown, Grussendorf, Shea, and DeMas 2022).
As of this writing, the RCII encompasses 126 sub-dimensions, 199 countries, and 17 years
of data organized into the holistic GEOS structure. The RCII takes its data from several sources,
including the CIA World Factbook, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the
World Bank, the World Economic Forum, the Yale and the Columbia Environmental Performance
Index to name a few.10 At this point it should be noted in the interest of transparency and ethical
integrity that I am the data and research consultant for the RCII, and have been since 2013.
However, no agent or representative of the RCII has provided any monetary compensation or any
other form of compensation, inducement, or pressure for the RCII to be included in this
dissertation.

9
This article, in an earlier draft as a working paper, won the Political Science Education Section’s Best
APSA Conference Paper Award for 2020.
10
A complete list of sources for the RCII can be found here by scrolling down and clicking on “View Our
Sources.”
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The RCII takes the collected data on each country and scores and ranks them. Countries
are scored from 1-1000 in each variable, subdimension, dimension, and for the whole index, with
a score of 1000 being the best possible score. RCII countries are then ranked comparatively using
their scores. For more details on the math behind this scoring system, please see Appendix B of
this dissertation. It should be noted that each variable is also assigned a normative directionality
based on typical liberal approaches to political economy. For example, the RCII assumes that
population is good, so a country with a higher population will score higher in the RCII for variables
dealing with population, like population growth or urbanization. Conversely, the RCII assumes
that pollution is bad, so a country with high levels of pollution will score lower in the RCII on
variables dealing with pollution, such as carbon emissions or indoor air pollution from cooking or
heating fuels. Variables are weighted in accordance with a classical liberal approach to political
economy, taking into account weighting at the data source when possible.

Source: Robinson Country Intelligence Index 2021
Figure 3-2: BYOI Tool
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Since the creation of the RCII in 2009, one of their chief goals has been to implement a
“build your own index” component to the tool, allowing users to customize their iteration of the
RCII as needed depending on the problem being studied. In 2017 this functionality became a webbased reality with the help of multiple talented graduate research assistants and interns. As shown
in Figure 3.2, the Build Your Own Index (BYOI) functionality of the RCII allows a user to
customize their iteration of the tool in multiple ways.11 Users can remove data or add new data,
change the directionality of a variable or variables (making good bad and bad good), change the
structure of the RCII by modifying the existing three structure of the index or creating a brand new
structure, change the data-threshold for a country’s inclusion in the RCII (the RCII currently
defaults to an 85% data threshold, meaning that no country with less than 85% available data for
the most recent year will be included), and/or change the regions and clusters within which
countries are grouped. The BYOI functionality of the tool allowed for the creation of the RI and
the MI, and thus the RCII was instrumental in carrying out the quantitative piece of this
dissertation. The RCII is also a data visualization tool and was immensely helpful in aiding the
analysis contained herein by allowing me to see, at a glance, potential relationships between
variables in different case pairs.
Before moving on to a discussion of the RI and MI separately, it is necessary to address a
question that is sure to come up: why not simply use raw data for the quantitative analysis? In
other words, and more specifically, what is the advantage of using an index score for a variable,
for example aggregate gross domestic product (GDP), over the actual data-value of a country’s
GDP? The answer to this is two-fold. First, the mathematical calculations that underpin the RCII
normalize data in the scoring calculation to account for outliers. This means that a country with

11

For full information on how to use the BYOI functionality of the RCII, see the online tutorials linked on
the website here.
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extremely good performance in a variable that sets it far apart from other countries – like the multitrillion-dollar GDPs of the United States and China being vastly higher than any other country –
will not be over-rewarded in the scoring. Nor are countries with extremely bad performance in a
variable – like the GDP growth of Libya being -66% in 2020 – over-penalized in the scoring as
the scoring is calculated upwards through the weighted subdimensions and dimensions. Thus, a
normalized score helps ensure a valid country comparison. Second, the ability to rank countries on
a normalized score means that countries in the RI can be compared with first-legalizing countries
in their respective regions and clusters, particularly in sub-dimensions in which there are multiple
variables each with different units of measure and weights. For example, in the Sinic East Japan
scores higher than Taiwan by 51 points (849 to 798) in the overall Index. That easily measurable
difference in scoring allows for better comparison between the two countries, given that Taiwan
has legalized same-sex marriage and Japan has not.
This point becomes clearer if we go back to the example of aggregate GDP. For illustrative
purposes, we can continue the comparison between Japan and Taiwan. Japan has an aggregate
GDP of over 5 trillion US constant dollars, while Taiwan has an aggregate GDP of 788 billion US
constant dollars. The seventeen countries in the RI with the highest aggregate GDPs each have
values at over one trillion US constant dollars. It can be difficult to fully understand or analyze the
difference between 5 trillion and 788 billion in terms of their potential effect on a dependent
variable like same-sex marriage legalization. However, because of the score normalization process
of the RCII, Japan’s score in aggregate GDP, 890 out of 1000, can be more easily compared with
Taiwan’s score of 754 out of 1000.
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3.2

The Rainbow Index
Potential variables to include in the RI are identified in the literature review. They include

Emancipative Values and Secular Values. For these values variables, the data-value assigned by
the World Values Survey is used so that a proper comparison can be made with values variables
in the MI, which will be discussed later in this chapter. The list also includes the number of openly
LGB officials, the number of LGB bars in a country’s most populous city, the relative political
capital of homosexuals in each country, recorded and reported attendance at Pride celebrations in
the most populous city of each country, and the state of civil society in each country. These last
two variables are meant to capture the degree to which TANs have opportunities to work with
domestic LGB SMOs in a given country. Correlation testing and factor analysis discussed later in
this chapter reveals that each of these variables is statistically insignificant to a country’s
friendliness to LGB rights.

Figure 3-3: Rainbow Index Structure and Weighting
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Preliminary also leaves us with a structure for the RI reflected in Figure 3-3, with the
variables organized into the three macro-dimensions of Values, Mobilization Capacity, and TANs.
The weighting of these variables and dimensions is derived by dividing the sum of the correlation
values within each dimension by the correlation value of each variable in that dimension. But,
before moving on to a detailed explanation of each of the included variables and the tests
performed using the RI data, it is necessary to defend the choice of the RI (and by extension the
MI) as a tool for analysis.
The RI is a weighted average index, not an additive or multiplicative index. An additive
index is an index in which scores are aggregated, or added, to other scores to make another, more
inclusive measure. This only makes sense for use in analysis when there is some meaningful
difference between increments of values – and while that may be the case for some of the variables
in the RI (like internet users, for which each percentage point represents a countable number of
living persons), it clearly does not make sense for the RI. A multiplicative index multiplies
variables by one another so that the result is exponential, so that scores in a multiplicative index
would produce an increasingly pronounced result as they increase, resulting in “take-off” effects
or “hockey stick” graphs.
Figure 3-4 illustrates what the distribution of data points within theoretical multiplicative
and raw data versions of the RI would be compared to a weighted average that assigns scores to
each country. When the values for the three dimensions of the RI are derived from using unscored
raw data instead of scores derived from weighted averages. The distribution is not normal in any
of the three dimensions, and multiple countries are outliers for TANs. If the data in the RI were
organized as a multiplicative index, the data is even more skewed, with most countries in the RI
scoring less than 100 out of 1000. Likewise, when probability analysis is applied to the weighted
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average RI (bottom) and the multiplicative RI (top), the multiplicative RI indicates that where
friendliness to LGB Equality is concerned, there is a take-off point of >100 after which same-sex
marriage are always legal. Clearly, this defies what we can observe in the real-world.

Figure 3-4: Distribution in Types of Indices Compared

Figure 3-5: Different Results from Different Types of Indices
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It is therefore clear that the mathematical methodology used to derive scores in the RI from
weighted averages yields a result that is indicative of what we would expect based on observable
cases of same-sex marriage legalization. Now it would be appropriate to define the variables used
in the RI depicted in Figure 3-3, indicate where data on each of these variables comes from, and
explain more about how countries in the RI are organized. First, the Values Dimension contains
only two of Welzel’s Emancipative and Secular Values: choice and disbelief. Data for each of
these variables comes from Wave 7 of the World Values Survey, released in 2020.
Emancipative values are a subset of the World Values Survey (WVS) data
collected periodically since 1981. Emancipative values include a combination of
two value orientations: a liberating orientation, or an emphasis on freedom of
choice; and an egalitarian orientation, or an emphasis on equal freedom of choice
or equality of opportunity (Welzel 2013, 67). Emancipative values include the
values of autonomy, choice, equality, and voice.
Secular values involve rational value orientations, or a demystification of
traditional sources of authority: religious authority, patrimonial (a form of
governance in which all power flows directly from the leader) or patriarchal (male
domination) authority, state authority, authority of conformity (group) norms. It
should be noted that the term secular as it is used in the WVS and in Welzel’s work
on human empowerment means, “of or relating to the worldly or temporal; not
overtly or specifically religious; or not ecclesiastical or clerical” (Merriam
Webster). Secular values include agnosticism (or disbelief), defiance, skepticism,
and relativism
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For the Mobilization Capacity sub-dimension, the RI includes LGB Bars in most populous
cities, LGB political power, and openly LGB officials.
LGB Bars in Most populous Cities: Number of bars and/or nightclubs advertising
as LGB in the most populous city of each country according to a Google search.
LGB Political Power: Measure of the level of political power of LGB persons on
a 4-point scale, with a 4 indicating that LGBs enjoy somewhat more political power
than heterosexuals by virtue of greater wealth, education, and high level of
organization and mobilization; and a 1 indicating that LGBs are completely
excluded from the public sphere. This data comes from the Varieties of Democracy
V-Dem Dataset.
Openly LGB Officials: Number of out and serving LGB politicians or appointed
public ministers. This data comes from Google Searches, Wikipedia entries with
verifiable sourcing, and ILGA data were available. Also referred to as LGB elites.
Only countries with 100% of their available data in these variables are used in the RI, which
leaves us with 100 countries (see Figure 3-6). This is a high bar for data availability but given that
the RI and MI have so few variables, one missing data point could have an outsized impact on the
results. These countries are divided up into regions and clusters, taken from Welzel’s work on
Emancipative and Secular Values, with regions being analogous to Welzel’s culture zones and
clusters being analogous to Welzel’s stages of human empowerment. Regions in the RI, like the
cultural zones in Welzel’s work, contain countries linked by a common history, which often results
in strong cultural similarities. Clusters in the RI, like Welzel’s stages of human empowerment,
contain countries in which people enjoy a common level of capabilities for improvement and
prosperity and a common level of guarantees for their civil, political, and economic rights.
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Countries with low levels of prosperity and low levels of rights guarantees experience high
amounts of suffering and little opportunity for empowerment.

Figure 3-6: Countries in the Rainbow Index
The clusters in the RI are the Islamic East, the Indic East, the Sinic East, the Orthodox East,
the Old West, the Reformed West, the New West, the Returned West, Sub-Saharan Africa, and
Latin America. Welzel explains his cultural zones and human empowerment zones in Freedom
Rising (pp16-33) but the below descriptions should provide enough information to understand how
countries in the RI are divided.
Islamic East: countries in the Islamic East center around Mesopotamia and Egypt
and contain some of the world’s oldest civilizations. These countries were Arab,
Ottoman, and Persian Empires and were among the first in which Islam spread
following a long history of Greco-Roman influence. RI countries in the Islamic East
are Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia, Turkey,
and Yemen.

74
Indic East: countries in the Indic East range over South Asia and also contain some
of the world’s most ancient civilizations. Countries in this region have historically
been dominated by Indian traditions, whether that be influence from Buddhism or
Hinduism – which both originated in India, or from conquest by the Mughal Empire
which brought Islam to India through conquest and much of the rest of the region
through trade routes. However, Islamic traditions tend to be less rigid in this region
than in the Islamic East. Countries in the Indic East in the RI are Bangladesh, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand.
Sinic East: countries in the Sinic East tend to be culturally influenced, if not
dominated by, Chinese tradition and Confucianism rather than Buddhism. Unlike
countries dominated by Abrahamic religions, in the Sinic east religion has
traditionally been a private matter and tends to lack the political and social influence
found in some other regions. RI countries in the Sinic East are China, Hong Kong,
Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan.
Orthodox East: countries in this region were for a long time dominated by
Orthodox traditions of the Byzantine and Russian Empires, but these traditions
were also shaped by Mongolian conquest which left a tendency towards
authoritarianism and despotism. Countries in this region were also largely cut-off
from the Reformation and the Enlightenment. Twentieth Century dominance of the
Soviet Union only continued the legacy of authoritarianism. All countries in this
region were Communist at some point. Countries in this region included in the RI
are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
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Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan, the
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
Old West: countries located in Southern Europe and centered around the
Mediterranean Sea. Societies in the Old West were well-integrated in the Roman
tradition and the Catholic Church (with a few notable Orthodox and Jewish
exceptions) and industrialized and democratized later and with more conflict than
did societies in the Reformed West. Countries in the RI that are in the Old West
Region are Austria, Cyprus, France, Italy, Greece, and Spain.
Reformed West: countries that include Protestant societies of Central, Northern,
and Northwestern Europe. Most of these countries were only briefly or tangentially
part of the Roman Empire and were thus not strongly affected by Roman tradition.
Most societies in the Reformed West were centers of the Reformation, and
Enlightenment ideas gained the most currency earliest. Reformed West countries
were the earliest to industrialize and democratize. Countries in the RI that are part
of the Reformed West are: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and The United Kingdom.
New West: countries in the New West emerged as overseas extensions of the
Reformed West. Due to a relative lack of resources like silver that were important
in early colonialism, these countries lent themselves poorly to state-run extractive
institutions common in other colonies and possessions. Cool, wet climate in these
areas allowed for the flourishing of independent, family farms which influenced
societies more towards egalitarian ideals. New West countries also industrialized
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and democratized early. New West countries in the RI are Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United States.
Returned West: countries in the Returned West share many traditions with other
Central and/or Southern European states but were separated by four decades of
Soviet dominance. After the fall of Communism in Europe and the end of the Cold
War, many countries in the Returned West rushed to democratize and integrate with
Western institutions like the European Union. RI countries in the Returned West
are Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia.
Sub-Saharan Africa: countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were the most devastated
by European colonialism and imperialism, and societies in these countries are
irrevocably altered by European dominance. Because of the nature of the extractive
institutions that permeated this region, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were
among the last to democratize and industrialized, with many still neither fully
democratic nor fully industrialized. Countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region of
the RI are Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Latin America: countries with (mostly) Spanish and Portuguese colonial heritage
and that are predominantly Catholic even until today. Countries in this region also
suffered from the extractive institutions of European imperialism, which have left
a widespread legacy of extreme economic inequality. Countries in the RI in the
Latin America region are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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Low Stage: traditional economies with generally low levels of technological
advancement and high dependence on agrarianism or the export of raw materials or
petroleum products and in which most basic freedoms are denied or inaccessible.
Levels of human suffering in these countries are often high. Countries in the Low
Stage in the RI are Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, and
Zimbabwe. Countries in the Low Stage have scores that range from 1 (Yemen) to
406 (Guatemala) in the RI.
Modicum Low Stage: these countries also have largely traditional economies but
may be in the early industrial stages and likely have low but increasing levels of
technological advancement. Some basic freedoms may be denied or inaccessible,
but some may be protected, and democratization is often in its early stages.
Countries in the Modicum Low cluster in the RI are Albania, Armenia, Belarus,
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Colombia, Egypt, Georgia, India, Jordan,
Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru, Qatar,
Russia, Serbia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Zambia. Countries in
this cluster of the RI have scores that range from 93 (Jordan) to 611 (Mexico).
Modicum Stage: countries in the Modicum Stage have medium levels of
technological advancement and are generally industrialized with at least a plurality
of the workforce engaged in the industrial sector. Countries in this stage may have
higher levels of industrialization or technological advancement but they also have
hybrid regimes that are semi-democratic or competitive authoritarian in nature
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which limit the enjoyment of and access to many rights. Suffering is lower in
modicum countries, but populations are still struggling to gain the means of
empowerment. In the RI, countries classified in the Modicum Stage cluster are
Brazil, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova,
Montenegro, Philippines, Romania, and Singapore. Countries in the RI that fall into
this cluster have scores ranging from 328 (Montenegro) to 727 (Chile).
Modicum High Stage: countries in the Modicum High stage are beginning to
transition from industrial-based to knowledge-based economies and levels of
democratization may be significant. In many cases, the rights needed for
empowerment are protected or guaranteed but lagging development in some areas
may limit practical access to those rights. While some in these countries may be
suffering or struggling, the potential for human thriving is there. In the RI, countries
in the Modicum High Stage cluster are Argentina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, South
Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Trinidad and Tobago. Countries in the Modicum
High Stage cluster have RI scores ranging from 355 (Trinidad and Tobago) to 784
(Taiwan).
Thriving Stage: countries in the Thriving Stage are democratic and have
knowledge-based economies in which at least a plurality of workers is employed in
post-industrial work. Levels of technological advancement are high, and countries
grant more – often far more – rights than they deny, though in some cases the rise
of right-wing populism may be eroding democratic traditions and rights guarantees
for some. While suffering and struggling have not been eliminated, opportunities
to thrive are available to most. Countries in the Thriving Stage cluster are Australia,
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Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Slovakia. Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Thriving countries in the RI have scores that range from 487 (Poland)
to 1000 (Denmark).
Clusters have wide – and some cases very wide – overlaps in RI scores because while
Welzel’s demarcations in Freedom Rising may be somewhat more compartmentalized, the RI is
measuring something different from – though certainly related to – human empowerment. Where
friendliness to LGB equality at the country level is concerned, there are factors other than valuerelated variables that are captured in cluster groupings that influence the outcome of whether
consensual same-sex sexual relationships are punished or recognized as valid. Though, it is true
that thriving countries will tend to score higher than modicum or low countries.
3.3

The Modernization Index
In order to test the alternative hypothesis that the effects of modernization could explain

same-sex marriage legalization just as or more completely than friendliness to LGB rights, the
same process used to create the RI using the BYOI functionality of the RCII is used. This index is
called the Modernization Index, or MI. Based on literature reviewed in the previous Chapter, the
potential variables considered to be included in the MI are industrialization, GDP per capita,
change in annual household consumption per capita, internet usage, urbanization rates, adult
literacy rates, food security, Expressive Values and Rational Values. Before proceeding to
definitions of these variables, let it be noted that factor analysis revealed that change in annual
household consumption per capita and food security did not fit the model, so these were eliminated,
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leaving the final MI consisting of the remaining variables divided into three dimensions: Modern
Economy, Modern Society, and Modern Values (see Figure 3-7).

Figure 3-7: Modernization Index Structure and Weighting

Data for each of the Values variables also come from the WVS, Wave 7, but these are
different conceptualizations of post-modern values and therefore can be part of a valid comparison
against the values variables in the RI. Data for internet usage comes from the International
Telecommunications Union. Data for urbanization rate, adult literacy rates, and industrialization
each come for the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Data on GDP per capita comes
from the International Monetary Fund’s Word Economic Outlook (or IMF WEO). The variables
are defined as follows:
Expressive Values: Self-expression values have the opposite preferences to
security values. Societies that embrace expressive values give high priority to
environmental protection, growing tolerance of foreigners, gays and lesbians and
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gender equality, and rising demands for participation in decision-making in
economic and political life. (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).
Rational Values: Rational values have the opposite preferences to the traditional
values. Societies that embrace rational values place less emphasis on religion,
traditional family, and authority. Divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide are seen
as relatively acceptable; though suicide is not necessarily more common. (Inglehart
and Welzel 2005)
Communication: Percentage of individuals using the Internet.
Urbanization Rate: Number of literate persons aged 15 and above, expressed as a
percentage of the total population in that age group.
Adult Literacy Rate: People living in urban areas as defined by national statistical
offices.
Wealth: An approximation of the value of goods produced per capita in the
country, equal to the country's nominal gross domestic product (GDP) divided by
its population and expressed in constant prices to compensate for inflation rates.
Industrialization: Percentage of the labor force in a country employed in nonagricultural jobs. The Modernization Index publishes the best available data for a
given year, and there is a one-year lag for this variable (i.e., data reported by the
source in 2020 is from 2019).
Again, to facilitate an apples-to-apples comparison, the same region and cluster designations that
are used in the RI are also used in the MI, and the MI also contains the same 100 countries as the
RI.
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But why use both region and cluster classifications for the two indices? The answer to this
question is two-fold. First, the notion that cultural and historical factors, reflected in regions, as
well as economic and political factors, reflected in clusters, could be important in helping to
explain why some countries are more likely to legalize same-sex marriage is supported by the
literature. There can be – and this dissertation argues that there are – factors that countries within
both regions and clusters have in common that makes them more or less likely to legalize. For
example, we know from analysis that the regions Indic East, Islamic East, Orthodox West are
negatively correlated to same-sex marriage legalization, using a ten-point scale described in the
following pages to operationalize the dependent variable. This means that countries in these
regions are less likely to legalize same-sex marriage due to some regional factors held in common.
The correlations are not as strong as the independent variables described earlier in this chapter, but
they are present (see Table 3-1).

Table 3-1: Region Correlations to Same-Sex Marriage Legalization

SSM10
Islamic East
Sub-Saharan Africa
Indic East
Orthodox East
Sinic East
Returned West
Latin America
New West
Old West
Reformed West

SSM10
100%
-36%
-31%
-29%
-13%
1%
15%
16%
28%
29%
41%

Islamic
East

SubSaharan
Africa

Indic East

Orthodox
East

Sinic East

Returned
West

Latin
America

New West

Old West

Reformed
West

100%
-13%
-12%
-17%
-9%
-11%
-15%
-8%
-9%
-12%

100%
-12%
-17%
-9%
-11%
-15%
-8%
-9%
-12%

100%
-15%
-8%
-10%
-13%
-7%
-8%
-10%

100%
-12%
-14%
-20%
-10%
-12%
-15%

100%
-8%
-11%
-5%
-7%
-8%

100%
-12%
-6%
-8%
-10%

100%
-9%
-11%
-13%

100%
-5%
-7%

100%
-8%

100%

Likewise, correlation analysis of clusters shows that Low Stage and Modicum Low stage
clusters are both negatively correlated with same-sex marriage legalization (see Table 3-2). This
means that countries in those clusters are less likely to legalize same-sex marriage due to some
variable or variables that they have in common by virtue of being in those clusters. And when
regression analysis is used to test the significance of regions and clusters to the outcome of same-

83
sex marriage legalization, that analysis shows that, even when controlled for GDP per capita, both
regions and clusters have some explanatory value (see Table 3-3).
Table 3-2: Cluster Correlations to Same-Sex Marriage Legalization

SSM10
Low Stage
Modicum Low Stage
Modicum Stage
Modicum High Stage
Thriving Stage

SSM10
100%
-51%
-28%
5%
20%
62%

Modicum Modicum Modicum
Low Stage Low Stage
Stage
High Stage
100%
-35%
-22%
-17%
-33%

100%
-25%
-19%
-37%

100%
-12%
-23%

100%
-18%

Thriving
Stage

100%

Table 3-3: Significance of Regions and Clusters to Same-Sex Marriage Legalization
VARIABLES
Region
GDPperCap

(1)
SSM10

(2)
SSM10

0.638***
(0.100)
0.000991
(0.000986)

0.638***
(0.100)
0.000991
(0.000986)

2.936***
(0.371)

2.936***
(0.371)

Cluster
Constant

Observations
R-squared

3.4

(3)
SSM10

(4)
SSM10

0.000198
(0.00111)
1.254***
(0.203)
2.903***
(0.375)

0.000198
(0.00111)
1.254***
(0.203)
2.903***
(0.375)

96
96
96
0.590
0.590
0.584
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

96
0.584

Quantitative Analysis
Before any analysis can begin, the dependent variable is coded in two different ways for

testing using data for both the RI and MI. First, the dependent variable of same-sex marriage
legalization is operationalized as a ten-point scale (same-sex marriage10) used to capture the
degree to which countries punish or recognize the legality of consensual same-sex sexual
relationships, based on available information from the ILGA. Values are as follows:
1 = Punish by death
2 = Punish by >/= 14 years in prison
3 = Punish by 8-13 years in prison
4 = Punish by 3-7 years in prison
5 = Punish by </= 2 years in prison
6 = No punishment, no recognition
7 = Minimal or uneven recognition
8 = Common-law marriage
9 = Civil unions
10 = Full marriage equality
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Alternatively, this ten-point scale is also converted to a dichotomous variable (same-sex
marriage2) to allow for logistical analysis. For this version of the dependent variable, called
marriage, a value of 10 on the ten-point scale receives a value of 1, and all other outcomes receive
a value of 0 to facilitate logistical regression analysis. And now that the composition of the RI and
MI have been explained in detail and the dependent variable operationalized for analysis, the next
step is to expound on the quantitative methods used for this stage of analysis. The goal of the initial
quantitative analysis is two-fold. First, the quantitative analysis should show correlation between
the dependent variable, same-sex marriage, either operationalized on a 10-point scale (same-sex
marriage10) or as a dichotomous variable (same-sex marriage2). Second, the analysis should aid
in case selection by justifying the use of the RI to identify potential case-pairs if modernization
has been ruled out as a viable alternative explanation. First, analysis is used to confirm correlation
of LGBT acceptance and democratization each to same-sex marriage legalization as preconditions.
3.4.1 Democratization as a necessary pre-condition
To test the importance of democratization, data on regime type is taken from the Varieties
of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset, version 10, 2020 – specifically the variable v2x_regime_amb.
This variable is intended to classify regimes according to competitiveness of access to power and
liberal values (V-Dem Institute, 2020). This measure, which is part of V-Dem’s Regimes of the
World Index, has two operationalizations, a four-point ordinal scale and a ten-point ordinal scale.
This analysis uses the 10-point ordinal scale as it is better at differentiating between ambiguous
cases. In this case, the 10-point scale is as follows:
0 = Closed Autocracy
1 = Closed Autocracy – Upper Bound
2 = Electoral Autocracy – Lower Bound
3 = Electoral Autocracy
4 = Electoral Autocracy – Upper Bound
5 = Electoral Democracy – Lower Bound
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6 = Electoral Democracy
7 = Electoral Democracy – Upper Bound
8 = Liberal Democracy – Lower Bound
9 = Liberal Democracy
Upper and lower bounds of regime categories indicate a confidence interval overlap with
the regime category above or below in the ordinal scale. For example, countries that classify as
upper bound of the closed autocracy regime type are countries in which confidence intervals of the
multiparty election indicators overlap the level of electoral autocracies. In the country
classifications, Dahl’s institutional prerequisites to polyarchy are mentioned on multiple
occasions. V-Dem clarifies this term as follows:
The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value
of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral
competition for the electorate’s approval under circumstances when
suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can
operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or
systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the
chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is
freedom of expression and an independent media capable of
presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance (VDem Institute, 2020).
In a closed autocracy, there are no multiparty elections for the chief executive or the
legislature. China, Hong Kong, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Thailand, Vietnam, and Yemen are the
countries in the RI and MI that are classified as closed autocracies or upper bound closed
autocracies.
In an electoral autocracy, there are de-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and
the legislature, but those elections are not free and fair, nor de-facto multiparty, nor do these
countries achieve a minimum level of Dahl’s institutional prerequisites of polyarchy. In the RI and
MI, Algeria, Armenia. Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, Hungary,
India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali, Montenegro, Myanmar,
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Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Serbia, Singapore, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda,
Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe all classify as electoral autocracies (including upper and lower
bounds).
Electoral democracies have de-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level
of Dahl’s institutional prerequisites for polyarchy; but either access to justice, or transparent law
enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well
as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied. Albania, Argentina, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta,
Mexico, Moldova, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Trinidad
and Tobago, and Tunisia all classify as electoral democracies in the RI and MI (including upper
and lower bounds).
Finally, liberal democracies have de-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum
level of Dahl’s institutional prerequisites for polyarchy and guarantees of access to justice,
transparent law enforcement, liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law are all
present, as are judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive. These are polyarchies. In
the RI and MI, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Ghana, Greece, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the UK, the US, and
Uruguay all classify as liberal democracies (including the lower bound) or polyarchies.
Analysis shows that regime type is a statistically significant predictor of a country’s score
on both friendliness to LGB equality and the effects of modernization – in other words that
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country’s score in the RI and MI (Table 3-4). Analysis also shows that whether or not a country is
a polyarchy (in other words, an 8 or a 9 on the regime scale) is also predictive of a country’s degree
of friendliness to LGB equality and of the human rights benefits resulting from the effects of
modernization (Table 3-5). Moreover, polyarchy explains 51% of the variation in a country’s score
in the RI. However, polyarchy cannot offer a more complete explanation to a country’s likelihood
of same-sex marriage legalization than either the RI or the MI (Table 3-6). In fact, when the RI is
introduced into the regression, polyarchy ceases to be significant to the outcome of same-sex
marriage legalization. So, while we can say that regime type, and polyarchy specifically, are
important to both the RI and the MI, regime type cannot account for the outcome of same-sex
marriage legalization. This analysis justifies the assumption embedded in the theoretical
relationship between friendliness to LGB equality and same-sex marriage legalization that regime
type that polyarchy is a necessary precondition for same-sex marriage legalization, whether due to
friendliness to LGB equality or due to the effects of modernization.
Table 3-4: Regime Type, LGB Equality, and Modernization
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Table 3-5: Regime Type, LGB Equality, and Modernization

Table 3-6: Polyarchy and Same-Sex Marriage Legalization

3.4.2 Testing the Indices
Following the establishment regime type as a statistically correlated precondition for the
existence of opportunity structures, the analysis for the RI and MI are both done in steps. In the
first two-part step, factor analysis is used to test the inclusion of each of the individual variables
in both indices. Ideally both indices should capture a single dimension, or Factor, and analysis will
reveal this to be the case for both indices – this establishes the validity of both indices. Once this
is done, a variable is created representing the phenomenon, or Factor, captured in each index:
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friendliness to LGB equality for the RI and the effects of modernization for the MI. Then, a
collinearity test is performed to rule out that there is statistical overlap between the two factors that
might be skewing the results. Finally, regression is used to accomplish a number of analytical
goals. The first of these will be to establish that each variable and each macro-dimension in each
index is significant to the outcome, but not so significant that the variable or dimension alone could
be used to explain the outcome. The second of these goals is to establish whether friendliness to
LGB equality explains the increased likelihood for same-sex marriage legalization more fully than
the effects of modernization. Once each of these is established, this chapter will then go on to detail
how the case study analysis will proceed from those results.
Each of the variables in the RI mentioned earlier in the chapter are used in a factor analysis
to determine that they load well into the dimensions of friendliness to LGB equality and
modernization 12 . In each case, we see that the factor analysis produces a single dimension –
meaning that the variables when taken together are measuring some single phenomenon, or factor.
We can tell this because there is only one factor – Factor 1 – in the first table with an Eigenvalue
over 1.0. We can also tell that each of the variables is correlated to the factor by looking at the
values for each in the second table under the Factor 1 column (see Table 3-7). The same kinds of
results are seen when analyzing the variables in the MI (see Table 3-8).

12
This chapter shows the last step in this iterative process for creating the RI and MI. Some of the variables
ruled out by factor scoring include, for the RI: measures of political, economic, and social globalization; quality of
governance; physical security, happiness, social capital, and income inequality. Some of the variables ruled out by
factor scoring for the MI include food security, cell phone use, happiness, social capital, and income inequality.
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Table 3-7: Factoring Friendliness to LGB Equality
Factor analysis/correlation
Method: principal factors
Rotation: (unrotated)

Number of obs
=
Retained factors =
Number of params =

100
3
18

Factor

Eigenvalue

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
Factor5
Factor6
Factor7

3.69330
0.38581
0.12031
-0.02330
-0.08209
-0.13840
-0.16910

3.30749
0.26550
0.14361
0.05879
0.05631
0.03070
.

0.9754
0.1019
0.0318
-0.0062
-0.0217
-0.0366
-0.0447

0.9754
1.0773
1.1090
1.1029
1.0812
1.0447
1.0000

LR test: independent vs. saturated:

chi2(21) =

365.95 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

lgbtbarsin~y
openlylgbt~s
lgbtpower
prideatten~e
stateofciv~y
emancipati~s
secularval~s

0.7385
0.8043
0.7563
0.7078
0.5552
0.8802
0.5875

-0.0816
-0.2855
0.1903
-0.3536
0.0932
0.1890
0.3033

-0.0550
-0.0507
0.1495
0.0050
0.2349
-0.0678
-0.1804

Uniqueness
0.4449
0.2691
0.3695
0.3739
0.6279
0.1850
0.5303

Table 3-8: Factoring the Effects of Modernization
Factor analysis/correlation
Method: principal factors
Rotation: (unrotated)

Number of obs
=
Retained factors =
Number of params =

100
3
18

Factor

Eigenvalue

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
Factor5
Factor6
Factor7

4.35194
0.49328
0.21658
-0.02500
-0.08191
-0.11010
-0.12354

3.85866
0.27669
0.24158
0.05691
0.02820
0.01343
.

0.9218
0.1045
0.0459
-0.0053
-0.0173
-0.0233
-0.0262

0.9218
1.0263
1.0721
1.0668
1.0495
1.0262
1.0000

LR test: independent vs. saturated:

chi2(21) =

526.00 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

wealth
industrial~n
communicat~n
urbanization
literacy
expressive~s
rationalva~s

0.9365
0.8362
0.7938
0.7903
0.7342
0.6763
0.7243

0.2168
-0.1825
-0.2240
-0.2114
-0.2494
0.4416
0.2469

0.0257
-0.2075
0.2142
-0.2531
0.1823
-0.0900
0.1469

Uniqueness
0.0753
0.2244
0.2739
0.2667
0.3656
0.3395
0.3928
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Once the validity of the constructed indices is established through factor scoring by
regression, variables are created to measure those Factors, namely friendliness to LGB equality
and the effects of modernization. These variables are called Rainbow and Modern, respectively,
and it is these variables that are used in regression analysis from this point forward unless otherwise
noted (see Table 3-9).
Table 3-9: Creating Factor Variables Rainbow and Modern
Variable

Obs

Mean

Rainbow

100

-6.73e-10

Variable

Obs

Mean

Modern

100

1.94e-09

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

-1.66557

2.119383

Min

Max

.9737628 -2.415036

1.500733

.9522606

Std. Dev.

But, before analysis using these created Factor variables can begin, it is important to rule
out one major concern. We need to be able to rule out collinearity between friendliness to LGB
equality and the effects of modernization in order to be reasonably certain that both indices are not
simply different operationalizations of the same Factor. Or, more likely, that there is some sort of
significant statistical overlap between Rainbow and Modern such that the results of the regression
analysis would be unreliable. Fortunately, collinearity analysis confirms that both indices are
capturing different Factors – or put another way that both indices are measuring something
different (see Table 3-10). If there were collinearity, or high correlation, between the two indices
the variance inflation factor (VIF) would be somewhere over 5.
Table 3-10: Test for Multicollinearity between Rainbow Index and Modernization Index:
Variance Inflation Factor, Calculated after Model 3-9
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

Modern
Rainbow

2.43
2.43

0.412233
0.412233

Mean VIF

2.43
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Next, regression analysis reveals that the friendliness to LGB equality as captured in the
variable Rainbow has more explanatory value to the likelihood of same-sex marriage legalization
than the effects of modernization as captured in the variable Modern. The effects of modernization
do have some explanatory value for same-sex marriage legalization, but friendliness to LGB
equality has more (see Tables 3-11 through 3-16 and Figures 3-7, 3-8, and 3-9). As we can see
from these results, when the effects of modernization are introduced as a control for friendliness
to LGB equality, the effects of modernization lose explanatory power. According to ordered
logistic regression, even when controlling for the effects of modernization, friendliness to LGB
equality – again represented as Rainbow – is highly statistically significant and explains 68% of
the outcome. Additionally, the effects of modernization never produce 100% likelihood of samesex marriage legalization, while friendliness to LGB equality does.
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Table 3-11: Regressing Modernization on Same-Sex Marriage Legalization, Controlling for
Aggregate GDP

Table 3-12: Regressing Rainbow Index on Same-Sex Marriage Legalization, Controlling for
Aggregate GDP

Table 3-13: Regressing Rainbow Index on SSM Legalization, Controlling for Modernization
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Table 3-14: Logistic Regression of Modernization on Same-Sex Marriage Legalization,
Controlling for Aggregate GDP

Table 3-15: Logistic Regression of Rainbow Index on Same-Sex Marriage Legalization,
Controlling for Aggregate GDP

Table 3-16: Logistic Regression of Rainbow Index on Same-Sex Marriage Legalization,
Controlling for Modernization
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Figure 3-7: Linear Regressions on Modernization and Rainbow Index Compared

Figure 3-8: Logistic Regressions on Modernization and Rainbow Index Compared

Figure 3-9: Linear and Logistic Regressions of Rainbow Index Controlled for Modernization
Compared13
13

as well.

The analysis in Tables 3-14 through 3-16 and Figures 3-7 through 3-9 works with an Ordered Logit test
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Regression analysis can also rule out that any one variable in the RI is driving the effect.
We already know from factor analysis that each of the variables correlates well to the outcome of
same-sex marriage legalization. Linear regression shows that none of the variables is so strongly
correlated as to be driving the overall effect. And the only variable to lose explanatory value when
controlled for the total effects of modernization is secular values. Likewise, each of the macrodimensions of the RI is statistically significant and well-correlated to same-sex marriage
legalization, even when controlled for modernization (see Tables 3-17 and 3-18).
Table 3-17: Regression of RI Variables on SSM Legalization, Controlling for Modernization

Table 3-18: Regression of RI Dimensions on SSM Legalization, Controlling for Modernization
VARIABLES
Mobilization

(1)
SSM10

0.00329***
(0.000672)

Empowerment
Modernization

Observations
R-squared

(3)
SSM10

0.00627***
(0.000867)

TANs Proxy

Constant

(2)
SSM10

0.00433***
(0.00135)
0.00263*** 0.00514*** 0.00375***
(0.000824) (0.000729) (0.00121)
2.822***
2.128***
2.295***
(0.372)
(0.425)
(0.451)
100
0.683

100
0.609

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

100
0.559
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3.4.3 Second Iteration of the RI
At the risk of jumping ahead, once the case selection and case analysis are complete, a new
version of the RI – RI 2.0 can be created which incorporates variables gleaned from case study
analysis. While more detail on the RI 2.0 is contained in the concluding chapter, the variables
added to the RI 2.0 are Regime Type, Age of Democracy, and LGBT Acceptance as variables
representing the correlated preconditions to same-sex marriage legalization and High Court
Independence and Low Court Independence as variables representing the presence of opportunity
structures in a given country. The addition of these variables are informed by the case analysis
discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. While a full analysis of the RI 2.0 is beyond the scope of this
dissertation, for the purposes of illustrating the value of the iterative approach to index-building I
have included some basic factor analysis and regression.
Factor scoring shows that with the inclusion of these new variables there are now two factors
loaded in, which would indicate that while one of these new subdimensions – Preconditions or
Opportunity Structures – may be informative for a particular case pair, region, or cluster but not
necessarily for the whole universe of cases in the RI 2.0. Dropping the Opportunity Structure from
the RI 2.0 and leaving in the Preconditions loads higher, giving one factor with an Eigenvalue over
1 (Table 3-19). Linear Regression analysis shows that the iterated RI 2.0 yields roughly the same
coefficient but a higher R2 value and predicts legalization of same-sex marriage is most likely at
an RI 2.0 score of roughly 875 or higher, which is more in keeping with observable outcomes
(Figure 3-10). This preliminary analysis confirms both the value of the iterative approach to indexbuilding and the value of the case study analysis that informed that approach.
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Table 3-19: Factor Analyses for Iterative Versions 1 and 2 of the RI 2.0
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Table 3-20: Regressing RI on SSM Legalization, Controlling for Aggregate GDP, Compared
with Regressing RI 2.0 on SSM Legalization, Controlling for Aggregate GDP

Figure 3-10: Predicted Policy on Same-Sex Marriage for the RI and RI2, Compared
3.5

Case Selection
Quantitative analysis shows that the RI, which representation of a country’s friendliness to

LGB equality, has a statistically significant and highly correlated relationship to same-sex
marriage legalization. This means that country RI scores are predictive of the likelihood of samesex marriage legalization. Furthermore, analysis demonstrates that the effects of modernization
captured in the MI are not as predictive or explanatory for same-sex marriage legalization (see
Figures 3-7 through 3-9). Analysis has also shown the construction of the RI to be
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methodologically sound14. This means that the RI is a valid tool for aiding in case selection. This
section will explain how case-pairs are determined and eventually chosen for case study analysis
to further examine the hypothesis. Part of this case selection is pre-determined: countries which
have legalized same-sex marriage are known to have done so. And, based on the region and cluster
classifications already explained earlier in this Chapter, it is a simple matter to identify the first
legalizers within each grouping.
Table 3-21 breaks down countries that have legalized same-sex marriage against countries
that are predicted to be the most likely legalizers by RI score. The regions Indic East, Islamic East,
Orthodox East, and the Returned West as well as the Low Stage cluster each contain no countries
which have legalized same-sex marriage as of the writing of this dissertation. Countries in these
regions and clusters can be eliminated from case selection. Returning to the research methodology
of this dissertation, to test the hypothesis case-pairs of adopters and non-adopters are needed, so
that, following a most similar systems design, the adopter countries can be compared to the nonadopter countries to determine the key variable or variables that explain the difference in outcome.
In regions or clusters in which both the predicted most likely and the actual first legalizer countries
have legalized same-sex marriage, a comparison of any of these cases would violate most-similar
systems design. This leaves three possible case-pairs: Japan and Taiwan in the Sinic East Region,
Brazil and Chile in the Modicum Stage cluster, and Colombia and Mexico in the Modicum Low
Stage cluster.

14
This is crucial and the result of an iterative process, not unlike the process used in constructing the RI
and MI – creating a structure and adding or removing variables as appropriate until an index is created that measures
what the user is trying to measure. To borrow part of a quote at the beginning of Brown et al 2015, “Keynes. . . used
to say that his best ideas came to him from ‘messing about with figures and seeing what they must mean.’ He could
be as excited as any economist at discovering correlations in the data.” (p 246).
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Table 3-21: Countries Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage by Region and Cluster
Country (RI Score)
None
None
Argentina (754)
Canada (811)
Spain (893)
None
Netherlands (962)
None
Taiwan (784)
South Africa

Country (RI Score)
Netherlands (962)
South Africa (439)
Brazil (660)
Colombia (587)
None
Country (RI Score)
Netherlands (962)
Belgium
Canada (811)
Spain (893)
South Africa (439)
Norway (727)
Sweden (962)
Argentina (754)
Portugal
Iceland (753)
Denmark (1000)
Brazil (660)
Uruguay (842)
New Zealand (775)
France (929)
The UK (973)
Luxembourg
United States (804)
Ireland
Finland (917)
Colombia (587)
Australia (878)
Malta
Germany (972)
Ecuador (392)
Austria (912)
Taiwan (784)
Costa Rica

Legalization
Date
None
None
2010
2005
2005
None
2000
None
2019
2006
Legalization
Date
2000
2006
2013
2016
None

Predicted Most
Likely (RI Score)
Philippines (537)
Lebanon (292)
Uruguay (842)
Australia (878)
France (929)
Bulgaria (487)
Denmark (1000)
Czech Republic (696)
Japan (880)
South Africa (439)

Legalization
Date
None
None
2013
2017
2013
None
2012
None
None
2006

Thriving
Modicum High
Modicum
Modicum Low
Low

Predicted Most
Likely (RI Score)
Denmark (1000)
Tawian (784)
Chile (727)
Mexico (611)
Guatemala (406)

Legalization
Date
2012
2019
None
None
None

Legalization Date
2000
2003
2005
2005
2006
2008
2009
2010
2010
2010
2012
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013*
2014
2015
2015
2015
2016
2017
2017
2017
2019
2019
2019
2020

Region
Reformed West
Old West
New West
Old West
Sub-Saharan Africa
Reformed West
Reformed West
Latin America
Old West
Reformed West
Reformed West
Latin America
Latin America
New West
Old West
Reformed West
Old West
New West
Old West
Reformed West
Latin America
New West
Old West
Reformed West
Not Included
Old West
Sinic East
Not Included

Cluster
Thriving
Thriving
Thriving
Thriving
Modicum-High
Thriving
Thriving
Modicum High
Thriving
Thriving
Thriving
Modicum
Thriving
Thriving
Thriving
Thriving
Thriving
Thriving
Thriving
Thriving
Modicum-Low
Thriving
Thriving
Thriving
Not Included
Thriving
Modicum-High
Not Included

Region
Indic East
Islamic East
Latin America
New West
Old West
Orthodox East
Reformed West
Returned West
Sinic East
Sub-Saharan Africa

Cluster

*England and Wales legalized SSM in 2013; Scotland did so in 2014; and Northern Ireland did so in 2019.

These three possible case-pairs all satisfy two requirements for case selection in this
dissertation: 1) the actual first legalizer and the predicted first legalizer are different countries; and
2) the predicted first legalizer has not yet recognized same-sex marriage at the national level as of
the writing of this dissertation. What remains is to determine which case-pairs will yield the most
insight into how same-sex marriage legalization occurs in each. Figure 3-11 shows where each of
these countries rests on the probability curve for the RI scores and same-sex marriage legalization,
drawing on prior analysis detailed in the last section. The figure clearly shows that, according to
the RI, Colombia should not have been likely at all to legalize same-sex marriage while Japan is
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the country most likely to have legalized of these possible cases. Since Colombia has legalized
and Japan has not, and since analysis using the RI has shown it to be predictive of same-sex
marriage legalization, this strongly suggests that the case-pairs of Taiwan and Japan and Colombia
and Mexico can offer a more informative exploration of the hypothesis.

Figure 3-11: Same-Sex Marriage Probability for all Potential Cases
Using the data visualization capabilities of the RCII (now reconceptualized as the RI) shows
another way to illustrate the relative likeliness of legalization in each of these six potential cases –
neither Colombia nor Mexico have RI scores that indicate a 50% or better probability of
legalization and they score lowest out of the six in the Values dimension while performing well in
the other two (Table 3-22 as well as Figure 3-11).
Table 3-22: Six Potential Cases Compared
6 Countries
Japan
Taiwan
Chile
Brazil
Mexico
Colombia

Rainbow Index
Rank
10
16
20
24
26
27

Score
880
784
727
660
611
587

Mobilization
Capacity
Rank
Score
14
765
23
692
27
687
22
702
20
712
20
712

Transnational
Advocacy Networks
Rank
Score
10
919
1
1000
17
819
17
819
20
690
20
690

Source: Robinson Country Intelligence Index , Georgia State University.

Values
Rank
12
31
25
42
43
52

Score
854
599
638
449
442
381
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In addition, recalling earlier analysis on the importance of regions and clusters (Tables 3-1
through 3-3), a breakdown of probability for same-sex marriage legalization within the three
regions and clusters containing these case-pairs yields further insight into the value of each pair to
this dissertation. Note that the probabilities displayed will be slightly different from those in Figure
3-7 because in each case, the region or cluster being examined will be separated from the rest,
changing the overall probability curve. Beginning with regional analysis, countries in the Sinic
East are less likely to legalize same-sex marriage than their similarly scoring counterparts in other
regions (Figure 3-12). In fact, neither Taiwan nor Japan crosses the 50% probability threshold for
legalization on the RI-score probability curve for just the Sinic East – a fact that makes Taiwan’s
legalization even more surprising.

Figure 3-12: Same-Sex Marriage Probability in the Sinic East
When the probability curve for the Modicum Stage cluster is isolated, the figure shows that
Brazil is less likely than Chile to have legalized same-sex marriage, and that Modicum Stage
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countries as a group are less likely to legalize than similar scoring countries in other clusters
(Figure 3-13). On the other hand, similarly-scoring countries are more likely to legalize in the
Modicum Low cluster, suggesting that as a country’s score in the RI rises, if that country is in the
Modicum Low cluster, at least some variables are doing more work than they otherwise would be
in higher-scoring countries (Figure 3-14). This could explain why Mexico has >50% probability
of legalizing same-sex marriage while similarly scoring countries in other clusters, like Estonia
(Thriving) and South Korea (Modicum High) which are each within 100 points of Mexico in RI
scoring, do not. Though, in the Modicum Low cluster, Colombia is less likely to legalize than
Mexico, and this makes Colombia’s legalization even more noteworthy.

Figure 3-13: Same-Sex Marriage Probability in the Modicum Stage Cluster
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Figure 3-14: Same-Sex Marriage Probability in the Modicum Low Stage Cluster
In all three potential case pairs, the actual first adopter is less likely to have legalized than
the most likely adopter in their respective regions and clusters. However, since Japan is the highest
scoring country among these six in the RI and Colombia is the lowest, the case-pairs involving
these countries should make for the most informative comparisons. In addition, for comparative
purposes, having a case pair from one region and a case pair from one cluster will help increase
the external validity of this study. This will yield a higher possibility that the findings are
applicable globally, even if there are region and/or cluster-specific additional variables to be
considered.
As a prelude to the case pair analysis in the coming chapters, initial visualization of RI scores
for the case-pairs Taiwan and Japan and Colombia and Mexico in the individual variables
previously identified indicates several interesting possibilities (see Figure 3-15). First, Taiwan is
by far the best performer of the four cases in LGB Power, meaning that LGB persons in Taiwan
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enjoy greater influence in the levers of power than do their counterparts in Japan, Mexico, or
Colombia. This could prove decisive in the case analysis. Second, Mexico performs as well or
better than Colombia in every measure, and particularly so in Secular Values. This suggests that
some un-accounted for factor has held legalization efforts back in Mexico. Third, Pride attendance
in all four countries is very good, comparatively. This does not discount the importance of Pride
as an explanatory variable for increased likelihood of same-sex marriage legalization. It does
suggest that Encarnación (2011 and 2016) is correct when he asserts that domestic factors, like
Pride, are important in explaining same-sex marriage legalization because they give TANs the
opportunities necessary to network with and support local actors.

Figure 3-15: Case-Pairs Compared
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3.6

Summary
This chapter has discussed the RCII and how it is useful in constructing a customizable

index, the RI, for analysis of and the visualization of data related to same-sex marriage legalization
and has detailed the various quantitative methods used to test the validity of the structure of the
RI, including groupings of countries by both region and cluster. Quantitative analysis has also
shown that the hypothesis of this chapter – that a combination of values, mobilization capacity,
and transnational advocacy networks, represented as friendliness to LGB equality or the Rainbow
Index (RI) – is valid and has greater explanatory value than does the alternative hypothesis that
the effects of modernization as represented in the Modernization Index (MI). This chapter has also
detailed how cases were selected using data from the RI to identify possible case pairings with
known first adopters within regions and clusters. Analysis shows that the most informative casepairs for this dissertation are Taiwan and Japan in the Sinic East region and Colombia and Mexico
in the Modicum Low cluster. The next chapter will examine the case of Taiwan in detail using data
gathered from field work conducted in 2020 in Taipei to help explain why same-sex marriage has
legalized there first in the region.
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4

TAIWAN: A CASE STUDY

In 2020 I travelled to Taiwan twice to conduct interviews with activists, journalists, and
political elites concerning same-sex marriage legalization in Taiwan, from January through March
and again from October through December. My travel and research were funded, in part, by the
Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Taiwan Fellowship Grant, which is awarded to
researchers and faculty on a competitive basis. Much of the information contained in this chapter
is derived from research and interviews conducted during this field work. In addition, I surveyed
existing scholarly research and media coverage on same-sex marriage and LGB rights in Taiwan
to help provide some valuable context around what I was being told in interviews. As appropriate,
I will refer to these sources as well.
The goal of this chapter will be to explain why Taiwan legalized same-sex marriage,
despite the fact that the RI predicted Japan as the most likely first-legalizer in the Sinic East. This
will be done through process tracing in which the relationship between variables identified as
statistically significant within the RI and the outcome of same-sex marriage legalization will be
examined. In addition, additional variables which may have played a significant role for Taiwan
specifically will be identified for potential future analysis.
This chapter will be laid out as follows. First, I will provide a brief history of same-sex
marriage legalization efforts in Taiwan, beginning with the early activism of Chi Chia-wei in the
late 1980s during Taiwan’s authoritarian period and running through the activism of the Taiwan
Marriage Equality Coalition (later called the Taiwan Equality Campaign) headed by executive
director Jennifer Lu. Following this, I will discuss how Taiwan satisfies the preconditions
necessary to pro-LGB contentious politics, namely LGB identity formation (an endogenous
precondition) and democratization (an exogenous precondition). Then, the effects of mobilization
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capacity, opportunities for TAN involvement, and empowering values is discussed, with particular
emphasis paid to LGB power, which is not only the variable that seems most to separate Taiwan
from the other three cases (see Figure 3-11 in the previous chapter) but also one of the two most
highly correlated variables to same-sex marriage legalization (see Table 4-1). Attention will be
paid to critical junctures allowing for repertoires of contentious politics to be employed through
legal and political opportunity structures. In addition to this analysis, I will briefly discuss potential
country-specific moderating variables that made same-sex marriage legalization possible in
Taiwan as suggested by research and interviews. These include the influence of youth-driven
domestic political movements like the Wild Lilly Movement and the Sunflower Movement, the
process of concentrating power over time in the hands of Taiwanese-born citizens known as
Taiwanization, Taiwan’s desire to create a national identity as being distinct from The People’s
Republic of China, and the degree to which Taiwanese culture tends to assimilate foreign ideas
and norms more readily than other Sinic East countries. While these variables are briefly discussed,
no new quantitative analysis involving these variables is included here – that analysis being
reserved for future research. The chapter will conclude with a summary of findings.
Table 4-1: Correlation to Same-Sex Marriage Legalization
SSM
Legalization
SSM Legalization
100%
LGBT Bars
66%
LGBT Elites
63%
LGBT Power
74%
Pride
55%
Civil Society
53%
Emancipative Values
76%
Secular Values
53%

LGBT Bars

LGBT Elites

LGBT Power

Pride

Civil Society

Emancipative
Values

Secular
Values

100%
62%
54%
58%
39%
63%
44%

100%
56%
72%
38%
70%
37%

100%
45%
52%
72%
47%

100%
39%
54%
30%

100%
50%
30%

100%
64%

100%
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4.1

A Brief History of same-sex marriage Legalization Efforts in Taiwan
In 1983, Pai Hsien-yung, published the novel Crystal Boys 15 about a gay high school

student and his journey into the underground LGB subculture of Taipei in the 1970s. For many
Taiwanese, hetero and homosexual alike, this was their first inkling that there was even such a
thing as an LGB identity in Taiwan. Indeed, Crystal Boys is often pointed to as the event that gave
rise to tongzhi culture16 in Taiwan, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Then, in 1986,
Chi Chia-wei became the first person in Taiwan to come out on television. He was twenty-eight at
the time. He chose to organize a press conference at a popular McDonald’s restaurant in Taipei to
announce his identity. Prior to this event, there were no public activists for LGB rights, nor was
there even a public LGB community. Chi became Taiwan’s first LGB activist and the country’s
first activists for persons with HIV/AIDS (ChiA 2020; ChiB 2020). While there was no public LGB
community, there was a growing underground community as early as the 1970s in Taipei.
The first LGB group – a lesbian group called Between Us – was established in 1990. The
first legally registered LGB SMO, called the Taiwan Tongzhi Hotline Association, was founded
in 1998, after a series of teen LGB suicides shocked the nascent gay community (Xiao 2020).
Then, in 2003 the first Gay Pride parade in Taiwan was held, attracting some 20,000 participants
and spectators. In 2005, the first bill to legalize same-sex marriage was introduced in the
Legislative Yuan by a member of the Democratic People’s Party (DPP), though it was defeated.
LGB groups began openly advocating for marriage equality, and in 2016 several of these groups

As an illustration of how ostracized Taiwan’s gay community was in 1983, the novel was originally
published under the title Niezi (孽子) or “Evil Sons”.
16
The word tongzhi (同志) means “comrade” and was originally used to describe the followers of Sun Yatsen. On the Chinese mainland, it was used to mean “comrade” in the communist sense. In modern Taiwan – as well
as Hong Kong and Macau – the word is used to refer to LGB people.
15
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banded together, led by Jennifer Lu, to form the Marriage Equality Coalition of Taiwan17 (Lu
2020). Lu spent ten years involved in local LGB and feminist advocacy in Taipei and in 2016
became one of the first openly lesbian candidates for national office in Taiwan when she ran for a
seat in the Legislative Yuan under the DPP banner (Lu 2020). By 2019, Taiwan’s Pride was the
largest in Asia and one of the “world’s 15 biggest LGBQ celebrations” according to USA Today
(USA Today 2019). In politics the LGB community and their supporters flexed their political
muscle, slowly gaining political power (V-Dem 2021).
The activism of Chi and of Lu both drew on and
depended

on

a

degree

of

acceptance

of

emancipative and secular values, though both
activists approached their roles in contentious
politics in different ways. Chi often consciously
avoided involvement in organized politics or
formal advocacy groups, preferring instead to be an
individual voice agitating for change from outside
the system (ChiA 2020; ChiB 2020). This included
speaking

out

publicly,

raising

money

for

HIV/AIDS services and safe-sex campaigns,
attending Pride rallies and parades, giving
interviews, and filing several lawsuits in Taiwanese

17

The constituent groups of the Marriage Equality Coalition were Taiwan Tongzhi Hotline Association,
Taiwan LGB Family Rights Advocacy, Awakening Foundation, The Lobby Alliance for LGB Human Rights, and
Gagaoolala.
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courts challenging LGB discrimination – one case of which eventually led to
Figure 4-1: Timeline of LGB Rights

the legalization of same-sex marriage in the country. Lu, after obtaining her bachelor’s degree in
social work from National Taiwan University (NTU)18 and a master’s degree in policy studies
from Sydney University, became involved in organized LGB and feminist activism, first as a
senior fellow at the previously mentioned Tongzhi Hotline and then eventually as director of an
umbrella organization – the aforementioned Equality Coalition of Taiwan – which acted as an
epistemic resource for local LGB rights activists and actors as well functioned as an organizing
force to coordinate efforts towards same-sex marriage legalization through legislation (Lu 2020).
Around the time Pai was writing his groundbreaking novel, Chi was coming out, Lu was
beginning her education, and the first LGB groups were quietly forming, Taiwan was going
through a momentous political change. Beginning in the 1980s, the ruling Kuomintang (KMT)
Party begin slowly instituting democratic reforms. Opposition to the KMT was legalized. The
island also began a process of Taiwanization, which involved transferring political power to
citizens born in Taiwan as opposed to mainland China. Then, in 1996, Taiwan held its first direct
presidential election. In 2000, the KMT would lose control of Taiwan for the first time in 55 years.
At each step of the way, formerly authoritarian leaders chose to accept the principles of democracy
and rule of law, rather than attempt to maintain control by any means. In 2005, legislative and
electoral reforms further democratized the island, eventually helping to bring about legislative
control of the DPP, the first opposition party in Taiwan and the first non-KMT-affiliated party to

18

National Taiwan University (NTU) helped support the field work of this dissertation by acting as a host
institution for my grant and research. It is considered the flagship university of Taiwan.

113
hold an outright majority in the Legislative Yuan, in 2016. All-in-all, it was an exciting time to be
in Taiwan.

By 2014, a stage adaptation of Crystal Boys was exhibited at Taiwan’s National Theater
and in 2020 Chi Chia-wei was named one of Time Magazine’s 100 Most Influential People. That
Taiwan’s LGB community went from ostracized underground subculture to politically powerful
equal members of Taiwanese society – an equality that is now arguably part of Taiwan’s culture –
is remarkable. That this happened around the same time Taiwan moved to democratize is
important, as without this democratization it would have been much less likely that LGB persons
would achieve the necessary political power to advocate for their rights, including same-sex
marriage. The next section of this chapter will go into more detail about the birth of tongzhi culture
and the democratization of Taiwan as pre-conditions for LGB SMOs to successfully lobby for
same-sex marriage legalization.
4.2

Satisfying Pre-conditions of LGB Identity Formation and Democratization
Crystal Boys was the first Taiwanese novel written about the struggles faced by

homosexuals in Taiwan. It was written at a time when Taiwanese society was defined in part by
institutionalized patriarchy and homophobia (Huang 2011; Shi 2017). The opening of Crystal Boys
describes the life of the narrating character and his fellow teenage outcasts working as hustlers in
New Park, Taipei, in poetic but non-euphemistic terms.
“There are no days in our kingdom, only nights. As soon as the sun comes up, our
kingdom goes into hiding, for it is an unlawful nation. We have no government and
no constitution, we are neither recognized nor respected by anyone, our citizenry is
little more than rabble.” (Pai 1990, 17).
This is not simply an author’s literary expression but the language of identity: kingdom, nation,
citizenry. Around the time Taiwanese LGB persons were reading Crystal Boys, a similar argument
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for queer nationhood was being made in the West. Born out of anger at the slow response of
Western governments to the HIV/AIDS epidemic that was decimating homosexuals – particularly
gay men, groups like Queer Nation and ACT-UP argued that they were more than a social
movement – they were a people, with their own history, struggles, culture, language (or at the very
least a lingo), tastes, and ambitions19 (Walker 1996). And, while Pai was not an activist in the
sense of the early members of Queer Nation or ACT-UP, his language of identity resonated with
LGB Taiwanese who had never read about homosexuals in Chinese literature described
compassionately or empathetically as a people united by their status as exiles or outcasts.
But how can a novel give rise first to feelings or identity, and later, to a desire on the part
of people who share that identity for equal human rights? Historian Lynn Hunt argues that the
novel is actually crucial to Enlightenment societies of the West embracing the notion of human
rights. Hunt argues that in order for “human rights require three interlocking qualities: rights must
be natural (inherent in human beings), equal (the same for everyone) and universal (applicable
everywhere)” (2008, 20). In order for men who owned slaves and property to begin thinking of
others – the woman, or the slave, or the propertyless – unlike themselves as deserving of the same
rights as they had, they needed to be able imagine what the lives of these people were like as a
foundation for empathy. And, for that, they had the novel, for the novel, “made the point that all
people are fundamentally similar because of their inner feelings” (Hunt 2008, 27). If the novel can
do this for the acceptance of human rights, it is not a far cry to argue that the novel can also impart

Walker argues, in “Social Movements as Nationalism, or On the Very Idea of a Queer Nation” that groups
like ACT-UP and Queer Nation used the language of nationalism in new ways. Nationalism, traditionally, has been
based on racial or geographical identity, e.g., the Palestinians, or the Turks, or the Kurds, etc. But the gay liberation
movement showed that a nation indeed does not have to be racial or geographical, that essentially any group that
shares a common identity, a common history, a common struggle, and a set of common goals or a common destiny
informed by that struggle can, and perhaps should, be considered a nation. In any case, Walker argues for a much
broader conception of the nation, one that places issues of identity at the center of social movements.
19

115
a sense of identity to people sharing a struggle or a status that have not heretofore considered
themselves a people or a nation.
The novel Crystal Boys does this in several ways. First Crystal Boys reinterprets the
Confucian notion of filial piety – or devotion to the family – as a quality shared by homosexuals
as a way of humanizing them in a culture that had (and often does) regarded homosexuality as the
ultimate rejection of the family (Hu and Wang 2013; Huang 2011). In Crystal Boys, the narrating
character Li-Qing shows respect for his father even after being kicked out of the house, but he and
the other homosexuals in the novel struggle against their fathers’ expectations – a struggle not
unfamiliar to any son, Taiwanese or otherwise. Another Taiwanese artist, a filmmaker Ang Lee20,
explores similar themes in The Wedding Banquet, a 1993 film about a Taiwanese man living in
the United States with his same-sex lover who goes through the charade of a wedding banquet,
pretending to marry a Taiwanese woman, in order to avoid shaming or disappointing his parents
(Sun 2019). Crystal Boys also makes possible the notion of LGB identity – or tongzhi – because it
talks about the characters as members of a community struggling together for survival, rather than
isolated individuals who have transgressed their familial duties (Shi 2017).
In 1995, when the Taiwanese government announced plans to revitalize Taipei, a group of
LGB Taiwanese students calling themselves the Tongzhi Space Action Network (TSAN)
demanded that New Park, near the Presidential Palace (the setting for much of the action in Crystal
Boys and the country’s most well-known – if notorious meeting place for gay men) be recognized
for its historical significance using that very language of community (Huang 2010 and 2011).
TSAN’s invoking of the novel in its demand for recognition for Taiwanese LGB cemented the

20

This is the same Ang Lee who would go on to direct Brokeback Mountain in 2005. Indeed, the fact that a
Taiwanese heterosexual director would take on such a controversial (by 1993 standards) topic as same-sex, interracial
relationships only underscores the universality of the struggle faced by same-sex couples.
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book’s significance in Taiwanese LGB culture. Indeed, TSAN reimagined Pai’s “sorrowful”
narration about the LGB community as a “nation of rabble” from the novel into a modern
affirmation of pride and an assertion of equality:
In tongzhi’s kingdom, we are no longer afraid of daylight, are not forced
to remain invisible, for it is no longer an unlawful nation:
we have reasonable distribution of resources from the government,
we are fully protected by the laws of the country,
we are recognized and blessed by the multitude,
we are being respected by History, which also inscribes us. (Huang 2010, 374).
It is therefore no coincidence or surprise that several of my interview subjects mentioned Crystal
Boys as deeply important to Taiwan’s LGB identity formation (ChiA 2020; ChiB 2020; Lin 2020;
Lu 2021; and Hsaio 2020).
Discussing the efforts of groups like TSAN is appropriate here as it brings attention to the
second precondition for same-sex marriage legalization, democratization. While we will return to
the role of civil society and Taiwanese youth movements in same-sex marriage later in this chapter,
it is important to recognize that by the 1990s, SMOs that were typically marginalized, coopted,
persecuted, or outright banned under the authoritarian KMT state (1947-2000) had begun to find
their voice.
After the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, subsequent KMT leaders began slowly
liberalizing the state. First, the KMT began to allow competitive elections at the local level. Some
scholars argue that the beginning of democratic transition began with this limited electoral reform
in the 1980s and restrained themselves from imprisoning members of the Tangwai Movement21
that would eventually become the DPP (Riggers 1999; Wong 2001). In fact, these local elections,
though tightly controlled by the KMT at first, helped to normalize democracy and this in turn

21

The Tangwi Movement were a loose collection of KMT politicians who ran in local elections as
“Independents” or as “party outsiders” at a time when opposition parties were banned in Taiwan.
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emboldened nascent SMOs and activists like Wei to make greater demands on the state (Copper
1998; Hsiao 2008; Wong 2001). As grassroots SMOs became more demanding and more powerful,
they actually helped loosen KMT control even further, thus creating a virtuous cycle which helped
to transform Taiwan from a competitive authoritarian state to a vibrant liberal representative
democracy in a relatively short period of time and with relatively little bloodshed (Hsiao 2008).
Later in this chapter, I will argue that this represents a critical juncture which allowed for greater
use of contentious politics on the part of human rights SMOs in general and LGB SMOs advocating
for same-sex marriage in particular.
In addition, KMT power structures, which had been designed to benefit the Chinese
“mainlanders” who came with Chiang as they fled Communist rule began to be reformed to include
native-born Taiwanese – a process known as Taiwanization 22 (Hu 2005). During this time,
restrictions on freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press were
gradually lifted, along with martial law in 1987 (Hu 2005). In 1991 the government began to place
greater emphasis on local culture and history as opposed to the pan-China viewpoint of the
mainlanders and restrictions of the use of the Taiwanese language in media and schools was also
ended (Hu 2005). Because Taiwanization was part of the democratizing process, the notion of
identity – and an identity distinct from the mainland – became ingrained in Taiwanese politics,
also making the path easier for LGB SMOs using the language of nationality and identity in their
advocacy for equality. Taiwanization also represents a critical juncture which shaped the
opportunities available to SMOs. All interview subjects indicated the importance of

22

Essentially, as the island has democratized, the people of Taiwan have increasingly identified as
Taiwanese – a distinct nationality from Chinese. For more, see Bruce Jacobs, “Whither Taiwanization? The
Colonization, Democratization and Taiwanization of Taiwan” in the Japanese Journal of Political Science, 2013.

118
democratization in same-sex marriage legalization and as a potential explanation for why Taiwan
legalized before China.
4.3

Testing the Hypothesis
Revisiting the hypothesis, I argue that certain conditions within a given country or

territory – 1) minimal level of emancipative and secular values, 2) LGB mobilization capacity, 3)
and opportunities for Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) to engage and support local
actors – increase the likelihood that same-sex marriage will be legalized where preconditions of
democratization and LGB identity formation are present. But quantitative analysis in Chapter 3
strongly indicated the need to incorporate country-specific variables as part of the explanation
for same-sex marriage legalization. Figure 4-2 on the following page is a visualization of that
country-specific version of the hypothesis, customized for Taiwan’s legalization of same-sex
marriage in 2017.

Figure 4-2: Taiwan-Specific Hypothesis
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First, the formation of LGB identity must occur, and we see that with the publication of
Crystal Boys and the beginning of the Tongzhi movement. Taiwan’s history of embracing foreign
ideas and foreign cultures, discussed in more detail later in this chapter, acts as a moderating
variable strengthening this process of identity formation. Meanwhile, democratization and
Taiwanization begin to create the opportunity structures that make contentious politics possible –
like identity formation this is a necessary precondition as well. The LGB community begins to
mobilize resources, civil society begins to open and Pride celebrations create opportunities for
TANs to create linkages with domestic SMOs, and Taiwanese society accepts empowering
emancipatory and secular values. The confluence of these occurrences allows the LGB
community, through advocacy SMOs, to use contentious politics utilizing the aforementioned
opportunity structures to demand same-sex marriage legalization. Interviews and scholarly
research confirm the strong probability that this provides a defensible explanation for Taiwan’s
status as first-adopter in the Sinic East.
4.3.1 The Effects of Mobilization Capacity
Once an LGB identity has been established, in a state that denies equal rights to members
of identity, that community must begin to mobilize resources, ranging from money to volunteers
to political alliances, in order to achieve the goal of greater equality – in this case same-sex
marriage legalization. We see that clearly in the case of Taiwan. The Tongzhi Hotline, mentioned
earlier, is an example of this kind of resource mobilization. Founded in 1998, today it is Taiwan’s
oldest and largest LGBQ organization in Taiwan (Lu 2021; Tongzhi Hotline 2021; Xiao 2020). In
1997 and 1998, there were several highly publicized LGB teen suicide attempts and a group of
advocates from within the LGB community came together to provide counseling services through
the creation of a toll-free hotline, staffed and funded by LGB volunteers (Lu 2021; Tongzhi Hotline
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2021; Xiao 2020). At first, it was a challenge even to get registered as a non-profit organization
with the Taiwanese government and volunteers worked from their homes or from a shared,
discreetly tucked away rented space in a small building (Lin 2020; Xiao 2020). Eventually, the
group became involved in rights advocacy, being one of the organizations that would join the
umbrella group, along with a dozen other organizations, that would eventually come to be known
as the Marriage Equality Coalition of Taiwan (Lu 2021; Xiao 2020).
Today, the Tongzhi Hotline has grown into an organization with a budget of over
18,000,000 NTD (over $600,000 USD) that provides counselling and support services, HIV and
STD testing, HIV medications, educational videos on safe-sex practices and pleasurable sexual
techniques, addiction counselling, relationship advice, youth meetings, senior citizen support, and
chat rooms – all aimed at an LGB audience that, despite Taiwan’s relatively impressive progress
towards LGB equality, still finds themselves underserved in these areas (Tongzhi Hotline 2021).
Tongzhi Hotline is still funded primarily by donations from the LGB community, and their Board
of Directors is an impressive combination of professional activists, clinicians and doctors,
journalists, academics, civil servants, lawyers, and other LGB or LGB-allied professionals
(Tongzhi Hotline 2021).
Resource mobilization theory scholars would point out that the formation of the Tongzhi
Hotline is an example of a cohesive group responding to perceived threats (in this case, a lack of
equality and acceptance resulting in a deterioration of mental health to the point of attempted
suicide) by mobilizing available resources to achieve a response to that threat (Jenkins 1983;
Moore 1978; Useem 1980). Issues of importance include the kinds of resources available to this
group (like time, money, willing volunteers with relevant expertise) and the manner in which they
are able to mobilize these resources (Jenkins 1983). But resources also necessarily include allies
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among political elites which are open to hearing the group’s grievances – in this case politicians
and staff working mostly with the DPP, where some of the earliest supporters of LGB equality
were to be found as early as 1999 (Lu 2021; OfTaiwan.org 2021; Xiao 2020). Though, as we will
soon see, early support of LGB rights was not limited solely to the DPP.
This brings us to the variable LGB Power, which is the measure of the level of political
power of LGB persons on a 4-point scale, with a 4 indicating that LGBs enjoy somewhat more
political power than heterosexuals by virtue of greater wealth, education, and high level of
organization and mobilization; and a 1 indicating that LGBs are completely excluded from the
public sphere. This data comes from the Varieties of Democracy V-Dem Dataset. Resource
mobilization is at the heart of any conception of LGB power, and political allies are just as
important a resource as time, money, or skilled volunteers. The quality of the tongzhi community’s
political allies as a resource can be seen in the following examples:
1. Beginning in 1999, then-Mayor of Taipei and KMT politician Ma Ying-Jeou (who
would eventually be the President of Taiwan from 2008-2016) allocated $1 million
USD in public funds to support gay rights, becoming the first politician in Taiwan
to publicly do so. This included a same-sex group “wedding” in 2006 that was
widely criticized by the city’s religious leaders (Hsu 2006; OfTaiwan.org 2021). It
is rumored within Taiwan’s LGB activist community that Ma’s support did not
extend to actual legislation because Ma was afraid of giving credence to multiple
and persistent rumors that he was himself a closeted gay man (OfTaiwan 2021;
Wee 2014; Yan-chih 2009). Ma has consistently denied these rumors.
2. In 2002, newly-elected President Chen Shui-bian of the DPP invited LGB rights
activist Nan Hunter and human rights lawyer Michael Bronski to a meeting in the
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Presidential Office to discuss possible legislation on LGB rights. Some LGB rights
scholars mark Chen’s presidency as the beginning of the modern Taiwanese gay
rights era, as the DPP had a long history of involvement with rights SMOs,
including LGB rights SMOs (Chen and Fell 2021; Chu 2003; Fan and Wu 2016;
Sanders 2020).
3. In 2013, Vice-President Annette Lu of the DPP drafted a basic human rights law
that included an article on same-sex marriage and adoption rights for gay couples
(see Figure 4.1). While this law was not passed, some scholars attribute the creation
of this draft law to President Chen’s creation of the Presidential Office Human
Rights Consultative Committee in 2000, promising to make Taiwan, “a nation
founded upon the principles of human rights” (Lin 2000). The creation of this
committee for this stated purpose will be revisited in the section on Taiwan-specific
variables later in this chapter.
4. In 2016, President Tsai Ing-Wen published a video of her publicly supporting LGB
equality and same-sex marriage in particular. Several of my interview subjects
pointed to this support as a significant factor in same-sex marriage legalization
(Hsieh 2020; Lu 2021; Ro 2020). In the video, she says, “Everyone is equal. I agree
(or approve) of equality. People should have a right to love whomever they love,”
referring to same-sex marriage and LGB equality (translated by Yuhnian Lee,
2022). No Taiwanese leader to that time had made such a public and unambiguous
statement of support for same-sex marriage legalization.
5. In 2017, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court ruled that laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage were a violation of Taiwan’s constitution. This was the result of a case
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originally brought by Chi Chia-wei as an appeal to being denied a marriage license
for he and his same-sex partner in 2013. Each interview subject mentioned this is
perhaps the most crucial factor in the legalization of same-sex marriage, and
multiple subjects talked about the legal philosophies of several of the justices on
the Court as being aligned with the notions of equality, equal rights, and human
rights (ChiA and ChiB 2020; Hsieh 2020; Lin 2020; Lu 2021).
Another resource that the LGB community was able to mobilize were journalists who were
willing to write openly about LGB issues. During the White Terror23, it was common for students,
teachers and journalists who were critical of the KMT government to be executed or imprisoned,
as was the case during the 1947 Keelung Senior High School Incident and the 1984 assassination
of Henry Liu (Arax and Holly 1985). With the start of the LGB struggle for equal rights, some
LGB journalists began covering attempts to persecute or oppress homosexuals, who were
traditionally portrayed in Taiwanese media as perverts or deviants. A big part of Chi’s advocacy
strategy was to win over journalists in order to win more favorable or sympathetic coverage of the
LGB community (ChiA and ChiB 2020; Yang 2020). After democratic reforms lifting the
restrictions on freedom of the press, LGB journalists began using their voices and reporting more
openly about their community’s struggle for equal rights, such as this video essay published by
William Yang in 2021.
The role of LGB bars cannot be omitted from this discussion of resource mobilization. In
the earliest days of LGB rights movements in many countries, the gay bar was one of the few

23

The White Terror was the period of time from 1947 to the late 1990s in which civilians protesting or
criticizing policies of the ruling KMT were either imprisoned or killed for doing so. It was during this time that Chi
Chia-wei was imprisoned for eight years on trumped-up charges of burglary – a practice that was commonly used to
silence human rights activists. The White Terror is related to the February 28 th Massacre in which an anti-KMT
uprising was violently put down by the military, killing between 18,000 and 28,000. Both the White Terror and the
Massacre were perceived as examples of authoritarian means of controlling Taiwan for the benefit of “mainlanders”
over Taiwan-born citizens.
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relatively safe havens for non-heterosexuals to gather, to meet, and to socialize. These meeting
places became instrumental in the formation of advocacy SMOs because they provided a physical
space in which to gather, network, and coordinate. The gay bar was what the early Black Churches
were to the Civil Rights Movement, and the factory floors were to the Labor Movement. In the
case of Taiwan, gay bars became a source of funds and a weapon in the fight for hearts and minds.
The Ximen District around the landmark Red House is today recognized as the epicenter
of Taiwan’s gay life. But it wasn’t always so. In the 1970s and 1980s, the area was unremarkable
and the Red House a largely abandoned relic of Japanese occupation. Then businessmen like
Chang-ming Hsaio opened up gay bars in the area as intended safe-spaces for patrons to gather.
Hsaio told me that in those early days, he made significant effort to show the residents of the area
that homosexuals were non-threatening, ordinary people, far from their portrayal in the media as
perverted deviants (Hsaio 2020). As these bars became sources of revenue for the area, the
neighborhood and then the city itself started to support these businesses, or at least direct police to
not raid them.
This started a revitalization of the Ximen District of Taipei. Today, it is one of the most
popular and well-known parts of the city for Taiwanese and expats alike24. Hsaio pays for the
display and maintenance of permanent Rainbow Flags around Red House (see Figure 4-3) and has
even contributed significantly to the funding of Pride celebrations in Taipei as well as Tokyo and
Seoul (Hsaio 2021). In recognition of Ximen as the center of Taipei’s LGB life, there is a
permanent Rainbow Crosswalk across from MRT Station 6 in Ximen (see Figure 4-3). Based
largely on this revitalization, the area around Red House; which is home to more than a dozen
LGB bars, shops, bookstores, restaurants, and saunas; is also the sight of seasonal outdoor markets,

24

During my second field research trip to Taipei, I rented a small apartment in the Ximen area, a five-minute
walk to Red House and the MRT. It was always a hub of activity, particularly during the 2020 Pride season.
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festivals, concerts, and performances and Red House itself is a major exhibition space, gallery,
and shopping area. It could be argued that Red House is one of Taipei’s most well-known
landmarks, and the LGB community and the gayborhood25 is at its heart.

Figure 4-3: Red House and Ximen
Political allies, volunteers, activists, journalists, and businesses like bars are examples of
resources that can be and have been mobilized by LGB communities around the world in countries
that have legalized same-sex marriage, and Taiwan is certainly no exception. In the next subsection
of this chapter, we will discuss the importance of opportunities for TANS – especially Pride
celebrations – to network with local activists and groups.

The notion of “gayborhood” – meaning an area of a city that houses concentrations of LGB businesses
and residents – is a subject that will be revisited in the comparative chapter covering Colombia, Japan, and Mexico.
25
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4.3.2 The Effects of Opportunities for TANs
Transnational advocacy networks – or TANS – can provide crucial support to domestic
actors and activists, including knowledge and expertise, funding, and other resources necessary
for any group fighting for their rights. Regarding the LGB communities of the world, Pride
celebrations can often be their most visible and publicized events. In countries like Russia or
Turkey, it is newsworthy when one of these events is cancelled or when attendees are attacked or
harassed. In countries like Taiwan, these events are newsworthy because they have become
accepted and successful – indeed Taipei’s Pride celebration is the largest in Asia. In 2003, Taipei
held its first Pride celebration, attended by 20,000 people and funded by government donations.
By 2019, Taipei’s Pride had grown to a celebration of more than 200,000 and became a forum for
international participation as well (ChiA and ChiB 2020; OfTaiwan 2020). Scholars have noted that
as part of a repertoire of contention, Pride celebrations can be very effective because their festivallike quality and party-atmosphere are less threatening than other, more confrontational means of
contestation (Ayoub 2016; Corrales 2010 and 2016; Encarnación 2011, 2014, and 2016; Pecheney
2010).
Taiwan’s Pride celebration – being the largest in East Asia – now draws international
attention and as such funding and presence of international SMOs and NGOs. And with this
funding and presence and attention comes opportunity. For example, Taiwan has been chosen to
host East Asia’s first World Pride Parade by InterPride, the coalition of LGBQ Pride organizations
from throughout the world (Chibarro 2021). Kaoishung, the chosen host city and home to Taipei’s
second largest Pride celebration, beat out cities like Washington DC during the selection process.
Resulting from the kind of visibility that makes a bid like this possible, Taiwan hosted ILGA-
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Asia’s regional conference in 2015, which was at the time Asia’s largest international LGB
conference, attended by 300 activists from over 30 countries.
The Marriage Equality Coalition of Taiwan drew heavily on contacts made as a result, in
part, of these highly visible, well-publicized, and well-attended events. During the campaign for
same-sex marriage, Taiwanese SMOs consulted representatives from the Human Rights Campaign
(HRC) and Ireland’s “Yes Equality” campaign on the most effective ways to lobby for support for
same-sex marriage legalization. For example, based on polling in part funded by and facilitated by
the HRC and Yes Equality, the Marriage Equality Coalition focused on family values during their
campaigning – highlighting that queer families were like any other families (Lu 2021). This
decision was based on polling results that among those opposed to same-sex marriage legalization,
one of the biggest concerns was the integrity of the family unit along Confucian values – including
the notions of filial piety and the duty of children, especially sons, to carry on their family lineage.
The Marriage Equality Coalition also produced leaflets designed to help Taiwanese understand the
questions on the 2018 ballot concerning same-sex marriage, encouraging them to vote “yes” (see
Figure 4-4). This leaflet asks voters to vote “yes” on questions 14 and 15, or “Do you agree to the
protection of same-sex marital rights with marriage as defined in the Civil Code?” and “Do you
agree in accordance with the Gender Equality Education Act that national education of all levels
should educate students on the importance of gender equality, emotional education, sex education,
and same-sex education?”26 (Focus Taiwan 2018; Lu 2021; Taipei Times 2018; Taiwan News
2018).

26

Original text: 您是否同意，以民法婚姻章保障同性別二人建立婚姻關係？and 您是否同意，以「

性別平等教育法」明定在國民教育各階段內實施性別平等教育，且內容應涵蓋情感教育、性教育、同志教
育等課程？
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Source: Marriage Equality Coalition of Taiwan 2021
Figure 4-4: “Vote Yes” Leaflet Example
But opportunities for interactions with TANs cut both ways, and while major Pride
demonstrations in Taipei attracted the attention of pro-same-sex marriage SMOs, the 2017 Court
ruling galvanized anti-same-sex marriage SMOs who received support from socially conservative
organizations abroad. For example, the pro-marriage LGB equality campaign organized in Taiwan
was opposed by Christian religious groups who saw same-sex marriage as a threat to the family.
These groups launched their own marketing campaigns targeting parents around schools and in
markets, encouraging them to vote “no” on those same questions and arguing that equal rights for
LGB Taiwanese constituted a threat to children. Ironically, the Taiwanese opposition to same-sex
marriage legalization also drew on resources from the West, particularly conservative Catholic and
Evangelical groups, in devising this campaign (see Figure 4-5) (Lu 2021). One of these opposition
leaflets even offers voters four “scenarios” that will result if same-sex marriage is legalized,
including the grooming of and recruitment of children by homosexuals as well as loss of respect
for parents and the disintegration of the traditional nuclear family (ChiA and ChiB 2020; Lu 2021).
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Some activists even allege vote tampering by opposition groups during the referendum (ChiA and
ChiB 2020).

Source: Marriage Equality Coalition of Taiwan 2021
Figure 4-5: “Vote No” Leaflet Examples
Both the pro-same-sex marriage and anti-same-sex marriage campaigns, internationally
supported, were effective in their own way. Activists credit TANs with helping the pro-same-sex
marriage campaign to succeed by providing funding, knowledge, and support to local activists –
though domestic actors remained in control of the campaign itself27 (Lu 2021). But these same
activists also note that the rhetoric of anti-same-sex marriage campaign had been effective as well,
as seen in results of polling done in 2020 which indicate that even though very few Taiwanese

27
This is an important point to Latin American scholars like Corrales, Encarnación, and Pecheney who argue
that Western scholars from the US and Europe sometimes attribute outsized influence to Western-based TANs while
underplaying the contributions of local actors. Subjects I interviewed in Taipei agreed that the success of SSM
legalization depended both on the bravery and dedication and domestic activists and the local resources they
mobilized, and the support of TANs primarily based in Europe and the US.
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know of any negative effect of same-sex marriage legalization suffered by them personally, over
one-in-four think that same-sex marriage legalization has had a negative effect on Taiwanese
society as a whole (see Figure 4-6). It is an additional irony that the growing visibility of Pride
celebrations along with the 2017 Court decision crystalized religious opposition to Taiwanese
same-sex marriage, making Taiwan the next battleground for anti-same-sex marriage TANs (ChiA
and ChiB 2020; Lin 2020; Lu 2021; Yang 2020).

Source: Marriage Equality Coalition of Taiwan 2021
Figure 4-6: Post-Same-Sex Marriage Legalization Poll Results
It would be remiss not to pay attention to the fact that these opportunities for TANs would
matter far less in a system that is closed off to civil society. Recalling the data collected by Civicus
visualized in Chapter 2, Figure 2-7, Taiwan is a country that is rated as “Open” to civil society
organizations, meaning that citizens are free to engage with civil society organizations to affect
change. A Civicus rating of “open” is described as a condition when:
The state both enables and safeguards the enjoyment of civic space for all people.
Levels of fear are low as citizens are free to form associations, demonstrate in
public places and receive and impart information without restrictions in law or
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practice. The authorities are tolerant of criticism from civil society groups and
provide space and platforms for open and robust dialogue with members of the
public. As a rule, the police protect public protestors, and laws governing the
freedom of peaceful assembly adhere to international law and standards. There is a
free media, online content is uncensored, and citizens can access government
information easily. (Civicus 2021 – Civicus Monitor).
While critical junctures will be discussed later in this chapter, it is helpful to recall that scholars of
democratization in Taiwan note that KMT leaders opening opportunity structures for domestic
rights SMOs was a key factor in that country’s transition from competitive authoritarianism to
democracy. In my interviews, multiple subjects spoke to the importance of civil society in Taiwan,
arguing that their country’s comparative openness in the region was partly an explanation for
Taiwan’s legalization of same-sex marriage while countries like Japan and South Korea, which
Civicus ranks as having “narrowed” civil society access have not (ChiA and ChiB 2020; Civicus
2021; Lin 2020; Lu 2021; Yang 2020).
Like LGB mobilization capacity, the existence of opportunities for TANs through public
events like Pride and the openness of civil society play crucial roles in same-sex marriage
legalization. But in order for the benefits of mobilization capacity and opportunities for TANs to
be realized in full, the society within that country – especially the heterosexual majority – will
have had to embrace the post-material values that allow for human empowerment. The next section
of this chapter will examine those values and how to measure whether or not they have been
embraced in Taiwan.
4.3.3 The Effects of Empowering Values
Revisiting information from chapter 1, empowering values fall into two categories,
emancipative and secular. Both are a subset of the WVS. Emancipative values include a
combination of two value orientations: a liberating orientation, or an emphasis on freedom of
choice; and an egalitarian orientation, or an emphasis on equality of opportunity (Welzel 2013).
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Emancipative values include the values of autonomy, choice, equality, and voice, and these are
defined at length in Chapter 1. Secular values involve rational value orientations, or a
demystification of traditional sources of authority: religious authority, patrimonial (a form of
governance in which all power flows directly from the leader) or patriarchal (male domination)
authority, state authority, authority of conformity (group) norms. Secular values include
agnosticism (or disbelief), defiance, skepticism, and relativism, and these are also defined in
Chapter 1.

Figure 4-7: Values in the Sinic East
Figure 4-7 shows that Taiwanese society has embraced emancipative values to a lesser
degree than societies in Japan or Hong Kong have and have embraced secular values to a lesser
degree than those in South Korea or Hong Kong have. Remembering that emancipative and secular
values come from a subset of WVS data, scholars Dalton and Ong, analyzing past waves of WVS
data, found that, contrary to the Asian Values28 (or Confucian Values hypothesis) “acceptance of
authority” is not much different from that of many Western countries (2003). Other factors like

28

This concept of Asian Values will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter.
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feelings of individualism vs. collectivism (highly collective in South Korea and more
individualistic in Taiwan), or filial piety (lower in Taiwan than in Japan) can lead to different
policy outcomes than might be expected of post-material countries in the West (Dalton and Ong
2003). This could also partially account for Taiwan’s status as first legalizer.
There are other measures which could be used to cross-check RI data on Emancipative and
Secular Values. The Social Progress Index (SPI), published by the Social Progress Imperative,
publishes data intended to “comprehensively and systematically focus exclusively on the noneconomic dimensions of social performance across the globe” (Social Progress Imperative, 1). Of
interest here are the Personal Rights, Personal Freedom & Choice, and Inclusiveness variables as
these taken together most analogous to Emancipative and Secular Values. The SPI Personal Rights
variable includes data on access to justice, freedom of religion, political rights, property rights for
women, freedom of assembly, and freedom of speech. The Personal Freedom & Choice variable
includes data on satisfied demand for contraception, control of corruption, early marriage, youth
(15-24) who are both unemployed and not enrolled in school, vulnerable employment as a
percentage of total employment, and freedom of domestic movement. The Inclusiveness variable
includes equal protection under the law, equal access to political power, political power
distribution by sexual orientation, equal access to public services, violence against minorities, and
tolerance of LGB persons. Moving back to our case pairs for a moment, according to data in the
SPI Japan outperforms Taiwan and Mexico outperforms Colombia in each of these aggregate
measures (see figures 4-8 through 4-10 on the following page). This mirrors what we see in the RI
– from a values perspective, Japan and Mexico should have legalized first but they did not.
However, when we focus specifically on acceptance for gays and lesbians, Taiwan’s status as first
legalizer in the Sinic East begins to make sense.
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Source: Social Progress Index 2022
Figure 4-8: Personal Rights in Case Pairs

Source: Social Progress Index 2022
Figure 4-9: Freedom and Choice in Case Pairs

Source: Social Progress Index 2022
Figure 4-10: Inclusivity in Case Pairs
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While the Taiwanese are on the whole less emancipated than the Japanese, the Taiwanese
potentially have a greater willingness to place the wishes of their parents at a lower priority than
do the Japanese, and it is possible that in Sinic East countries this is important. The Taiwanese are
less secular than South Koreans, but Taiwanese report higher feelings of individualism. This might
also have some explanatory power for Taiwan having a higher degree of acceptance of
homosexuals than either Japan or South Korea (see Figure 4-11). Indeed, Taiwan has the highest
rate of acceptance of homosexuality in the Sinic East, though Figure 4-8 only includes Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan as these three countries have the highest probabilities of same-sex
marriage legalization in the region.

Acceptance of gays and lesbians
(0=low; 100=high)

'Acceptance of gays and lesbians (0=low; 100=high)' by
'Year' and 'Country'
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Source: Social progress Index 2021.
Figure 4-11: Acceptance of gays and lesbians (0=low; 100=high) by Year and Country
In the following pages of this subsection, I will explore some of the policy outcomes that
have potentially been driven by this higher level of acceptance. Each of these were mentioned in
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the interviews I conducted as being examples of Taiwan’s tolerance and acceptance. These policy
outcomes were also always mentioned as proof of Taiwan’s status as exceptional in the region as
well. But, before getting to those topics, it is necessary to explore – briefly – one variable that is
entirely unique to Taiwan, and that is the worship of Tu’er Shen, or the “Rabbit God” that was
mentioned briefly in the preface.
Some of the interview subjects mentioned Taiwan’s particular version of religiosity as
being a potential contributing factor to same-sex marriage legalization (ChiA and ChiB 2020; Hsiao
2020). Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism are the three primary religions of Taiwan but in my
experience most temples in the major cities offer a fusion of all three religions, allowing adherents
to take from each what they value, leaving the rest. It has been argued that one of the reasons
Confucian values are often associated with a rejection of liberal democratic norms is because the
authoritarian regimes of East Asia (particularly the Sinic East) used an interpretation of those
values to justify oppression (Fetzer and Soper 2014). But Taiwanese, especially those born on the
island after the KMT fled, are not only embracing some of these norms, they are reinterpreting
them – reimagining them.
Younger political activists whose views are not scarred by a political manipulation
of the Confucian tradition by the state are making powerful arguments that
Confucian values like ren (benevolent empathy), filial piety, and even social
harmony are consistent with liberal ideas. It is not so much that these thinkers are
rejecting traditional norms as that they are revising them in light of evolving
circumstances (Fetzer and Soper 2014, online).
This explains why Taiwanese can simultaneously report being less secular than South Koreans or
Hongkongers and less emancipated than Japanese or Hongkongers and yet more accepting of
human rights and homosexuality than any of these. Thus, Confucianism as practiced in Taiwan is
unique in the region in that it seems to have played a supporting role in the struggle for greater
LGB equality on that island.

137
Perhaps of equal importance is that Taoism on the island has also been uniquely practiced,
particularly in the worship of Tu’er Shen. Tu’er Shen is the patron of homosexuals in the Taoist
pantheon, and Taiwan is the only place in the world where he is worshipped. Taiwan is, in fact,
the only place in the world in which any patron or deity explicitly and primarily protecting or
supporting homosexuals has a place in the pantheon. To put this in perspective, Christianity in
some parts of the world may be fairly accepting of homosexuality, as is suggested as a possibility
from the number of Christian countries which have legalized same-sex marriage, and some
churches in some of these countries have ordained homosexual clergy 29 . But no Christian
denomination has a patron saint of or a guardian angel for homosexuals, and these might be the
nearest equivalent to Tu’er Shen. This is important because 81.8% of Taiwanese practice a mix of
Chinese folk religions, Buddhism, and Taoism, while only 6% identify as Christians (World
Religion Database 2021). So it isn’t surprising that many of the young people I spoke to during
my stay in Taiwan – students, bar patrons, Pride revelers, and friends who frequented the Ximen
District knew about Tu’er Shen and none of them seemed particularly surprised that he would be
worshipped in Taiwan. To them, and to some of the subjects that I interviewed, it was also no
surprise that Taiwanese religion would be that tolerant (ChiA and ChiB 2020; Hsiao 2020). This
could be part of the reason homosexuality was never criminalized in Taiwan, instead regarded as
simply a private matter – though admittedly one that carried a significant social stigma until the
last twenty years or so. And while this chapter will not deal much more with the subject of religion
in Taiwan, it is helpful to recognize that it could be part of the reason Sinic values have been
channeled towards different ends there than elsewhere in the region, creating a uniquely (one might

29

The Right Reverend Gene Robinson became the first known homosexual man to be ordained a bishop of
a major Christian denomination in 2003 – in the Episcopal Diocese of New Hampshire. He retired in 2010.
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say even queer, in the sense of the unusual) Taiwanese interpretation of emancipation and
secularism.
Returning to the question of values, beyond existing WVS data, either as used to produce
the Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map (refer back to Figure 2.3) or as used in creating the deriving
Emancipation Values and Secular Values variables used in this analysis, it is possible to arrive at
an approximation of the degree to which a country has embraced post-material values by the
policies legally enacted by the people’s representatives. These policies should be regarded as
proxies for the degree to which post-material values are embraced on the assumption that, in a
representative democracy, policy outcomes tend to reflect the will of the majority, or at the very
least the will of a majority of the decision-making elite. Therefore, in countries where we see proLGB-rights policies adopted, it would be reasonable to conclude the strong possibility of an
embrace of post-material values. Indeed, this assumption lies at the heart of the World Values
Survey. In Taiwan, there are several such policies that would seem to indicate a very high degree
of acceptance for LGB persons.
1. Military Service – Taiwan has allowed LGB persons to serve openly in the military since
2002 (Ottosson 2006).
2. Gender Equity Education Act of 2004 (GEEA) – This law mandates that each school have
a gender equity education committee, at least half of which must be women and two-thirds
of which must be experts in a relevant field of study, which answers to the national Ministry
of Education, whose tasks include promoting curricula, texts, and assessments on gender
equity education. In addition, the GEEA outlaws discrimination based on gender or sexual
orientation and requires sex education courses to include information on same-sex sexual
activity. The GEEA also requires that the gender equity education committees aid students
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who are members of groups historically marginalized or disadvantaged because of their
sexual identity, including LGB students (Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic
of China 2022a; Sinacore, Chao, and Ho 2019).
3. Employment Service Act and Act of Gender Equality in Employment of 2007 and 2008
(ESAAGEE) – This law was enacted to protect gender equality in the right-to-work, and
to “implement thoroughly the constitutional mandate of eliminating gender discrimination”
and promote the spirit of substantial gender equality (Laws and Regulations Database of
the Republic of China 2022b). ESAAGEE stipulates that employers may not discriminate
against applicants or employees because of their gender or sexual orientation during
recruitment, screening, hiring, placement, assignment, evaluation, and/or promotion unless
the nature of the work to be performed is only suitable to a specific gender.
4. Long-Term Care Services Act of 2017 (LTCSA) – this law bans discrimination based on
the gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, marriage, age, physical or mental
disabilities, illness, social class, race, religious belief, nationality, or place of residence of
the persons receiving long-term care services, which the law defines as, “the living support,
assistance, social participation, care and relevant healthcare services in accordance with
the needs of any individual whose mental or physical incapacity has lasted or is expected
to last for six months or longer” (Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China
2022c).
5. Banning of Conversion Therapy in 2018 – The Ministry of Health issued a binding
directive to local health authorities and care providers stating that any doctor or caregiver
practicing any form of “therapy” aimed at changing the sexual orientation of a minor could
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be subjected to fines and suspensions of licenses as well as face prosecution under
Taiwanese Criminal Code (Taiwan News 2018).
In addition to the above laws and regulations, same-sex couples have been able to legally
register as such nationally in Taiwan since 2017. Figure 4-9 and Table 4-2 (following page)
show that Taiwan outperforms other Sinic East countries (including those not included in the
RI for data availability reasons) in the matter of LGB equality. While admittedly this is not a
direct measure of post-material values, these legal and policy outcomes combined with the
observed and previously referenced survey data strongly indicate the Taiwanese embrace of
these values in a way that is unique in the region.

Source: ILGA 2021
Figure 4-12: Map of LGB Protections in the Greater Sinic East
Table 4-2: LGB Rights in the Greater Sinic East
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The ability of the LGB community to mobilize resources, the presence of open civil
society and opportunities for TANS to interact with and support domestic actors, and the
embrace of post-material values have all been shown to play an important role in same-sex
marriage legalization. But quantitative analysis also indicated that country-specific
variables also affect the outcome of same-sex marriage legalization efforts. In the case of
Taiwan, these variables are its open culture, the unique nature of Taiwan’s national
identity, and the influence of powerful youth movements during and after Taiwan’s
democratization. The next subsection of this chapter will briefly explore these variables
and speculate as to their role in legalization.
4.3.4 Potential Country-Specific Factors to Consider
As a result of conducting my interviews and in doing my research, it becomes clear that
the combination of mobilization capacity, opportunities for TANs, and post-material values –
while certainly predictive of same-sex marriage legalization – is not enough to fully explain outlier
cases like Taiwan. There are three factors which came up over and again that also likely play a
very important role in Taiwan becoming the first in the Sinic East, and indeed al of Asia, to legalize
same-sex marriage. Those factors are open culture, the unique nature of Taiwan’s national identity,
and the influence of powerful youth movements during and after Taiwan’s democratization. It is
not the aim of this dissertation to fully evaluate the power of these variables in influencing the
dependent variable. But it is within the scope of this work to identify their existence and establish
the potential for future research on these topics, and that is what this subsection will do.
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One of the first things I noticed when traveling around Taipei was the multicultural aspect
to the city. One cannot visit Ximen without being reminded of a scaled-down New York City
Times Square. The crown jewel of the area where I stayed – The Red House – is a physical
manifestation of the heteroglossic nature of the country. Red House was built in 1908 under
Japanese occupation as a shopping center, but after liberation from Japanese rule in 1945 a troupe
performed Peking Opera there until the site was transformed into a cultural and artistic exhibition
space in the 2000s. The building is a mix of Western and Japanese artistic styles. Since 2003 it
has been the site of Pride celebrations, the Mr. Gay Taiwan pageant, and LGB New Year’s Eve
celebrations (Ferber 2015; Lin 2015; www.redhouse.org/tw). A symbol of Japanese occupation
influenced by Western architecture is transformed into a space to celebrate Chinese mainland
culture and then is transformed into a space in which Taiwanese artists and merchants exhibit their
wares and Taiwan’s LGB community is celebrated, the Red House is a physical manifestation of
Taiwan’s multicultural past – an island conquered and reconquered by European and Asian powers
and dually influenced by Confucian and Enlightenment values.
Several of my interview subjects pointed to this history and remarked that Taiwan is special
in the region because, rather than rejecting foreign influence, as the Japanese had done for
centuries; or attempting to control it, as the Qing Dynasty had, much like they had in their religious
practices the Taiwanese simply take from each culture ideas they like and incorporate them into
their own (ChiA and ChiB 2020; Xiao; Yang 2020). And Taiwan had many opportunities to do so,
even though some of those came at a high cost. Taiwan’s strategic location along trade routes
between China and the Philippines and Japan made it a strategically valuable location for
Europeans intent on establishing dominance in the East. In 1624 the Dutch East India Company
establishes a base in southwestern Taiwan (Fort Zeelandia), employing Chinese laborers from the
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mainland to work on rice and sugar plantations established there. In 1626 the Spanish establish a
fortress (Fort Santo Domingo) near a bay in the northern part of the island but are soon driven out
after a brief conflict with the Dutch. In 1662, the Ming General Zheng Cheng-gong (himself born
in Japan to a Chinese father and Japanese mother) takes control of the island after fleeing Qing
conquest from Manchuria, and in the process, he drives the Dutch and remaining Spanish off the
island. Two hundred years later, in 1885 the Qing take possession of the island and claim it as a
province of Qing China, only to cede control to the Japanese ten years later (www.taiwan.gov.tw).
But each of these left their mark on the island’s culture, especially the Japanese.
Take, for example, Taiwan’s bathing culture around the Beitou Hot Springs in the north of
the island. Because of its sulfurous hot springs fed by the volcanic core of Mount Datun, for
centuries indigenous inhabitants, Chinese mainlanders, as well as Dutch and Spanish travelers and
traders regarded Beitou as an evil place (its name in the language of the indigenous Ketagalan
people means “home of the witch”) (Taiwan Today, 2009). But, once the Japanese took possession
of the island, Japanese colonizers, coming from a culture that appreciated the therapeutic nature of
hot springs, built a public bath house on the site in 1913. Ever since, this kind of bathing has gained
popularity on the island, where Taiwanese enjoy visits to the hot springs for recreational and
therapeutic reasons. Like the Red House, even the building’s architectural design reflects a kind
of multiculturalism. Quoting an official from the Department of Culture under the Taipei City
Government,
“The building combines Japanese and European styles, and the design was an
imitation of resorts in Izusan Onsen, a famous hot spring site in Japan. The first
floor was constructed using bricks, while the second floor is mainly timber. The
façade of the house is decorated with European arches and British colonial slanted
weatherboards, while the interior design adopts a more traditional Japanese style
with tatami flooring and sliding paper doors.
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The main bath is located on the first floor surrounded by Roman arches and
columns. Covering an area of 58.8 square meters, the pool was lit by stained glass
windows, rare and expensive decoration in those days. The pool facilities were also
segregated, reflecting social norms during the Japanese era” (Taiwan Today 2009).
Even the Presidential Palace of the Republic of China, established as such in 1950, is the former
site of Taipei’s Japanese colonial administration, built by the Japanese in 1919. Red House, Beitou
Hot Springs, and the Presidential Palace are all treasured cultural landmarks in modern Taiwan,
incidentally, as are Fort Zeelandia and Fort Santo Domingo. No effort is made to hide their origins
or history. But Japan’s influence is not the only one currently perceptible on the island.
If one visits Ximending after dark30 on the weekends or goes to any urban nightclub with a
dance floor, one will see Taiwanese youth dancing intricately choreographed routines to South
Korean K-Pop hits. According to a survey conducted in Taiwan in 2019, 40% of respondents to
an online poll aged 15-59 considered K-pop to be “very popular” within the country and another
36% considered it “quite popular” (Statista 2022). During my second visit to Taipei, the South
Korean government sponsored an exhibition on life in South Korea in the Red House Square, at
which Taiwanese could learn about travelling to or working in South Korea. And it would be
remiss to dismiss the gradually increasing influence of the West, especially the United States, on
the island since the Cold War and which is regarded as at least partially responsible for Taiwan’s
embrace of LGB rights (Yang 2020). Ironically, the influence of the United States can also be felt
in opposition to same-sex marriage and LGB equality, primarily driven by an increasingly
globalized and interconnected Religious Right movement (ChiA and ChiB 2020; Yang 2020). To
be clear, I am not suggesting that Japanese colonialism or hot springs or K-Pop or architectural
heteroglossia or even Cold War politics per se made Taiwan more likely to legalize same-sex
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The public K-Pop dances are usually performed on or near the Pride crosswalk, just near the multistory
H&M storefront there.
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marriage, but rather the demonstrated willingness in evidence on the part of the Taiwanese to
embrace new ideas and integrate aspects of other cultures into their own, however they are
exposed.
Speaking of Cold War politics, Taiwan’s national identity is a legacy of the conflict
between Maoist Communists of the People’s Republic of China, at the time supported by the
Soviet Union (prior to the Sino-Soviet Split of the 1960s), and the Nationalists led by Chiang Kaishek, supported by the United States. At the founding of the United Nations (UN) the Nationalist
government represented China in the United Nations. In 1971, the UN General Assembly passed
a resolution declaring that the Communist government in Beijing was the only legitimate
representative of China and the Taiwanese delegation lost representation and the international
recognition that comes with it. Then, in 1979, the United States withdrew its troops which had
been permanently stationed in Taiwan since in the end of World War II under the United States
Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC)31. Meanwhile, Beijing continued and continues to insist that
Taiwan is a part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and has vowed to “retake” the island by
force if necessary32. Under constant threat of invasion and without formal representation at the
UN, without international recognition, and without the permanent presence of US armed forces on
the island, Taiwan has found it necessary to engage in a kind of “queer diplomacy”, meaning that
Taiwan must approach international relations in unusual ways as the traditional avenues of
communication and interaction between states are closed to it (Chen and Fell 2021).
One aspect of this queer diplomacy since the island’s democratization began has been a
diplomatic approach prioritizing human rights, including LGB rights. Specifically, Taiwan does
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Interestingly, the former headquarters of the USTDC is now the Taipei Fine Arts Museum.
While always a threat, rhetoric from Beijing regarding possible invasion and occupation of Taiwan has
become increasingly bellicose under President Xi Jinping.
32
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not seek to influence LGB-related policies in other countries – how could it, but instead tries to
use the issue of LGB equality (and same-sex marriage since 2019) to enhance its reputation in the
world as a liberal democracy and to differentiate itself from the mainland (Hsieh 2020; Lin 2020;
Nia-chia and Fell 2021). Taiwanese take great pride in their country’s status as the first legalizer
of same-sex marriage. Just one year after same-sex marriage was legalized in Taiwan, the PRC
moved to shut down the mainland’s largest Pride celebration, held in Shanghai since 2009 (Li and
Wang 2020; Reuters 2020). This stark contrast is not lost on the Taiwanese themselves. The
Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) of Atlanta routinely Tweets out an official
commemoration of Pride Month in June and Atlanta Pride in October every year (see Figure 413), most recently highlighting its status as the “first country in Asia to legalize same-sex
marriage” (teco_in_atl 2022). As part of Taiwan’s renewed push to rejoin the UN and as a lead up
to National Day in 2020, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a series of videos, through
their TECO offices on social media, highlighting Taiwan’s human rights record, including specific
videos on transitional justice, freedom of religion, gender equality, and same-sex marriage
legalization.

Source: Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office of Atlanta, 2021
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Figure 4-13: Examples of Taiwan’s “Queer” Diplomacy
Some might be critical of such overt displays of support for LGB rights as a possible form
of “pinkwashing”, given that Taiwan seems to be using its human rights record performatively to
build international support and legitimacy. But pinkwashing connotes an insincere commitment to
LGB rights for some hidden and usually nefarious and violent agenda33. These Tweets and videos
and official statements (refer to 4.3.1 on the Effects of Mobilization Capacity) from Taiwan on
LGB rights are in keeping with a consistent dedication to respect for human rights. For example,
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranked Taiwan 8th in its 2021 Democracy Index (the United
States ranked 26th in that same report) (Economist Intelligence Unit 2022). The EIU scores
countries based on their perceived performance in five categories: electoral process and pluralism,
functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. In the
category of civil liberties, Taiwan scores 9.4 out of a possible 10 (the United States scores 8.53)
for its free press, freedom of expression, freedom of expression, open internet, independent
judiciary, and equality before the law (Economist Intelligence Unit 2022). Taiwan also ranks as
one of the best countries in the world for expatriates to live and work, in large part because of
human rights issues like safety and security, access to healthcare, and LGB equality34 (InterNations
2021).
Further, those Taiwanese I did speak with, including my interview subjects, spoke of
Taiwan’s dedication to human rights as part of their national identity. To them, Taiwan is the
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Pinkwashing is the strategy of promoting LGB rights protections as evidence of liberalism and
democracy, especially to distract from or legitimize violence committed against their own citizens or against others.
For example, Taiwan still practices the death penalty, for which it has received much criticism from Amnesty
International. However, I would argue that the death penalty, when applied as a result of due process, does not rise
to the level of violence usually implied by the term. For more, see Atshan, Sa’ed (2020); “Global Solidarity and the
Politics of Pinkwashing”; Queer Palestine and the Empire of Critique; Stanford University Press.
34
Taiwan ranked 1st in the InterNations Expat Insider Survey in 2019, 2020, and 2021. In 2018, Taiwan
nd
ranked 2 , behind Bahrain. In 2017, Taiwan ranked 4 th.
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country it is because of the human rights they enjoy as citizens, and these rights were hard-won
after decades of authoritarian rule (ChiA and ChiB 2020; Lin 2020; Hsieh 2020; Xiao; Yang 2020).
In fact, this dedication to human rights as a matter of identity was at the heart of the Wild Lily
Movement made up of student protestors pressing for political reforms who occupied Liberty
Square during a sit in that lasted for six days (Chen 2006; Wright 1999). Among the demands of
the Wild Lily protestors were that the degree of martial suspending Taiwanese civil liberties be
lifted. The public were largely supportive of these protests, going so far as to donate food, water,
and blankets to those sitting and even participating in the protests themselves, swelling their ranks
to over 10,000 (Global Nonviolent Action Database 2022). The political pressure created by this
genuine grassroots movement – protestors refused to align with the DPP in order to maintain their
independence – is credited in part with forcing the regime to speed up the reform process. Nearly
fifteen years later, the Sunflower Movement would see student protestors occupy the Legislative
Yuan for twenty-four days in opposition to increased economic integration with Beijing, sparking
the “biggest pro-democracy protest rally in the island’s history” (Rowen 2015, 5). More
importantly for this topic, the Sunflower Movement ushered in a new wave student activism
involving such issues as wealth equality, civil rights, labor rights, same-sex marriage rights, and
Taiwanese independence (Ho 2018).
Multiculturalism, a prioritization of human rights as a matter of identity, and youth activism
are all likely significant variables in Taiwan’s same-sex marriage legalization process. Future
research conducted to ascertain the exact nature of the relationship between these variables and
the outcome would be fruitful. Though, it is uncertain that such variables could operationalized in
such a way so as to be incorporated in the RI as their importance in different countries in which
youth activism is not so intertwined in the democratization process may be negligeable. In
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particular, Taiwan’s focus on human rights as a matter of national identity is unique, given its
contested status as a self-governing stateless nation under constant threat of invasion and without
the needed access to the traditional corridors of power in international relations. Still, the addition
of a brief examination of these variables are an informative addition to the theory that mobilization
capacity, opportunities for TANs to network with local actors, and the embrace of post-material
values make same-sex marriage legalization more likely.
Mobilization capacity, opportunities for TANs to network with local actors, and the
embrace of post-material values, along with any combination of country-specific variables, are far
less likely to produce an outcome of same-sex marriage legalization is legal and political
opportunity structures for rights advocacy are lacking. This next subsection will address the critical
junctures in recent Taiwanese history that have opened these opportunity structures. Three of these,
early competitive local elections, the Taiwanization of politics, and the increased activity of SMOs
after the lifting of martial law, are all related to Taiwan’s process of democratization and are
classified as having created political opportunity structures. The fourth, the creation of independent
judiciary during the period of reform in the 1990s, created the necessary legal opportunity
structures.
4.4

Critical Junctures
Before we begin to explore the critical junctures in Taiwan that make it possible for SMOs

to engage in contentious politics, it should be noted that the aim of this section is to demonstrate
that these critical junctures occurred, that they created sufficient opportunity structures to allow
for the possibility of same-sex marriage legalization, and that they were utilized by SMOs or
activists to some degree sufficient to support the theory. A thorough and detailed, qualitative
historical institutional analysis of exactly how these structures were utilized is a worthy future
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endeavor for which it is my goal that this research will lay the foundation for. That having been
addressed, to engage in their repertoires of contention, SMOs and activists must have opportunities
to reach those in power in order to affect change. A historical institutional approach requires that
we identity certain events, or critical junctures, that occur and create these opportunities within
legal and political systems – which is why we call these opportunity structures. In the context of
same-sex marriage, we can think of these opportunity structures as gateways to legalization. This
chapter will examine the critical junctures of early competitive local elections, increased SMO
activity following the lifting of martial law, the movement to Taiwanize politics on the island, and
judicial reform undertaken by influential judges during Taiwan’s period of liberalization.
One of the first steps the KMT took towards liberalization was to allow for local,
competitive elections, even if at first on a limited basis. As early as 1950-1951, a few local offices
were up for single-party elections – opposition parties were illegal in Taiwan until 1987. In 1968
Taiwan held a series of elections organized by the ruling KMT and the aging Chiang were held, in
part to replace many of his original compatriots who came with him from the mainland, in part to
prepare the way for his son to take over as president, and in part to reinvigorate the government
and continue the “Taiwanese miracle” of economic boom during its period of cohesive capitalist
state-directed development (Chao and Meyers 2000; Kohli 2004; Plummer 1969; Reuters 2011).
That year, in a series of two separate elections 312 village chiefs, 847 city and county councilmen,
20 city chief executives, and 71 Taiwan Provincial Assembly members stood for election
(Plummer 1969). The elections limited though they were and absent any official opposition
(candidates could either run under the KMT banner or as “independents”) had a profound effect
on the island. Of Taiwan’s eligible voters, 75% cast ballots; the average age of office holders on
the island was reduced to 40; and most of the victors, especially at the local level, were native-
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born Taiwanese. This meant that while the KMT certainly maintained tight control of the island,
seeds of future democratic reforms had been planted.
From 1960 to 1979, several political magazines aimed at the islands intellectual and
political elite were published35 and then banned, but their call for reform and democracy had a
profound influence on political candidates (Chai and Meyers 2000). In the late 1960s and early
1970s, encouraged by the limited electoral reforms and emboldened by these political publications
and the intellectual movement behind them, a new breed of Taiwanese politician emerged. They
called themselves dangwai candidates (translated: “outside the ruling party”) and acted as
Taiwan’s first real opposition candidates (Chai and Meyers 2000). By 1977, voters on the island
elected four dangwai candidates to be country magistrates, another 21 to the Taiwan Provincial
Assembly36, and six to Taipei’s city council (Chai and Meyers 2000). This election year was the
political equivalent of an earthquake on the island and a signal to the ruling KMT that Taiwanese
voters were hungrier for ever-increasing reform and more of the island’s elite were both listening
and willing to offer an alternative to single-party rule. Beginning in 1978, the KMT began allowing
dangwai candidates to campaign freely and without pressure from the ruling party. For this reason,
these early local elections act as a critical juncture, or periods of significant change that influence
future outcomes. During this period, Taiwanese politics become more and more influenced by a
growing opposition movement that prioritized (relative) youth, democracy and human rights, and
reform – all important to the success of same-sex marriage legalization. This growing influence
was protected by the fact that Chiang himself had promised that these local elections would be the

35
The most famous of these was Daxue zazhi (The Intellectual) which circulated from 1968-1973 before it
was banned.
36
The Taiwan Provincial Assembly was Taiwan’s early democratically elected representative body, which
fell under the authority of the executive. It was constituted of representatives from each of the country’s administrative
districts. In 2000, its duties were formally transferred to the Legislative Yuan. See Appendix G for a map of the
administrative divisions of Taiwan.
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beginning of a “democratic revolution” in Taiwan, which committed KMT leaders to, among other
things, respect the independence of the dangwai politicians.
Francis Fukuyama has written at length about all democratic states having three
characteristics in common: rule of law, a strong bureaucracy, and accountability of government to
the governed (whether through elections, or the courts, or both). Fukuyama has also written that
the order in which these characteristics become a part of the democratic fabric of as country matters
(2012). In Taiwan, a strong bureaucracy was put in place by the nationalist KMT government after
fleeing the mainland at the end of the Chinese Civil War. In the years that followed, as democratic
reforms were introduced and the island’s leadership became more and more constrained in the
name of reform and respect for human rights, rule of law was slowly strengthened37. Finally, as
elections proliferated during the early reform era, especially after the lifting of martial law and
with it the lifting of the bans on free press, free expression, and opposition parties (free
association), a tradition of accountability grew. But because this accountability came last, the
nature of democracy as it evolved in Taiwan was one for which government (i.e., bureaucracy)
was not automatically regarded with suspicion but was and is perceived as part of a potential
solution to any number of problems38. This order of evolution itself should be regarded as a critical
juncture – it means that Taiwanese SMOs and activists were comfortable working within the
system to a greater extent than LGB activists in other countries like the United States.
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Rule of law in this case being defined as a system of legal checks on government that are binding and
enforceable. We might substitute the term “constitutional” here – as in constitutional democracy. It is important to
note, however, that to qualify as having “rule of law”, this constitutionalism would have to be both de facto and de
jure.
38
Contrast this with America’s natural suspicion of authority and bureaucracy – in the US rule of law came
first, then accountability, and final bureaucracy. So, for that reason (among others), many Americans tend to think of
government solutions as a contradiction in terms. This feeling was perhaps best summed up by President Ronald
Reagan when he famously remarked that the scariest words in American English are “I’m from the government and I
am here to help.”
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This relative trust in institutions is evidenced by Taiwanese LGB activists’ willingness to
avoid more aggressive means of confrontation like the public outings, sit in protests, and other
more aggressive forms of protest surely available to them and instead focus on lobbying political
elites by appealing to a shared sense of respect for human rights. In fact, LGB SMOs like the
Equality Coalition of Taiwan made it a point to frame the call for equality not in terms of sexual
liberation, as was done in many Western democracies in the early Stonewall Era, but in terms of
universal human rights (Lin 2020; Lu 2021; Hsieh 2020; Xiao 2021). The institutional legacies of
democratic liberalization and early competitive elections in which reformers were often rewarded
made this sort of lobbying more likely to be effective – consider that the chief executive of Taiwan
was meeting with officially invited LGB activists in the capital a year before the United States
Supreme Court invalidated sodomy laws in the United States39.
Returning to the subject of early Taiwanese elections, that so many of this new crop of
political leaders swept into power during these early political reforms were native-born Taiwanese
and not mainlanders was also to have significant impact on the future of Taiwan’s politics in
general, and same-sex marriage legalization in particular. Earlier in this chapter, we read that a
respect for human rights and democratization has become part of Taiwan’s national identity, as
distinct from mainland Chinese (read communist and authoritarian) identity. While the social
forces that continue to drive this trend can be traced back to the February 28th Massacre of 1947,
as a political reality Taiwanization began during this early stage of democratic reforms.
Taiwanization is more than the simple transfer of power to native-born Taiwanese, although that
is the earliest political manifestation of the phenomenon. Taiwanization means the politization of
a developing Taiwanese identity that is distinct from the Han Chinese identity of the Communist-

39

Lawrence v. Texas, 2003.
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controlled mainland. As the link between Taiwanese identity and a respect for democracy and
human rights has been discussed in this chapter already, I will simply add here that such a link has
been reinforced by Taiwanization because the political parties have been pressured to embrace
policies favored by Taiwanese citizens, and these policies are increasingly divergent from the will
and priorities of the mainland (Horowitz and Tan 2005). As such, Taiwanization itself can be
considered a critical juncture as this process, begun in the early reform stages of Taiwanese
competitive authoritarianism, has had lasting policy implications which include the legalization of
same-sex marriage40.
Around the same time Taiwanization was exerting its influence over the island’s politics,
the lifting of martial law signaled the opening up of Taiwanese institutions to civil society,
including SMOs. But SMOs had been a growing force in Taiwan beginning in the early 1980s, at
a time when the authoritarian government signaled a limited but significant tolerance for demands
for change on their terms. Beginning in 1980 and through the 1990s, multiple social movements
emerged, which including SMOs advocating for consumers’ rights, anti-pollution, environmental
conservation, women’s rights, student’s rights (the student movement eventually helped manifest
both the Wild Lily and Sunflower Movements), the rights of Christians, labor rights, farmers’
rights, teachers’ rights, the rights of persons with handicaps, and indigenous peoples’ rights (Hsaio
1992 and 1996). While it is well beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore each of these
movements in detail, it is important to note that each of these movements had one thing in common:
each set about making demands of the state.

40
Among other implications of Taiwanization are the rise of the DPP, greater calls for independence, more
support for economic integration with the DPRC – but as coequal countries, adaptive defensive strategies aimed at
maintaining independence in the face of growing Chinese aggression, the aforementioned “queer diplomacy” aimed
at increasing external legitimacy, and even the potential for nuclear deterrent as China continues to assert regional
hegemony.
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For example, the early student movement sought less government control over education,
eventually managing to force liberalization at NTU even though the KMT maintained stricter
control at other, smaller universities for some time to come (Hsaio 1996; Wright 1999). But their
efforts were not met without opposition. Prior to the lifting of martial law, it was standard practice
at Taiwanese universities to assign loyal students as KMT “counselors” (jiaoguan) who lived with
students in the dormitories and were responsible for keeping tabs on student behavior. In addition,
each class-year included at least one individual who was a long-devoted KMT member (usually
having been recruited in high school) who was responsible for recruiting potential future party
members and for informing their superiors of potential disloyalty. The identities of these studentspies were always kept secret, even from non-KMT affiliated administrators (Wright 1999).
Emboldened by the previously discussed success of dangwai candidates in Taipei, students at NTU
began to demand greater freedom in electing student representatives to the student government
and to the relaxation of prescreening on student publications designed to stifle critique. Their
efforts culminated in the first free and open student government elections in Taiwan in 1987
(Wright 1999). When members of student organizations pushing for reform were threatened with
punishment, NTU students held demonstrations that put pressure on administrators to relent.
As students at other universities across the country became inspired by early victories and
NTU and began making demands on their own campuses, elites within the KMT moved to coopt
the student movement by directing their various government-sponsored organizations to adopt
similar demands. Leaders believed they could take control of the movement from within and
defuse it. But this strategy backfired as student groups’ demands began to reach beyond campus
reform and into larger areas of politics like human rights and liberalization. Once the door to civil
society had been opened, the government found it much more difficult to close that door than they
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had perhaps anticipated (Wright 1999). The reason this is important for same-sex marriage
legalization is that the rise of SMOs and the opening of Taiwan’s political institutions to civil
society created a new opportunity structure that later social movements, like the LGB Rights and
same-sex marriage movements could exploit. Indeed, early LGB activists often used feminist
discourse and found their first support within the feminist movement (Hsieh 2020; Lu 2021; Niachia and Fell 2021; Xiao 2020). Early SMOs not only tapped into reform-minded political alliances
led by sympathetic elites, they also engaged in various forms of contentious politics and built up a
collective repertoire of contention for Taiwanese activists that included sit-ins, marches, peaceful
demonstrations, and the publication of materials demanding reform – all of which at one time or
another were used by LGB activists in their fight to legalize same-sex marriage in Taiwan.
Multiple interviews quoted earlier in this chapter reveal the importance of the Taiwanese
Constitutional Court’s 2017 ruling that laws barring same-sex marriage violated the constitution.
This was important because it settled the political question, freeing up thew legislature to act as
the question of same-sex marriage legalization was no longer whether but when. But this ruling
might never have come about without the independence of Taiwan’s judiciary. Unlike other Third
Wave democracies that emerged after the end of the Cold War, Taiwan’s judiciary experienced of
wave of reform carried from within the judicial branch itself and carried out a coalition of reformminded judges which also could constitute a social movement. In 1993, a group of reform-minded
judges in the Taichung District Court set about enacting judicial reforms in the name of human
rights and democracy.
Under the single-party rule of the KMT, the ruling party exercised a great control over the
judiciary. They did this in two ways, first by making it very hard to pass the bar examination
needed to begin a career as a judge and second by creating a rigid system of promotion to full
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judgeship which would allow them to seed out “undesirable” candidates before they could become
full judges (Wang 2010). In addition, party loyalists still exerted a great deal of control over case
assignment, ensuring that cases involving bribery allegations, for example, would be assigned to
KMT-controlled or sympathetic judges. These policies allowed the KMT to exert a great deal of
control over who got to be a judge (Wang 2010). Partly for this reason, prior to reform the
Taiwanese judicial branch was regarded as the “most conservative institution in Taiwanese
society” and an integral part of maintaining KMT control of the government through favoritism
and corruption (Wang 2010, 131). But this early group of reformers, who first met in Room 303
of the Taichung District Court House, wanted Taiwan’s judiciary to be fully independent and
governed by rule of law. These early judicial reformers, despite their different politics, had two
other things in common besides their desire for reform: each came from lower middle-class
families rather than elite lineage, and each was under the age of 40 (Wang 2010). Through a
strategy of non-politicized reform based on reading of the law, these judges were able to gather
supporters in the judiciary in other cities and, together were able to accomplish several reforms
that went on to ensure the independence of the Taiwanese judiciary, including case assignment
reform, reform to the judge selection process, and reform to the judicial budgeting process (Wang
2010). While none of these reforms in themselves touched on human rights issues per se, without
these reforms the judiciary would have been far less free to rule in human rights related cases in a
way that would be contrary to established policy.
Two of the subjects I interviewed commented on the legal philosophies of the justices who
ruled in the same-sex marriage case as being influenced by the reforms undertaken during this era,
both to the judiciary and to Taiwan’s political system as a whole. In their view, it would have been
less likely that the Court would rule in such a way so as to challenge the state had their philosophies
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been otherwise (Hsieh 2020; Lin 2020). Other subjects I interviewed commented that the
independence of the judiciary itself was essential to the same-sex marriage ruling – and
independence that would not have been possible without these reforms (ChiB 2020; Lu 2020).
Because of this, we can consider these reforms to the judiciary, popularly known as the 303
Movement, as another critical juncture that made same-sex marriage legalization more likely in
Taiwan.
4.5

Conclusion and Lessons Learned for Case Comparison
Research and field work quoted and/or referenced in the chapter confirms the findings of

the quantitative analysis in Chapter 3, that for same-sex marriage to be legalized in Taiwan there
had to be a high degree of LGB mobilization capacity, which included a relatively high degree of
LGB power; an open system to civil society that allowed for TANs to take advantage of
opportunities to connect with local SMOs and advocates though high-profile events like large Pride
celebrations; and an embrace of post-material emancipative and secular values. There also had to
exist legal and judicial opportunity structures that permitted these LGB SMOs and activists access
to the levers of power such that they were capable of challenging the state, and these structures
often came about as the result of critical junctures during Taiwan’s reform period as it transitioned
from authoritarian rule to democracy. The field work and research also confirm that country
specific variables can help explain why Taiwan legalized first, and these were Taiwan’s open
culture, its distinct Taiwanese identity, and the influence of youth and reform movements within
the system. This combination of variables would be unique to Taiwan.
The next chapter will show that in the case of Colombia, mobilization capacity,
opportunities for TANs, and Emancipative and Secular Values are all important but that courts
will also play a pivotal and country-specific role and that LGB SMOs in that country used the
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courts, and more importantly a form of judicial politics to win same-sex marriage legalization. It
will also show how Japan (as compared to Taiwan in the Sinic East) and Mexico (as compared to
Colombia in Modicum Low countries), two countries in which LGB SMOs also benefit from high
mobilization capacity, opportunities for TANs, and an embrace of Emancipative and Secular
Values, have country-specific variables explaining why they have not legalized as expected. In
addition, the next chapter will show some key differences within those three macro-variables that
could also explain the unexpected outcome in Japan and Mexico. In the case of Japan, there are
differences in the LGB bar culture that make bars less of an opportunity for significant
mobilization and there are differences in the judiciary that change the nature of the opportunity
structures there. In Japan, youth have also been significantly less likely to become involved in
politics, leaving social policy in the hands of their more traditional parents and grandparents. In
the case of Mexico, aspects to Mexican democracy, including federalism, regime type, and age of
democracy have potentially made access to same-sex marriage uneven even though that country’s
highest Court has ruled that bans against same-sex marriage are a violation of the constitution,
resulting in roughly 20% of the population lacking access to same-sex marriage rights.
4.6

Summary
Taiwan is the Sinic East’s first country to legalize same-sex marriage because of strong

LGB ability to mobilize, specifically a thriving bar scene and access to elite allies; and open civil
society providing opportunities for TANs to take advantage of major events like Pride to network
with and support domestic actors; and a wide-spread embrace of Emancipative and Secular Values,
including a uniquely Taiwanese interpretation of Confucian value systems. This is in keeping with
expectations derived from the theory and quantitative analysis. But country specific variables also
help explain why Taiwan legalized before other countries in the Sinic East, like Japan, which the
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theory indicates should have been more likely to legalize than Taiwan. These country specific
variables include an open culture that permits the assimilation of outside values into its matrix, a
history of youth involvement in politics that has historically added to pressure for reform, the
Taiwanization of domestic and international politics, and opportunity structures which both
favored SMO participation in contentious politics and judicial activism.

5

CASE-PAIR COMPARISIONS IN THE SINIC EAST: JAPAN AND TAIWAN
The last Chapter examined the question of why Taiwan legalized same-sex marriage first

in the Sinic East. Lessons learned from this analysis are that a thriving bar scene and access to elite
allies; and open civil society providing opportunities for TANs to take advantage of major events
like Pride to network with and support domestic actors; and a wide-spread embrace of
Emancipative and Secular Values, including a uniquely Taiwanese interpretation of Confucian
value systems helped to create favorable conditions for same-sex marriage legalization. In this
Chapter, the hypothesis will be tested qualitatively in the case pairs of Taiwan-Japan and
Colombia-Mexico (full legalizers listed first in the pairs).
Within each case pair, first there will be a general comparison of the state of LGB rights in
each country. This will include a brief analysis of the history of LGB rights and LGB activism in
each, or a brief review in the case of Taiwan as this was already presented in detail in the last
Chapter. Then, the RI hypothesis for each country will be presented as it was for Taiwan in the
last Chapter (see Figure 4-2). This will include an examination of the preconditions, the
independent variables of mobilization capacity, opportunities for TANs, and values, and of the
potential country specific variables which could be the focus of future analysis. Finally, the
Chapter will close with a conclusion based on the analysis presented in each case pair.
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This Chapter first turns to a region-based comparative case pair study involving Taiwan,
the first legalizer in the Sinic East region, and Japan, the highest scoring country for the region in
the RI and the highest-ranking country not to have legalized same-sex marriage. Countries in the
Sinic East tend to be culturally heavily influenced, if not dominated by, Chinese tradition and
Confucianism rather than Buddhism. Unlike countries dominated by Abrahamic religions, in the
Sinic East religion has traditionally been a private matter and tends to lack the political and social
influence found in some other regions, unless it is being used by the state to enforce authoritarian
rule as it was in pre-democratic Taiwan. But that is not to say that religion has no bearing on life
in East Asia, it just influences behavior in a more subtle way.
There should be a brief note on methodology before going on - unfortunately, sample sizes
for regions (like the Sinic East) and clusters (like Modicum Low) are far too small to utilize tools
like correlation analysis or regression analysis to test variables for their significance within those
groups. So, analysis will be guided, as it was in the case of Taiwan, based on quantitative results
either from the RI as a whole or on analysis done on regions or clusters as a whole.
Any conversation about the Sinic East region has to begin with an understanding of what
comparative researchers have termed Asian values. C. Y. Yoon first articulated for academic
purposes the four claims generally made by proponents of the Asian Values theory, especially East
Asian governments:
The “Asian Values” theory, in brief, makes four claims. First,
human rights are not universal, and neither can they be globalized.
They emerge differently according to the context of particular
social, economic, cultural, and political conditions. Second, Asian
societies are not centered on the individual but on the family. The
nation is like a big family. It supposedly comes naturally for Asians
to let the combined interests of the family and the nation go before
the interests of each individual. Third, Asian societies rank social
and economic rights over an individual’s political rights. Finally, the
right of a nation to self-determination includes a government’s
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domestic jurisdiction over human rights. This implies that other
nations should not interfere with the internal affairs of a state,
including its human rights policy” (Yoon 2004, 155).
Consensus, unity, harmony, and community are said to be the priorities valued most highly in East
Asian countries (Huntington 1996; Yoon 2004). This contrasts with what is commonly understood
to be the core value of Western liberalism, individualism, which brings conflict and disunity.
Critics of the Asian Values theory, however, point out that the Asian values argument is most often
employed by countries that wish to violate what the West views as universal human rights. Leaving
aside debates about the application of the Asian Values theory for the moment, understanding
where these values supposedly come from will shed light on why this region is named the “Sinic”
East – or Chinese East.
Modern Chinese culture is derived from values and traditions set forth in the Han Dynasty
(206 BCE-220 CE) – in fact the inheritors of this legacy today refer to themselves as “Han
Chinese.” It was during the Han Dynasty that the values of the scholar and philosopher Confucius
were used to create a political culture, centered around a meritocratic civil service bureaucracy
based on Confucian values41. As the Han conquered territory stretching from Korea and Manchuria
in the north to northern Vietnam in the south and west to the borders of modern Xinjiang province,
which closely corresponds with census figures showing provinces in which 80% or more Chinese
surveyed identity as “Han” (see Figure 5.1).

41

Confucian Values are understood to be benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and fidelity.
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Source: The Economist 2016

Figure 5-1: Examples of Taiwan’s “Queer” Diplomacy
During the Han Dynasty, young aristocrats could study Confucian values in preparation
for the civil service exam. In subsequent dynasties, the civil service was opened to any worthy
scholar, aristocratic or not, which created a new elite of scholar bureaucrats. Those males wishing
to achieve upward mobility could attend local universities where they would be trained in
Confucian values and classic writings, and these became the dominant values of Han Chinese
culture. Future dynasties would carry these values to the lands they conquered, and Chinese
merchants would carry those values to the lands in which they traded or lived. This is one factor
leading to the Sinic cultural dominance of the region.
The Qing Dynasty (1644 CE-1912 CE) at one time or another controlled territory in present
China, Mongolia, and Taiwan, as well as parts of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and India. But
they also inherited from the Ming Dynasty what Western scholars since the 1940s have called “the
tribute system.” This is another factor that has led to Sinic cultural dominance. Weaker states
bordering the Chinese Empire and falling under its hegemony regularly sent emissaries to the
Chinese emperor to pay tribute – that is to acknowledge the superiority and authority of China. In
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return, those states received favorable terms of trade and even military protection under certain
circumstances. And, while Korean and Japanese kings at various points during the Ming Dynasty
challenged that hegemony from time-to-time, for nearly six hundred years China was the dominant
military, economic, and cultural force in East Asia (Lee 2016). That military, economic, and
cultural hegemony was reinforced through the tribute system.
The weight of centuries of Chinese hegemony can be felt in East Asia even today. Japanese
culture has roots in Tang Dynasty traditions. Korean art and literature, K-Pop not withstanding,
show a strong Chinese influence. Japan, Korea, and Vietnam used Chinese characters in their
written languages for centuries, and Japan and South Korea still do in some cases. One
consequence of Chinese hegemony in the region was the spread of Confucian morality: respect for
parents and hierarchy, loyalty to family and government, and “keeping to one’s place” in society
(Bader 2005, Adamczyk 2017). Because of the centrality of family to Confucian morality,
individuals are seen to have a duty to their parents and ancestors to have children of their own and
thus continue the family lineage. In large part for this reason, homosexuality has often been either
discouraged or condemned throughout much of Chinese history, though not for the same reasons
that homosexuality was condemned in European states (Adamczyk 2017). Homosexuality was
(and still is in many cases) seen as immoral because it is a deriliction of one’s duty to procreate. It
should be noted, however, that many countries in the Sinic East either never had any laws against
sodomy, or adopted them only after the openning of trade with industrializing Western powers.
According to traditional interpretations of Confucian morality, homosexuality represents the
shunning of the community in favor of the desires of the individual. But, scholarship on
development and modernization assert that as countries modernize and grow richer, religious
traditions should hold less sway. Persons in Sinic East countries have typically expressed lower
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levels of religiosity than their counterparts in Latin America, the Orthodox East, the Islamic East,
or in much of the West. Countries like Singapore and Japan have higher GDP per capita than the
U.S. or the U.K. or the Netherlands (Inglehart and Welzel 2005 and 2020). And yet, the Sinic East
lags behind much of the rest of the world in terms of its tolerance for homosexuality. Returning
our attention to the quantitative analysis in Chapter 3 in the Section on case selection, Sinic East
countries have a lower probability of same-sex marriage legalization at almost any given score
than do their counterparts in other regions (refer to Figure 3-14).
To date, Taiwan is the only country in the Sinic East that recognizes same-sex marriage
marriages, and none recognize civil unions. This is in part due to the reimagining of Confucian
values in Taiwan discussed in the last chapter, in which benevolence, righteousness, propriety,
wisdom, and fidelity are recontextualized to be compatible with evolving sexual and social norms
which challenge the traditional heteronormativity that has been the foundation of the accepted
form of family for much of human history. But there has been some progress in the region, outside
of Taiwan however.
Some cities in Japan issue ceremonial certificates to same-sex couples recognizing their
bond, but these come with no legal rights or privileges and are entirely symbolic (Masanori 2016;
Osumi 2016). Same-sex partners of residents of Hong Kong may apply for and receive spousal
visas and spousal benefits (Kang-chung 2018; Chan 2019). Mongolia offers some broad
protections, but it is not included in the RI for data availability reasons (ILGA 2020). But this
progress is not universal throughout the region.
South Korea and Vietnam offer no benefits of any kind to same-sex couples, symbolic or
otherwise. Singapore, up until very recently, maintained a colonial-era sodomy law inherited from
the British Empire that criminalizes same-sex sexual activity between men, even though the law
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has yet to be enforced post-independence (Bader 2005, Adamczyk 2017). Outside of Taiwan, the
environment for same-sex couples in most of the Sinic East ranges from mostly indifferent to
unwelcoming. China has even started cracking down on LGB events, backtracking from what
seemed like progress over the last decade. In 2020, Shanghai Pride was cancelled by Chinese
authorities for the first time in its elevan year history, meaning that there are now now LGB Pride
events in mainland China (Zhang 2020).
The RI predicts Japan, not Taiwan, to be the most likely country to break from Chinese
Confucian cultural hegemony, but Japan has yet to offer any protections or recognition at all for
same-sex couples, beyond the previously mentioned symbolic certificates available in a handful
of prefectures. And it is Taipei, not Tokyo, that boasts the largest Pride celebration in the region
and is considered to be the most LGB-friendly city in East Asia. Despite COVID restrictions
making international travel into Taiwan almost impossible, it is estimated that around 130,000
people attended Taipei’s 2020 Pride celebration in October. And the Ximen District – home to
Taipei’s gayborhood located around the Red House – is often awash in rainbow flags even when
Pride isn’t being celebrated. For all of these reasons, Taiwan has a reputation is the best destination
for LGB persons in all of East Asia. (see Figure 5-2).
The next sections of this Chapter will briefly review the progress made in Taiwan and
explore in some detail the relative lack of it in Japan. Special attention will be paid to RI variables
that research suggests are of particular importance in the region. And, just as in the last chapter,
country-specific variables unique to Japan that could be hindering progress towards same-sex
marriage legalization will be identified and briefly discussed.
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Source: ILGA 2020

Figure 5-2: LGB Rights Environment of the Sinic East
5.1

Refresher on the History of LGB Rights in Taiwan
As covered at length in the last chapter, a shared sense of LGB identity became possible

with the publication of the popular novel Crystal Boys, and that identity took on a political
dimension when LGB SMOs like TSAN began using the language of community as part of
political demonstrations and protests. As Taiwan began to liberalize and transition from an
authoritarian state to a liberal democracy, the human rights claims of SMOs became an organic
part of the democratization process, making a respect for human rights, including LGB rights, a
part of democratic Taiwan’s national identity. LGB groups mobilized resources – including using
LGB bars as both meeting places and as venues to present the public face of the LGB community
as good neighbors, business partners, and members of the community. In part because of the
importance of human rights to Taiwan’s national identity and political culture, LGB activists were
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able to cultivate political allies within the DPP, Taiwan’s first opposition party and the party in
control of Taiwan’s government since 2016.
Starting in 2003, Taiwan began holding Pride celebrations, and the yearly Pride event in
Taipei has become the largest in East Asia, presenting numerous high-profile opportunities for
domestic LGB SMOs and activists to connect with Western LGB SMOs through TANs.
Organizations like the Marriage Equality Coalition formed to combine and coordinate the efforts
of local activists and SMOs and provide more efficient ways to network through TANs. And,
Taiwan has a history of incorporating outside values into their culture, including emancipative and
secular values which prioritize equality and freedom of choice. So, the combination of ample LGB
mobilization capacity, numerous opportunities for SMOs to make connections through TANs, and
an embrace of post-material values made Taiwan more likely to legalize same-sex marriage, which
it did in 2019.
But there are also country-specific variables which may have played a role in Taiwan’s
status as first-adopter in the Sinic East. The multiculturalism of Taiwan, as evidenced by the many
architectural styles seen in Taipei and the blending of numerous religions into a faith-way that is
uniquely Taiwanese, likely played a role in same-sex marriage legalization. The fact that youth
movements, including grassroots student protest movements like the Wild Lilies or the Sunflower
Movement focusing on human rights, were an integral part of Taiwan’s liberalization process and
identity formation through Taiwanization may also be significant. Taiwan’s unique status as a
country that is de facto independent of China but unable to engage in traditional forms of
diplomacy, forcing Taiwan to use the power of attraction through the promotion of universalist
human rights, including LGB rights, to gain the support of Western allies and to differentiate
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themselves from authoritarian Communist China likely also played a role in making same-sex
marriage legalization more likely.
The next subsection will examine the presence (or lack of it) of preconditions in Japan as
well as the Japanese LGB community’s mobilization capacity, opportunities for Japanese LGB
SMOs to connect with outside allies through TANs, and Japan’s embrace of post-material values
in order to determine why Japan has not legalized, even though the RI shows them as more likely
to have done so. Then, potential country-specific barriers to legalization, including differences in
the LGB bar culture, differences in the Japanese judiciary and their approach to human rights
issues, and a lack of youth involvement in politics will also be explored. But first, the next
subsection will present a brief history of LGB rights in Japan as a means of providing a little
historical context.
5.2

The History of LGB Rights in Japan
Homosexual activity has only ever been criminalized briefly during the Meiji era, from

1872-1880. Since 1880, consensual homosexual sex has been legal in Japan. But social acceptance
is another matter. When male homosexuality is depicted in modern Japan, it is often conflated with
transgenderism, transsexuality, or youthful indiscretion and curiosity42. The word most commonly
used to describe a male homosexual is okama which literally means “pot” but colloquially means
“queen” and in Japanese slang means “buttocks” (Lunsing 1995 and 1997; McLelland 2000 and
2006). Early depictions of male homosexuals in post-war Japan were as cross-dressing male
prostitutes known as danshō. Danshō were always depicted as passive recipients in male-to-male
sexual encounters and were often thought of as ūruningu, literally having a “female soul” in an

42

Historically, prior to the Meiji Era, Japanese male homosexuality was often depicted as Nanshoku, or
pederastic relationships between either older and younger samurai warriors or between young kabuki actors and their
male patrons. This could explain the modern depiction of homosexuality described here, but more research is needed.

170
effeminate male body (McLelland 2006). Later depictions of male homosexuality during the socalled Japanese “Gay Boom” of the late 1960s and 1970s presented gay men as sex-obsessed. In
early gay magazines like Barazoku, Japan’s first magazine aimed at gay men, there was little talk
of politics or communal identity or even of non-sexual relationships. But there was plenty of
erotica and advertisement of masturbatory aids. And adds for marriages to women as a way of
camouflaging their homosexual desires were also prevalent (Lunsing 2008).
However, the most popular depiction of male homosexual desire was and is actually aimed
at young heterosexual women. A certain genre of manga, or Japanese graphic novels, depict
conventionally attractive, effeminate young men engaging in homosexual sex or romantic
relationships, sometimes nonconsensual in nature, and are intended for a primarily heterosexual
female audience (McLelland 2000). Categorically, these manga are known as yaoi and frequently
depict instances of what can be described as rape or sexual assault. But these rapes are not always
depicted as violent, criminal acts but very often rather as manifestations of uncontrollable sexual
desire ignited by the irresistible beauty of these effeminate young men that ultimately culminates
with the two men falling in love (Kazumi 2003; McLelland 2006). Once again, these characters
conflate male homosexuality with hypersexuality and transgenderism – the men in these manga,
at least the objects of the initial desire that creates the dramatic tension of the stories, are almost
always delicately beautiful and androgenous. This depiction resonates because, as McLelland
observes,
The idea that same-sex attraction necessarily involves some kind of
transgenderism or desire to be like or even become the opposite of
one’s biological sex is constantly reinforced by Japanese media
which discuss homosexuality and transgenderism in the same
context (2006, 461).
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This is not to be confused with another type of manga called bara, which are erotic graphic novels
by gay men written for gay men depicting same-sex desire and sexual acts between stereotypically
masculine-looking men and as more consensual in nature. See Figure 5-3 for a comparison
between the artistic styles of the two.

Sources: Kincaid 2013 and Kolbeins 2014.
Figure 5-3: Contrasting Depictions of Male Homosexuality in Yaoi and Bara Manga
But why is this issue of depiction important to same-sex marriage legalization? This
hypersexualized characterization of homosexuality as being gender-bending, perverse,
transgressive, or even initially non-consensual against the backdrop a fairly conservative
Confucian culture are just one factor that exerts pressure to keep homosexual men from coming
out as gay. The men depicted in the stories of these manga often do not identify as homosexual,
they are merely in love with one another and pursue a sexual relationship, helpless to resist their
urges. In the case of the yaoi, this sexual relationship starts as involuntary, with the seme (top)
pursuing and overpowering the uke (bottom) who subsequently comes to see the seme as a
dominant romantic partner and protector. The relationships depicted in the bara are similarly
problematic, from a Western sensibility, and usually involve an older or more powerful man using
a younger or less powerful man for sexual gratification. Themes of bondage and sadomasochism
are common (McLelland 2000; Kincaid 2013; Kolbeins 2014; Ishii, et. Al. 2014). Neither of these
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are healthy depictions of same-sex love between two men capable of enjoying a shared identity
that might encourage one to come out. Since the 1990s, popular media in Japan has begun to
present more positive portrayals of non-heterosexual celebrities. It is likely not a coincidence that
(male) homosexuality is depicted in this way and that there are no national protections for LGB
Japanese against discrimination and no legal recognition of same-sex relationships.
5.3

The RI Theory of same-sex marriage Legalization in Japan
Returning to the original theory, conditions which make same-sex marriage legalization

more likely are – 1) a minimal level of emancipative and secular values, 2) high LGB mobilization
capacity, and 3) the presence of opportunities for Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) to
form partnerships with domestic actors. These factors increase the likelihood that domestic social
movement organizations (SMOs) acting within their movement will use contentious politics to put
pressure on elites through existing opportunity structures – either legal or political – to accept the
norm or LGB equality thus making it more likely that same-sex marriage will be legalized. But
before these conditions can be met, two preconditions must also be fulfilled: LGB persons must
form a sense of community – of a common and uniting struggle, and democratic institutions must
provide access to opportunity structures. These next subsections will show that Japan fails to meet
the identity precondition and that Japan’s specific iteration of democracy creates unique challenges
to LGB activists. They will also show that emancipative and secular values are not as readily
embraced concerning sexual norms, that mobilization capacity is limited due to differences in the
LGB bar scene, and that opportunities for TANs are limited due to the relatively closed nature of
Japanese civil society. Further, there are country-specific variables in Japan which are possibly
working against legalization of same-sex marriage, including a lack of youth involvement in
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politics and a judiciary that has remained largely closed to challenging the state on human rights
issues.
5.3.1 Preconditions of LGB Identity Formation and Democratization in Japan
LGB identity formation is a key precondition for social movements to coalesce and
advocate for change. Without a shared sense of LGB identity – an imagined community – there
can be no sense of shared struggle against heteronormative oppression. The first step to ending
this oppression is often coming out. Western studies on the act of coming out have identified the
process as having stages involving coming out to oneself as non-heterosexual and then coming out
to others as such, with identity synthesis or integration being the ultimate and desired result (See
Table 5-1, reproduced from Motoyama 2016, page 18).
Table 5-1: Comparison of Cass’s and Coleman’s Coming Out Models

Source: Motoyama 2016, page 18
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Partly because of the way Japanese non-heterosexual sex is often depicted, and
partly because of the unique way Japanese tend to conceive of identity43, there is little coherent
LGB community in Japan as westerners might recognize it – though that is starting to slowly
change – because many LGB Japanese simply do not publicly come out to others often, and when
they do it is usually to other homosexuals (Motoyama 2016). Thus, many Japanese LGB persons
are stuck in Cass’ Stage 2 or Stage 3 or Coleman’s 1st Stage or 2nd Stage. This makes political
action much more difficult. There may be some hope that prospects for LGB Japanese to come out
to others will improve. That it hasn’t yet, or at best that it has only slowly improved, may well be
part of the explanation why there have not been greater strides towards LGB equality, including
same-sex marriage legalization, in this highly developed country.
There is another aspect of heteronormativity that effects the formation of a cohesive LGB
culture in Japan. That is the fact that one’s citizenship in Japan is expressed in terms of one’s
paternal familial lineage and one’s marital status. Since consensual same-sex sexual relationships
in Japan are not recognized as valid, and since LGB couples do not have adoption rights in Japan,
the concept of family in Japan is entirely heteronormative, and by extension the concept of
citizenship is as well (Baudette 2016). To be Japanese is to be assumed to be a heterosexual, by
definition. The Japanese nation is defined, in part, by heteronormativity – and any homosexual
relationships which may occur in private are expected to be discreet and fleeting.
For this reason, Japanese LGB persons suffer from an internalized homophobia that leads
them to expect their parents, teachers, coworkers, bosses, friends, etc. will not except them if they
come out publicly (Motoyama 2015). The assumption is that coming out, for the reasons

43
Japanese identity formation involves navigating one’s place in their seken, or traditional group. Under this
model, homosexuality is considered kegare (unnatural, impure, disgraceful) because it goes against the notion of
conformity within the seken. For more on the effects of Japanese identity formation and LGB identity, see Motoyama
2016.
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previously mentioned, will disappoint the authority figures in an LGB person’s life. Another
element to this internalized homophobia is the fact that most Japanese LGB persons are cognizant
of the fact that Japanese society, relatively speaking for the region, is tolerant of homosexuals.
Japanese police do not have a history of raiding gay-owned establishments. The sodomy law
criminalizing homosexual activity in Japan, passed at a time when Japanese elites were attempting
to modernize by emulating behaviors of Western powers, was abolished in 1880. But this tolerance
is extended at a price – silence. Given these realities, coming out is often seen as needlessly
disruptive (Tamagawa 2018). In such a tolerant society the need for confrontational political
activism seems much less urgent. The fact that relatively low numbers of Japanese LGB persons
are willing to come out as such makes the identity formation that is a precursor to an effective
social movement difficult. Interestingly, gay and bisexual men refer to themselves as kocchi
euphemistically, which can mean “here”, “over here”, or “our side” (Moriyama 2010). And, while
this term does imply a kind of group awareness – as in “our side” – it avoids the use of more
straightforward and potentially politically powerful terms for identity.
Turning to the issue of democracy in Japan, while Taiwan democratized through a process
of elite-driven liberalization, Taiwanization, and grassroots pressure for greater respect of human
rights, Japan’s modern transition to democracy came at the point of a gun, so-to-speak. During
Japan’s Meiji Era, there were nominal democratic institutions, but the Meiji Constitution of 1889
vested sovereignty in the emperor and in the wake of the Great Depression, Japan descended into
a fascist military dictatorship. It wasn’t until the adoption of the 1947 “MacArthur Constitution”
that the concept of popular sovereignty was institutionalized in Japan (see Figure 5-4). Under this
new constitution, women were given the right to vote, civil liberties were introduced, local
governments were strengthened, land reforms and labor protections were enacted, and mandated
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civics lessons were taught in schools (Colombia University 2022; Council on Foreign Relations
2022; Huntington 1991; Kohli 2004; Scheiner 2006; Takemae 2002).
But, since shortly after the end of the American Occupation in 1952, the conservative
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has maintained a virtual stranglehold on national politics,
controlling the government for the vast majority of the last seven decades by institutionalizing a
form of corruption driven by clientelism which creates strong incentives for local governments,
organizations, and politicians to align with the central government, dominated by the LDP. This is
especially true in rural areas, where the LDP has been able to use centralized control of fiscal
policy to deliver pork-barrel benefits to Japanese prefectures. This creates a sort of dual system in
Japan in which urban districts are competitive while rural ones are not (Bowen and Kassiola 2016;
Pekkanen et al 2018; Scheiner 2006).

Source: V-Dem 2021
Figure 5-4: Democracy in the Sinic East
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For the study of same-sex marriage legalization, this is significant in that, while Japan
democratized earliest in the Sinic East, the way in which Japan democratized in an absence of
grassroots activism and the clientelism-driven single-party dominance of the LDP which is
dependent on rural support have combined to create significant challenges. Japanese, particularly
in rural areas, have also demonstrated a resilient resistance to accepting the norm of same-sex
marriage legalization. According to a 2021 Ipsos poll measuring approval for same-sex marriage
in 27 countries, Japan had an approval rating of 69%, placing between South Africa and Peru44.
This is a remarkable improvement since 2013, when Ipsos conducted a similar poll asking the
same question, and in that poll only 24% of Japanese respondents indicated an acceptance of samesex marriage – the second lowest in the survey after Poland45 (Ipsos 2013). Further, in a 2019 Pew
Research poll, 38,426 people in 34 countries were asked if they approved of homosexuality, and
in Japan 68% of respondents indicated that “homosexuality should be accepted by society.46” And,
yet, despite this seemingly widespread approval only two prefectures in the whole country offer
nonbinding partnership certificates in all municipalities – Ibaraki and Osaka, though several others
offer then in some municipalities (see Figure 5-5). But, even in Osaka the judiciary has been slow
to except the same-sex marriage norm, as will be discussed later in this chapter, having found that
prohibitions on same-sex marriage do not violate the Japanese constitution. The policy lag on
same-sex marriage could be explained by the alliance between the conservative LDP and its rural
voters who tend to be less accepting of LGB rights norms. If further study shows this to be the

44

Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, France, Germany, Hungary,
India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain,
Sweden, Turkey, the UK, and the US were included in this survey.
45
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, South
Korea, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US were the countries included in the survey.
46
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway,
Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the
UK, and the US were the countries included in the survey.
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case, it could explain how single-party control in Japan creates challenges to same-sex marriage
legalization.

Source: The Economist 2021
Figure 5-5: consensual same-sex sexual relationships Recognition Limited in Japan
5.3.2 Mobilization Capacity, Opportunities for TANs, and Values in Japan
Japan outperforms Taiwan in the RI – Japan has a rank/score of 13/849 while Taiwan’s in
16/798. These countries are the two top ranked and scored countries in the Sinic East. South Korea
comes in third at a rank/score of 34/563. When comparing the two countries at the dimension level,
the two countries score well in all three variables of Mobilization Capacity, Transnational
Advocacy Networks, and Values (see Figure 5-6). When drilling into the individual measured
components of these variables, we can see some clear indicators of possible critical differences
that could help explain Taiwan’s legalizing same-sex marriage first while Japan has yet failed to
make any significant steps towards doing so – and indeed remains the only one of the top-ten RI
countries not to have done so. Taiwan significantly outperforms Japan in LGB Power – this is
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actually Japan’s worst-performing variable (see Figure 5-7). In Chapter 3, it was indicated that this
could prove a decisive variable to consider – at least for the Sinic East.

Figure 5-6: Mobilization, TANs, and Values in Japan and Taiwan

Figure 5-7: The Importance of LGB Power in Japan and Taiwan
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But there are some other issues that might occasion a re-examination of other variables, in
much the same way that Emancipative and Secular Values were in the case of Taiwan in
accounting for that country’s unique take on Confucian Values as reinforces of human rights
norms. According to a simple count of LGB Bars, Japan outperforms Taiwan significantly. But a
deeper examination of how LGB bars operate in Japan will offer added insight and potentially
evidence to warrant reconfiguring the variable in future analysis. Secondly, Japan’s Civil Society
is ranked as slightly better than Taiwan’s in V-Dem, but Civicus notes that Japan’s civil society
environment is less open to than Taiwan’s, which could indicate a crucial difference in opportunity
structures in the two countries that needs to be explored (Civicus 2020). This subsection will detail
these elements of the theory that may be holding Japan back from legalizing same-sex marriage.
As we will see, Japanese LGB SMOs face a number of challenges that Taiwanese LGB SMOs did
not face in their efforts to legalize same-sex marriage. These include barriers to mobilization in
the form of a lack of suitable public spaces in which to gather and reduced political power for LGB
persons. Additionally, Japan’s civil society is more closed off than Taiwan’s, thus potentially
depriving LGB SMOs of opportunities to avail themselves of the benefits of TANs devoted to
same-sex marriage legalization. All of these factors help explain why Japan, though it scores
higher in the RI overall, was not the first in the Sinic East to legalize same-sex marriage.
5.3.2.1

Challenges to Mobilization Capacity in Japan

In the Chapter on Taiwan, LGB Power was highlighted as an important component of
mobilization – and it also happens to be the one measure for which Japan and Taiwan are the
furthest apart. As a refresher, the V-Dem variable of “Power distributed by sexual orientation (C)
(v2pepwrort)” is an ordinal variable with a 0-4 score. The values are indicated as follows:

181
0: LGBs are entirely excluded from the public sphere and thus deprived of any real political
power (even though they may possess formal powers such as the ballot).
1: LGBs have much less political power than heterosexuals. LGBs enjoy formal rights to
participate in politics but are subject to informal norms that often serve to exclude them
from the halls of power.
2: LGBs have somewhat less political power than heterosexual citizens.
3: LGBs have about the same political power as heterosexuals. Each group enjoys degree
of political power that is roughly proportional to their population.
4: LGBs enjoy somewhat more political power than heterosexuals by virtue of greater
wealth, education, and high level of organization and mobilization.
These are the values that are used to create the measure in the RI, and it should be noted
that no country in the RI or in the entire V-Dem dataset scores a “4” on this measure. While Taiwan
scored a “2” on the scale, Japan scored a “1” – indicating significant lack of power of the LGB
community in Japan. There are only four countries that score a “1” on this measure that have
legalized same-sex marriage: Australia, Colombia, Ecuador, and South Africa. So, while it is
evidently possible for countries to legalize same-sex marriage even though LGB persons in those
countries have “much less political power than heterosexuals”, it is not the statistical norm. The
closest Japan has come for the kind of empowering political support given to Taiwanese LGB
persons by their elites is that in 2009, Japanese officials in the Justice Ministry began providing
Japanese LGB persons of legal age to apply for paperwork allowing them to marry citizens of
other countries in which same-sex marriage had been legalized but these marriages would have to
be performed in those countries and would not be recognized as valid in Japan. In 2021 a Japanese
district court in Sapporo ruled that bars against same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, but a
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district court in Osaka handed down a contradictory ruling in 2022 (BBC News 2021; NPR 2022).
This means that the Japanese Supreme Court will have to decide the issue eventually, and as we’ll
see later in this Chapter, the prospects of a victory for LGB SMOs are unlikely.
The previously discussed challenges to coming out for Japanese non-heterosexuals
certainly contribute to this significant lack of political power. And the lack of public approval for
LGB rights from political elites – partially because of LDP control of the political system that
relies on rural support – only exacerbates and reinforces both attitudes against LGB equality and
internalized homophobia, both of which are disempowering for SMOs. It could be possible that an
availability of public spaces in which to organize an emergent movement. But, as we will see, the
LGB bars in Japan (Tokyo, specifically) provide no such opportunity for mobilization on a large
scale.
We know from earlier quantitative and qualitative analysis that LGB bars have played a
particularly important role for SMOs in countries with legalized same-sex marriage when the
movements in those countries were in their emergent and coalescent phases. For many reasons,
the same may not be true in Japan. The history of gay bars is very different in Japan than in most
Western countries, or even in Taiwan. Japanese gay bars historically serve as small businesses
where young Japanese men go to meet potential sexual partners or for prostitutes to meet potential
clients. Beginning in the late 1950s, these geibā (Japanese transliteration of gay bar) began
springing up in what had historically been the heterosexual red-light district, and, with this
proliferation, they began catering to both male and female clientele (McLelland 2006). Because
there was no sodomy law and police generally left geibā alone, these businesses could advertise
openly as such and did so – attempting to attract both heterosexual and homosexual clientele.
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Modern-day LGB bars in Japan no longer focus on catering to both homosexual and
heterosexual clientele, but they have retained some character of the historical geibā. For example,
Tokyo’s modern gay bar scene in the Shinjuku Ni-Chome – Tokyo’s gayborhood – could best be
described as bifurcated. There are larger bars which cater mainly to tourists or expats and the
Japanese LGB persons who frequent them are interested in meeting foreigners. These are the bars
one is likely to find advertised in travel guides aimed at foreign LGB tourists. The smaller venues
that cater to local Japanese LGB clientele, and which might potentially serve as a place for early
resource mobilization are a different matter.
These bars are usually quite small, some as small as 10’ by 10’, and typically seat between
four and six customers in total but never more than ten or fifteen (Senju 2018; Japan Visitor 2020).
Because space is at such a premium, it is not uncommon for these smaller gay bars to specialize in
the clientele they want to attract. Visitors who are not the target clientele can be barred from entry,
but even if they are not, the reception they receive will be typically polite but chilly (Japan Visitor
2020). This tendency to specialize is indicated by the suffix sen47, which is short for senmon,
meaning “specialty.” According to LGB travel blogs which share information for those wishing to
travel to Japan and experience a more authentic bar scene, some examples of sen that a Japanese
LGB bar might cater to are:
•

Gai-sen ( 外 専 ) — Japanese people who prefer Western foreigners ( 外 国 人 ,
gaikokujin).

•

Debu-sen (デブ専) — Refers to those who likes heavier men (Debu means chubby).

•

Fuke-sen (老け専) — Typically for younger guys who prefer older, “mature” men.

47

2016.

In place of the term sen, sometimes taipu, a transliteration of the word “type” is used. See Baudinette
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•

Gatai-sen (ガタイ専) — Used to describe those who focus purely on muscularity
(often equating it to sexual prowess). Gatai relates to body building (Japan Visitor
2020; All About Japan.com 2021).

Such a bifurcated and specialized LGB bar environment is not conducive to identity
formation or SMO emergence in the same way that LGB bars in Western countries have been at
the beginnings of their rights movements. While there is little research on the specific effects of
LGB bars in Japan on the gay rights movement there, extrapolating from research discussed
previously it is reasonable to postulate that part of the reason for the lack of a shared sense of
struggle is that there historically have not been safe spaces for large numbers of diverse LGB
people to gather and interact. Ironically, however, Japan’s LGB bar scene collectively is regarded
domestically and internationally as one of the world’s most welcoming, precisely because any type
of person will find a bar that caters to their sen if they only look hard enough (Baudette 2016). But
the lack of larger, more inclusive LGB bars makes mobilizing the necessary resources for engaging
in contentious politics difficult.
Another aspect of LGB life in Japan that should be briefly discussed, and which will further
illustrate the point that LGB bars in Japan do not have the same community-building potential as
they do elsewhere, is the ethno-eroticism that permeates Japan’s LGB community. The reality is
that taipu, mentioned earlier, can refer to ethnicity as well, and certain ethnicities will find the NiChome more welcoming than others. In Japan, nationality is often equated with the concept of
“race” in the sense that persons from different countries are seen as having different identities in a
substantive and inherent way that goes deeper than mere citizenship (Chapman 2008; Kawai 2015;
Baudette 2016). As such, Japanese LGB persons care about racial or ethnic identity a great deal,
even to the point of forming sexual desires based on them.
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In terms of sexual desire, studies show that there is a hierarchy of ethnicity in Japan. The
gaijin, or white men, especially the muscular and masculine type depicted in popular gay media
from the West, have often been considered the apex of sexual desirability for many Japanese. It is
theorized that this is due to a kind of internalized complex created by the symbolic emasculation
of Japan during the American occupation (Mackintosh 2010; Baudette 2016). However, Japanese
gay men are starting to regard themselves as equally desirable and “relatively white” when dealing
with other Asian ethnicities, especially those from Southeast Asia (Baudette 2016). One study in
particular conducted with the participation of Chinese and Korean gay men visiting Ni-Chome,
most as businessmen on extended trips of several weeks or students on exchange programs, found
that these gay men often felt excluded or unwelcome. This is despite their preferring Japanese gay
men specifically for various reasons48. Many respondents described being refused entry or asked
to leave local gay bars because they were not Japanese, with one Korean respondent indicating
that the only bar he was made to feel welcome in was a bar that catered to gai-sen, and in which
no Japanese men showed any interest in him (Baudette 2016). On the other hand, Japanese gay
men who participated in the study expressed no outright antipathy for Chinese or Korean men, but
nor did they express anything like acceptance. Their responses are described as “ambivalent”, as
they simply did not regard Chinese or Korean gay men as having a place in their sexual hierarchy
(Baudette 2016).
This brief discussion on racialized desires in Japanese LGB sub-culture of Ni-Chome is
important because it further illustrates the possibility that LGB bars in Japan simply do not play

48
Chinese and Korean respondents in the Baudette study characterized Japan as more progressive than their
home countries with regard to acceptance of homosexuality; were consumers of Japanese media, including erotic
manga previously discussed; had an unfavorable view of white gay male culture as “over-sexed and consumeristic;
and where regular consumers of Japanese gay pornography as there was, at the time of the study, little to no domestic
gay pornographic industries in their own countries. All of these conditions taken together created the perception in
these respondents that Japanese gay men were more attractive. See Baudette 2016.
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the same role in identity formation and movement emergence as research indicates their
counterparts in other countries like the U.K. or the U.S. do because they do not contribute to a
shared sense of struggle which could extend to all Japanese LGB and even to foreign LGB persons
as well. So, while LGB bars do remain important to the legalization of same-sex marriage in
general – as quantitative research has shown, and case study research in Taiwan has corroborated
– they may not be important at all for the LGB rights movement in Japan. So, the fact that Japan
has so many LGB bars in relation to many other countries (Japan ranks 9th out of 100 RI countries)
likely is not helping Japanese LGB SMOs in their efforts to legalize same-sex marriage because
LGB bars simply don’t function in the same way with regard to the movement in Japan as they
have in other places.
5.3.2.2 Challenges to Leveraging TANs in Japan
In addition to challenges facing mobilization for Japanese LGB SMOs, there are barriers
to taking advantage of what opportunities would typically exist to leverage global rights TANs
networks in the same way Taiwan was able to do. This is because Japanese civil society can be
more closed than is typical for developed representative democracies or polyarchies. Japan’s civil
society environment is “narrowed.” Civicus defines “narrowed” as:
While the state allows individuals and civil society organizations to
exercise their rights to freedom of association, peaceful assembly
and expression, violations of these rights also take place. People can
form associations to pursue a wide range of interests, but full
enjoyment of this right is impeded by occasional harassment, arrest
or assault of people deemed critical of those in power. Protests are
conducted peacefully, although authorities sometimes deny
permission, citing security concerns, and excessive force, which
may include tear gas and rubber bullets, are sometimes used against
peaceful demonstrators. The media is free to disseminate a wide
range of information, although the state undermines complete press
freedom either through strict regulation or by exerting political
pressure on media owners.
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Such harassment occurred when Japanese LGB SMO Occur (アカー akā), one of the first LGB
SMOs in Japan encountered hostility and ridicule in Tokyo when their youth members were kicked
out of a youth hostel, after being called “okama”, on the grounds that their presence in the hostel
was endangering other young people (Lunsing 2005). While this may seem like a trivial example,
it is indicative a common attitude, still held by many political elites today in Japan, that LGB
equals a threat to the youth (similar to the narrative of right-wing opponents to same-sex marriage
in Taiwan discussed in the last chapter). For example, in 2011, then-governor of Tokyo Shintaro
Ishihara called LGB people “deficient” and said that activists and public figures in the LGB
community had become “untamed” 49 (Human Rights Watch 2011). In another high-profile
example, during a speech before the Diet entitled, “The LGB issue is getting out of control”, LDP
member Koji Shigeuchi told a trans woman elected official in the audience, “There is no need for
you to have your hormone therapy covered by insurance because you are healthy. You should live
with the body you were born with” (Doi and Knight 2021). Even among LGB activists,
heteronormative attitudes have historically created an ani-same-sex marriage bias that is only
recently began to be overcome (Tamagawa 2016).
What this could mean is that any LGB SMOs which are able to overcome the significant
barriers to effective mobilization – and there are LGB SMOs in Japan to be certain – find it difficult
to avail themselves of the kind of support SMOs in countries like Taiwan received. Recalling from
the Taiwan Chapter, the Marriage Equality Coalition of Taiwan consulted representatives from the
Human Rights Campaign (HRC) and Ireland’s “Yes Equality” campaign on the most effective
ways to lobby for support for same-sex marriage legalization, and received valuable support in the

The full quotes, widely reported at the time, were “We have got homosexuals casually appearing even on
television. Japan has become far too untamed.” and “I saw a parade made up of gays, and I really felt sorry for them.
There were pairs of men and women, but it certainly did feel like they were deficient somehow.”.
49

188
form of material, epistemic knowledge, and even field workers to help in polling. The Marriage
Equality Coalition of Taiwan formed these contacts in part with the help of the exposure that comes
from massive and successful Pride celebrations. In Japan, the Pride celebrations exist in the major
cities, but are not as large – in 2019 Tokyo’s Pride exceeded 10,000 attendees for the first time
since the celebrations there began in 1994 (Fahey 2019). By contrast, Taipei’s 2019 Pride saw
200,000 attendees 50 (Hioe 2019; Jenson 2019). So, the scale of the event in Tokyo is simply
smaller, which can translate into a reduced opportunity for forming connections with high-profile
LGB SMOs in other countries. But, even if this were not the case, the social and cultural barriers
domestic SMOs face in Japan are significant and cannot be overlooked and this keeps them from
fully taking advantage of those reduced opportunities that may exist.
The first of these social and cultural barriers to SMO action is that same-sex marriage has
simply not become the topic of human rights conversation to the same extent that it has in countries
like Taiwan or other legalizers (Tamagawa 2016). That is in part because Japan doesn’t have a
history of human rights discussions around many other LGB rights that may be considered “small
steps” towards same-sex marriage – namely the repeal of sodomy laws and the enactment of some
basic protections against discrimination (Tamagawa 2016; Waaldijk 2004). Japan hasn’t had any
sodomy laws to repeal since the Meiji Era, as already discussed, though neither has Taiwan. There
are very limited protections against LGB discrimination as of yet, and certainly not to the degree
we see in Taiwan, in some part because there has never been a robust LGB social movement on
the scale we tend to see in other countries which have legalized same-sex marriage, for reasons
already explored in the previous section of this Chapter (see Table 5-2).

50

Estimates range from 175,000 on the low end of attendance and 250,000 on the high end. But, most
reports put the number at 200,000.
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Table 5-2: Comparison of Steps Towards Same-Sex Marriage in Japan and Taiwan
PROTECTION

RECOGNITION
SECOND
PARENT
ADOPTION

CONST.

BROAD PROT.

EMPLOY.

HATE CRIME

INCITEMENT

BAN CONV.
THERAPIES

Japan

NO

LIMITED

LIMITED

NO

NO

NO

NO

LIMITED

NO

NO

Taiwan (China)

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

COUNTRY

SAME SEX
MARRIAGE

CIVIL UNIONS

JOINT
ADOPTION

Source: ILGA Homophobia and the State dataset, 2020.
As of this writing, only the Tokyo Metropolitan Government has enacted
antidiscrimination laws protecting LGB persons from discrimination in employment, while the
LDP has steadfastly refused to legislate those employment protections nationally (Out Leadership
CEO Brief 2022). In 2018, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare issued a regulation requiring
companies with ten or more employees to draft antidiscrimination policies for the workplace, but
this regulation has not been strictly enforced or judicially reaffirmed as of yet. In 2018, the
Japanese Ministry of Health outlawed discrimination against persons based on sexual identity in
housing, but as recently as 2021 this discrimination continues to occur, and the regulation also
remains largely unenforced (Nijiro News 2018). Whereas in Taiwan, the Employment Service
Act of 2007 and the Act of Gender Equality in Employment of 2008 have been updated to include
specific protections for sexual orientation and sexual identity, as discussed in the last Chapter.
Another reason for the difference between Japan and Taiwan in the environment SMOs
face is that the early phases of the AIDS epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s was treated in Japan
with a sort of nationalized panic. Media in Japan tended to report on AIDS as an “American
disease” and conservative researchers and politicians alike successfully steered the national
conversation on HIV/AIDS as one of blame – LGB rights movements, or “gay liberation” was
understood in Japan to be the reason for the severity of the epidemic in the United States
(Kawaguchi et al 1997; Tamagawa 2016). In one example, a member of the Ministry of Welfare
in 1991 said, “America has the [greatest] number of AIDS patients, and an overwhelming majority
are homosexual males. It could be said that gay liberation is the cause” (Tamagawa 2016, 166).

190
To be fair, similar levels of stigmatization and fear were present in Taiwan’s response to
HIV/AIDS well into the 21st Century (Yamamoto and Ito 2006). But over the last ten years, as
public attitudes towards homosexuality have changed and laws protecting LGB Taiwanese from
discrimination have been enacted, so too have the Taiwanese political and medical elites changed
their attitudes towards HIV/AIDS. In 2015, Taiwan revised laws so as to lift the long-standing
restrictions on the entry, stay, and residence of foreigners with HIV in Taiwan, and the HIV
screening test for foreigners’ health examinations was removed for those applying for residency
in Taiwan and the Taiwanese CDC covers HIV treatment for Taiwanese nationals, whereas
previously they had been solely responsible for their own care (HIVTravel.org 2021; People with
HIV/AIDS Rights Advocacy Association of Taiwan 2021).
5.3.2.3 Empowering Values in Japan
Challenges to mobilization and barriers to SMO opportunity are part of the explanation as
to why Japan has not legalized same-sex marriage. But values also play a key role. According to a
2018 Dentsu Diversity Lab survey, more than 65% of questioned LGB people said they had not
come out to anyone at work or home (Fabre 2019). At first glance, this puzzling, since in many
polls Japanese report higher levels of acceptance for homosexuality that in other Sinic East
countries surveyed (Ipsos 2021; Pew Research 2019; World Values Survey 2020). But, these
surveys are random sampling surveys, presumably without regard to the sexual identity of the
respondent. When only LGB Japanese people are interviewed, they report feeling tremendous
pressure to keep their sexual identities hidden out of respect for their families or out of a sense of
obligation to societal harmony (Fabre 2019). In the last Chapter, anti-discrimination laws were
pointed to as proxy measures for the embrace of empowering values in Taiwan, and the same could
be done here, even though the lack of such protections in Japan has been discussed in the context
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of barriers to SMO action as that is certainly the case. Indeed, my theory indicates that it is the
combination of mobilization, opportunity, and values that leads to a greater likelihood of samesex marriage legalization, so these variables are expected to interact with and potentially reinforce
one another.
Another canary in the coalmine, as it were, for the embrace of post-material values is the
degree to which same-sex couples move to build families of their own and adopt children. Samesex couples in long-term relationships in Japan have been comparatively slow to adopt children.
This is in part because Japanese courts tend not to process applications for adoptions from samesex couples as only married couples are permitted to adopt children. Same-sex couples also have
difficulty starting families because there are few reproductive assistance technologies legally
available to them, because of the same family restrictions (Tamagawa 2016). Because so few samesex couples actually raise children, the cultural norm in Japan to view same-sex relationships as a
threat to the continuation of the family remains unchanged. When Taiwan’s Marriage Equality
Coalition pivoted their strategy to focus on LGB couples and their families, they were able to
credibly do so because Taiwanese same-sex couples had been legally able to adopt children
through second-parent adoption for some time (ILGA 2020).
5.3.3 Country Specific Variables in Japan
In addition to the challenges to mobilization, the barriers to SMO opportunities, and the
limited embrace of empowering values in such a way so as to be liberating to LGB persons, there
are some specific variables unique to Japan that may help explain the country’s failure to legalize
same-sex marriage. These include a cultural norm against youth involvement in politics and a lack
of judicial independence where politically controversial issues are concerned.
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5.3.3.1 Lack of Youth Involvement in Politics
Japan lowered its voting age in 2016 from 20 to 18. Yet, since then, youth political
engagement has been on a downward trend (see Figure 5-8). Experts speculate on many factors in
Japan that could be driving this youth disengagement, including an inability to decide on a party
to support, a lack of feelings of voter efficacy, or being discouraged from being “political” in
schools (Glass 2022; Lee and Inuma 2021). Gill Steele, a political scientist at Doshisha University
in Kyoto, notes that the LDP-controlled Japanese political apparatus as well centrally administered
educational institutions (Japan’s is a unitary system) has designed a system intended to actively
discourage youth turnout. Steele says, “The Japanese state has cultivated or even mandated an
atmosphere of depoliticization that discourages citizen interest and engagement” (Kuhn 2021).
This can include the publication dense and jargon-laden political platforms, unexciting political
reporting by Japanese media, and an educational environment which generally and actively
discourages political debate and protest (Kuhn 2021).

Figure 5-8: Youth Disengagement in Japan
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This low voter turnout among Japan’s youth could be one of the factors helping the LDP
to maintain its six-decade-long grip on political control of the country, and Japanese youth
certainly are not attracted to the LDP platform in significant numbers – which could also help
contribute to youth apathy regarding politics. Japanese laws that ban student-led political
organizing only help to solidify this disconnect. In addition, there is a significant generational gap
between Japanese political elites and young would-be voters – Japanese youth simply don’t have
many inspiring political figures to look up to or get excited about. The controlling LDP is over
90% male and publicly hostile to issues, like gender equality or LGB rights, that matter to young
Japanese. All of these institutional and cultural factors have created a political norm that Japanese
young people simply tend not to be political. By contrast, multiple domestic and international news
agencies reported in 2020 that a surge in youth turnout (Taiwan’s voting age is set at 20) helped
the DPP retain power in a tough electoral climate. The potential addition of youth voter turnout
data to the RI could yield some significant findings.
5.3.3.2 Limited Judicial Independence
Reform to Taiwan’s judicial system was discussed in the previous Chapter, and what we
find in Japan is that there have not been similar reforms undertaken there which could have
constituted a critical juncture for LGB SMOs to exploit. For example, Japan still practices internal
control over its judges, potentially rendering the judiciary effectively much less independent of
controlling political elites in cases that challenge the political status quo (Wang 2010). Japan has
created a judiciary that is conservative and constitutionally restrained by design, in which judges
who wish to retain their positions or move up within the ranks are pressured to rule in favor of the
LDP in politically contentious cases. Judges who are more willing to challenge the status quo, on
the other hand, find themselves effectively silenced – assigned to low-ranking positions in rural
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courts. (Srour 2012; Wang 2010). The most noteworthy example of this judicial constraint imposed
by political elites is the Naganuma Jiken Hiraga shokan Case51 in which the Japanese Supreme
Court simply circumvented a lower court’s ruling that would have impeded government plans for
the construction of a Japanese Defense Force Airbase (Ramseyer and Rasmusen 2003; Tsuji 2011;
Wang 2010). Thus, even reform-minded judges find themselves discouraged from challenging the
ruling party or from reforming the judiciary in the way the 303 Movement did in Taiwan.
Japanese political elites also control the training of judges and prosecutors, as Taiwanese
elites did in their own country prior to reform (Wang 2010). This gives the LDP considerable
influence over the hiring and promotion of prosecutors and judges, essentially stacking the deck
in their favor, judicially speaking. Looking at the judicial rulings issued in same-sex marriage cases
or cases involving the recognition of consensual same-sex sexual relationships on any level, it
appears this strategy has met with some success. In 2020, a Tokyo court ruled that cohabitating
same-sex couples should have the same rights as opposite-sex couples, though stopping short of
holding that bans on same-sex marriage were unconstitutional. This ruling was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Japan in 2021. In 2021, a Sapporo Court ruled that bans on same-sex marriage
were unconstitutional, but stopped short of compelling the legislature or bureaucracy to take any
action to rectify the violation. Later, in 2022, an Osaka court held the opposite, that Japan’s ban
on same-sex marriage was constitutional – specifically ruling that marriage was legally defined as
“being between one man and one woman” (Jiji Press 2021; Montgomery 2022). What is most

51

The Naganuma Case involved plans to build a Japanese Defense Force Airbase on federally protected
forest land in Hokkaido. The Ministry of Agriculture removed the protections so that the base could be constructed,
and locals sued. A lower court held that the removal of protections violated the Japanese Constitution as it did not
serve the interest of the effected community. During the case, it came out that the presiding judge had been pressured
to rule the other way by a senior member of the judiciary. When the government appealed the case to the Japanese
Supreme Court, that Court simply focused on a different aspect of the case and ignored the question of constitutionality
altogether, essentially nullifying the lower court’s ruling without expressly overturning it. For more, see Ramseyer
and Rasmusen 2003.
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interesting about these examples is that they seem to offer compelling contradictions to generally
favorable ratings on Japanese judicial independence by groups like the World Economic Forum
and the World Justice Project. If measures of judicial independence are added, data that focuses
more on outcomes in politically contentious cases might be preferable.
5.4

Conclusion and Lessons Learned for Japan
Concluding this subsection, Japanese SMOs face significant challenges to mobilization,

limits on opportunities to avail themselves of TANs in a way that would allow them to challenge
the status quo ban more effectively on same-sex marriage, and an embrace of empowering values
that liberates only those who conform to traditional notions of sexuality. A political culture which
discourages youth involvement in politics, and which is reinforced by institutional pressures on
young people to politically disengage potentially adds to these challenges. And the ability of the
LDJ to effect a kind of control over an already conservative judiciary could lessen the chances of
SMOs successfully challenging bans on same-sex marriage at the highest level for at least the
foreseeable future. Still, Japan is the next most likely case to legalize in the Sinic East, based on
the theory tested by the RI. Future research endeavors might do well to include a refining of the
RI to include variables on youth involvement in politics and judicial independence.
5.5

Summary
Japanese LGB persons have not formed a large-scale social movement due to a lack of a

shared identity, though this may be slowly starting to change. The LDP’s virtual stranglehold on
political control of the countries for the last seven decades creates an environment in which
political elites who might be willing to advocate for same-sex marriage rights are silenced in favor
of more conservative, traditional voices. Those few LGB SMOs that do exist, like Occur, face
barriers to mobilization which include a lack of political power enjoyed by LGB Japanese, in part
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because of cultural attitudes about the nature of same-sex sexual relationships – which can even
be internalized by LGB Japanese themselves – and also because of the way in which Japan’s LGB
bar scene operates. Japanese SMOs face challenges interacting with LGB TANs due to decreased
opportunities resulting from smaller Pride celebrations and a civil society environment that tends
to be hostile to LGB rights demands. The embrace of empowering values in Japan may be
impressive, but only insofar as Japanese are willing to conform to heteronormative cultural norms
– the Japanese resistance to LGB rights is not religious in nature. In addition, Japanese youth who
tend to feel much more liberally about issues related to sexuality and LGB rights are often actively
discouraged from political action and therefore tend to disengage from the political process to a
higher degree than other Sinic East democracies. And, finally, the conservative LDP is able to
exert considerable pressure and influence over Japanese courts so as to close off potential legal
opportunities for the advancement of LGB rights claims.
In the next Chapter, we will examine the cases of Mexico and Colombia in order to
determine if similar patterns can be uncovered in the comparison. What we will find will be that
aspects of Mexican democracy, including age of democracy, federalism, and regime type could
provide the explanation for the differences in outcomes.
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6

A COMPARISON OF LGB RIGHTS IN MODICUM LOW COUNTRIES:
COLOMBIA AND MEXICO

In this Chapter we will examine the cases of Colombia and Mexico. What makes this next
case pair so interesting is that the two countries involved have both legalized same-sex marriage
and share very similar ranks and scores in the RI overall and across all three dimensions (see Table
6-1 on this page and Figures 6-1 and 6-2). And, yet all Colombians enjoy legal access to same-sex
marriage while about 20% of Mexico’s 128.9 million people still lack access despite a Mexican
High Court ruling in 2019 declaring bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. What qualitative
analysis will show is that it may be aspects of Mexican democracy, including age of democracy,
federalism, and regime type could provide the explanation for the differences in outcomes. Given
this possibility and given that Mexico and Colombia are most-similar systems, this subsection will
take a slightly different approach than the last and focus on how domestic LGB SMOs used
contentious politics within their respective opportunity structures (in these cases, the courts) to
achieve their goals of getting same-sex marriage recognized as being legally equal to heterosexual
marriage. I will then move on to explore the difference in outcomes. But, first, I will explore the
theory in these cases to show that mobilization, values, and opportunities for TANs helped explain
why both states legalized – though the results in Colombia fully extend marriage rights to samesex couples while in Mexico this is still done unevenly. But first, a refresher on what makes a
country like Colombia or Mexico “Modicum Low” and why it matters.
Table 6-1: Comparison of Colombia and Mexico in the RI

Rainbow Index
Mobilization
Transnational
Rank
Score
Rank
Score
Rank
Score
Mexico
20
761
21
619
22
933
Colombia
24
727
21
619
11
981
Source: Robinson Country Intelligence Index , Georgia State University.

Values
Rank
Score
37
639
60
499
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Figure 6-1: Mobilization, TANs, and Values in Colombia and Mexico

Figure 6-2: Similar Performance, Different Outcomes
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6.1.1 Refresher on Modicum Low Classification
As a refresher, Modicum Low Stage cluster countries have largely traditional economies but
may also be in the early industrial stages and likely have low but increasing levels of technological
advancement. Some basic freedoms may be denied or inaccessible, but some may be protected,
and democratization is often in its early stages. The classification of these countries as Modicum
Low comes directly from the work of Christopher Welzel in Freedom Rising, (Table 1-3, pages
23-24) but the classification can be defended by examining data from Freedom House, the CIA
World Factbook, and the RCII on the state of democracy; the state of economic development; the
degree of internet communication technology (ITC) adoption; and the level of internet freedom in
each country.
An examination of this data reveals only two countries in the Modicum Low Stage cluster
in the RI, Peru and Tunisia, rank as “free” in terms of their civil liberties and political rights – and
they are only barely so. This means that most countries in the Modicum Low Stage cluster may
not have fully free and fair elections, may not have competitive elections, may not have
governments that are accountable to the public, may have high levels of corruption, may not have
free and independent media, may not have freedom of religion and/or belief, and may not have
academic freedom. Individuals in these countries may not enjoy freedom of expression or
assembly, NGOs in these countries are not free to work without state pressure or interference, and
labor unions may not free to organize. Rule of law in Modicum Low Stage cluster countries may
be lacking, as countries tend not to have independent judiciaries and citizens do not benefit from
due process or freedom from the illegitimate use of force. Finally, citizens in Modicum Low Stage
countries may not enjoy personal autonomy, as they may not have freedom of movement, freedom
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of employment, the protection of private property, and citizens may have low levels of social
freedom, equality of opportunity, and freedom from exploitation (see Table 6-2).
Table 6-2: Justification of Modicum Low Stage Classification

Country
Albania
Armenia
Belarus
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
China
Colombia
Egypt
Georgia
India
Jordan
Kyrgyzstan
Lebanon
Malaysia
Mali
Mexico
Morocco
Nicaragua
Peru
Qatar
Russia
Serbia
Tunisia
Turkey
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Zambia

Political
and Civil
Rights
66
55
11
66
53
9
65
18
60
67
34
28
43
51
33
61
37
30
71
25
20
64
71
32
60
11
52

% GDP
from
Agriculture
21.7%
16.7%
8.1%
13.8%
6.8%
7.9%
7.2%
11.7%
8.2%
15.4%
4.5%
14.6%
3.9%
8.8%
41.8%
3.6%
14.0%
15.5%
7.6%
0.2%
4.7%
9.8%
10.1%
6.8%
12.2%
17.9%
7.5%

% GDP
from
Industry
24.2%
28.2%
40.8%
37.8%
28.9%
40.5%
30.8%
34.3%
23.7%
23.0%
28.8%
31.2%
13.1%
37.6%
18.1%
31.9%
29.5%
24.4%
32.7%
50.3%
32.4%
41.1%
26.2%
32.3%
28.6%
33.7%
35.3%

ICT
Adoption
590
679
na
510
556
825
609
453
762
333
469
549
421
697
282
613
491
522
507
765
840
581
549
639
635
na
268

Internet
Freedom
na
75
38
na
na
10
66
26
76
51
49
56
52
58
na
61
52
na
na
na
30
na
64
35
61
27
59

Political and Civil Rights scale: 0-34 Not Free; 35-70 Partly Free; 71-100 Free
ICT Adoption scale: 0 (lowest adoption) to 1000 (highest adoption)
Internet Freedom scale: 0 (least free) to 100 (most free)
Sources: Freedom House 2020; CIA World Factbook 2021; RCII 2021

Before going further, it would be helpful to consider what it is that is meant by the term
“democracy” in the context of freedom and civil liberties mentioned in Freedom House reports.
Political scientists often define democracies according to their procedures and outcomes,
specifically on whether or not a country’s decision-making political elites are elected through free
and fair elections and in which citizens are guaranteed by law certain basic negative freedoms, like
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freedom of speech and association, to allow for those decision makers to be held accountable
between elections (Schumputer 1943; Dahl 1971; Huntington 1968 and 1991). Colombia and
Mexico both satisfy these minimum criteria, as evidenced by their “partly free” rankings in
Freedom House. Both countries score very well in the procedural elements of democracy. But
there are also important principles of democracy that go beyond the procedural.
The degree to which all citizens within a democracy are equal before the law is necessary
for a country to be considered democratic, over and above procedural concerns like elections
(Beetham 1993 and 1994). To be sure, there are stages of democracy – not all democracies are
equal. A simple breakdown of these stages might be electoral democracy, or minimal procedural
democracy; liberal democracy, or democracy that has free and fair and competitive elections but
also basic protections in place for at least some negative rights; and advanced democracies, or
democracies which satisfy the previous conditions but go beyond (Collier and Levitsky 1997;
Schedler 1998; Levitsky and Way 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010). Mexico, at least, does not yet
qualify as an advanced democracy, as it only began to democratize in the early 21st Century and
still has deficits in civil and political rights (Levitsky and Way 2010; Freedom House 2020). It is
debatable whether either Colombia or Mexico would qualify as a liberal democracy, though
Colombia is probably a stronger case. In any case, they can both at least be considered democracies
in the minimal sense that also provide some rights protections to citizens – what might be termed
flawed democracies. What is important for this research is that even in minimal democracies
(democracies which moved beyond competitive authoritarianism but not much further)
opportunity structures for SMOs exist.
Economically speaking, countries in the Modicum Low cluster tend to generate significant
amounts of their economic wealth in agriculture and industry, though several are starting to
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develop significant service industry capability. Countries in the Modicum Low cluster also tend to
have comparatively lower rates of ICT adoption, which means citizens have limited access to
fixed-broadband internet, mobile broadband internet, mobile cellphone subscriptions, fiber
internet subscriptions, as well as comparatively low rates of internet use, though this is changing
as the forces of globalization make it harder for governments to keep consumer internet
technologies out of the hands of their citizens and as those technologies become cheaper and more
user-friendly (Freedom House 2020, also see Table 5-3 on previous page). And those who do gain
access to the internet in Modicum Low cluster countries tend not to enjoy high levels of internet
freedom. For example, in Georgia – the highest scoring Modicum Low country for internet
freedom as measured by Freedom House – citizens encounter obstacles to free access, such as
infrastructural limitations that prevent high levels of internet penetration, and violations of user
rights due to only nominal protections being in place as well as limits on the non-independent
judiciary to enforce those protections (Freedom House 2020). These economic considerations are
important because inclusive economic development can lead to the deepening of democratic
institutions, though development by itself is not sufficient to do so (Huntington 1968 and 1991;
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2014).
An examination of RI data on countries in the Modicum Low stage reveals similar
conditions that further justify the classification from the perspective of LGB rights. Using RI
scores of 1-1000, with 1000 being the best possible score for any variable, an examination of the
data shows that in terms of LGB Bars in Most Populous City, Openly LGB Officials, LGB Power,
Pride Attendance, State of Civil Society, Emancipative Values, and Secular Values most countries
in the Modicum Low cluster perform very poorly on some or many of these measures, meaning
that the ability of LGB persons to mobilize, the propensity of the general society to be responsive
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to LGB rights claims made by SMOs, and opportunities to interact with TANs are both
comparatively low. For example, there tend to be few gay bars in the most populous cities of
Modicum Low countries, meaning that those LGB SMOs have little or no safe space in which to
emerge or to coalesce. As discussed in Chapter 2, gay bars are important because the social
pressure to hide their identity frequently denies members of the LGB community the use of family,
workplace, or neighborhood as tools for identity formation, the development of a group
consciousness, and mobilization – all options available to many other marginalized groups (Wald,
Button, and Rienzo 1996). Because of that limitation, the gay bar has typically served as the
primary safe space for organization, mobilization, and calls to action. Interestingly, only two
countries in the Modicum Low Cluster have significant Pride celebrations – Mexico and Colombia
(see Table 6-3).
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Table 6-3: Modicum Low Stage Cluster Countries in the RI
LGBT Bars in
Openly LGBT
Most
LGBT Power
Officials
Populous City

Pride
Attendance

State of Civil Emancipative
Society
Values

Secular
Values

Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score
Colombia
12
724
13
513
42
505
1
1000
24
955
46
452
65
482
Mexico
12
724
13
513
42
505
1
1000
55
858
44
474
19
699
China
18
651
41
1
72
1
24
1
100
1
65
384
37
636
Turkey
18
651
41
1
72
1
24
1
97
193
74
325
83
308
Bolivia
18
651
41
1
42
505
24
1
70
706
64
385
50
565
India
23
562
24
318
42
505
24
1
88
344
77
279
90
240
Lebanon
35
448
41
1
72
1
24
1
53
860
55
424
52
552
Morocco
35
448
41
1
72
1
24
1
81
504
83
247
96
129
Peru
35
448
24
318
72
1
24
1
42
908
60
406
48
583
Serbia
35
448
32
205
12
795
24
1
73
693
52
433
40
623
Nicaragua
35
448
41
1
42
505
24
1
92
296
68
359
54
529
Albania
64
286
41
1
12
795
24
1
47
895
54
430
77
392
Armenia
64
286
41
1
72
1
24
1
28
949
81
250
43
610
Belarus
64
286
41
1
42
505
24
1
93
289
58
415
6
836
Egypt
64
286
41
1
72
1
24
1
98
164
99
56
99
49
Georgia
64
286
41
1
42
505
24
1
22
959
76
308
81
331
Jordan
64
286
41
1
72
1
24
1
77
632
94
133
98
52
Kyrgyzstan
64
286
41
1
72
1
24
1
74
650
91
181
75
411
Malaysia
64
286
41
1
72
1
24
1
69
716
50
439
45
590
Tunisia
64
286
41
1
72
1
24
1
45
898
80
253
76
410
Ukraine
64
286
41
1
12
795
24
1
61
813
62
398
7
825
Zambia
64
286
41
1
72
1
24
1
76
634
61
399
51
560
Bosnia and
64
286
41
1
42
505
24
1
35
935
57
418
67
474
Herzegovina
Mali
89
1
41
1
42
505
24
1
50
872
85
231
91
236
Libya
89
1
41
1
72
1
24
1
56
857
97
112
92
228
Source: Robinson Country Intelligence Index , Georgia State University.

It is telling that the two countries in the Modicum Low cluster that tend to score highest in
the RI variables in Table 6-3 are also the two countries in the cluster in which LGB SMOs have
made the most progress on their rights claims.
6.1.2 Initial Comparison of Colombia and Mexico
Colombia and Mexico both lead the Modicum Low cluster in overall RI score, and their
scores are only 34 points apart on a 1-1000 scale (see Figure 6-3). Previously conducted
quantitative analysis indicates that Mexico and Colombia have the highest probability for samesex marriage legalization in their cluster, to which the map will also attest. That same analysis
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also shows that Mexico only barely crossed the 50% probability threshold, but also that as
countries in the Modicum Low cluster scored higher in the RI, their probability for same-sex
marriage legalization increased at a slightly steeper rate than countries in other clusters (you may
refer to Chapter 3, Figure 3-13).

Figure 6-3: Modicum Low Cluster Mapped
Another similarity is that according to Civicus State of Civil Society Report 2020, every
country in the RI’s Modicum Low cluster is either obstructed or repressed (see Figure 6-4),
meaning that either “civic space is heavily contested by power holders, who impose a combination
of legal and practical constraints on the full enjoyment of fundamental rights”; or that “civic space
is significantly constrained [and] active individuals and civil society members who criticize power
holders risk surveillance, harassment, intimidation, imprisonment, injury and death” (Civicus
2020). This tracks somewhat with arguments made by Encarnación (2011 and 2016) that TANs
are not the cause of same-sex marriage policy diffusion for many reasons but have extended rights
and protections of citizenship to LGB persons for primarily domestic reasons and without
significant assistance from the outside (Encarnación 2016). For example, in Mexico activists for
the rights of indigenous peoples still face high risk of disappearances, murders, and imprisonments
while in Colombia social, community, environmental, territorial, community, and human rights
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activists opposed to “predatory extractive megaprojects” by mining conglomerates have been the
victims of attacks and murders (Civicus 2021b and 2021c). Limitations to the effectiveness of
TANs in Colombia and Mexico will be discussed in more detail later in this Chapter. For now, it
will suffice to point out these similar challenges.

Source: Civicus 2021
Figure 6-4: The State of Civil Society in Mexico and Colombia
6.1.3 The RI Theory of same-sex marriage Legalization in Colombia
It is surprising that Colombia should have legalized at all. Mexico also scores and ranks
better in the Modicum Low cluster than does Colombia, so it is doubly surprising that Colombia
should have legalized same-sex marriage and provided for universal access to same-sex marriage
rights while Mexico still suffers from uneven access to the same right. How same-sex marriage
came to legalized in Colombia will be the focus of this subsection.
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The theory that the combination of mobilization capacity, values, and TANs increase the
likelihood that SMOs will be able to take advantage of opportunity structures to successfully
pressure governments to legalize same-sex marriage holds in Colombia. Pride celebrations, LGB
bars, and out politicians are all important to changing norms in that they all provide visibility for
same-sex couples. As early as 2010, a poll conducted by local newspaper El Tiempo, 63% of
Bogota residents supported the right of same-sex couples to marry (Herlinger 2015). Lobbying
and public campaigns from right wing groups eroded that support down to 29% by 2014 (Semana
2014). But change to the social and political culture has occurred despite these counter-efforts, as
is evidenced by the 48% of Colombians who responded that LGB persons should be accepted
(Gallup 2020). This section will demonstrate that this is likely in no small part due to Pride
celebrations, LGB bars, and out politicians which help give domestic SMOs the tools they need.
6.1.3.1 Mobilization Capacity in Colombia
Bogota is home to 43 LGB bars and/or nightclubs (or gay bars for short). This makes
Bogota the second “gayest” city in the Modicum Low cluster (see Table 6-4). The Theatron in
Bogota’s Chapinero district – Bogota’s gayborhood – is known as “one of the best gay bars in
Latin America” and is said to be the largest gay bar in the world, with a capacity of 8,000, seven
rooftop terraces, and five floors of music, dancing, and entertainment (Culture Trip 2021;
Siemasko 2021). Bars also remain community focal points during annual Pride celebrations, which
are crucial to the success of the movement, in Colombia and beyond.
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Table 6-4: Bogota’s LGB Bar Scene

When politicians or other elected or appointed officials come out publicly as LGB, they
become very visible symbols of the community and are well-positioned to press the movement’s
rights claims. There is little cross-national comparative research on descriptive representation of
LGB persons in country legislatures, but the research that does exist shows that it almost certainly
matters. As of 2011, according to a study of out LGB politicians, the only Modicum Low country
with any out members of the national assembly was Mexico (Reynolds 2013). However, since then
Colombia has had a handful of politicians come out – including current mayor of Bogota Claudia
Nayibe López Hernández, who once served as a senator in the Colombian upper house from 20142018 and is the first openly-lesbian legislator elected in her country; and her now-wife Angélica
Lozano Correa, who currently serves in the Colombian senate and is the first openly bisexual
elected to the national legislature (Corrales 2014; Associated Press 2019).
Much like other minorities seeking to advance rights claims, descriptive representation of
the LGB community – that is the presence of out LGB representatives in the national assembly –
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makes it more likely that a country will adopt LGB-friendly policies (Reynolds 2018 and 2013).
This is confirmed by studies done on state legislatures in the United States (Schwindt-Bayer and
Mishler 2005) and on the national legislatures in the U.K., the U.S. and Canada ( Rayside 1998).

In addition, qualitative studies on the U.S. state legislatures of California, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington show that out representatives can advocate for
equality-friendly policies and promote LGB rights claims in ways that non-LGB allies cannot.
These out representatives frequently act as “educators” for their fellow representatives,
increasing the likelihood that they will also support equality-friendly legislation (HaiderMarkel 2007 and 2010). But, even in cases where their efforts are unsuccessful, the presence
of openly LGB representatives – and indeed politicians at any level, like mayors or governors
or secretaries of departments – positively affects the views on equal rights and perceptions of
gay people held by the electorate of the country where they serve (Reynolds 2018 and 2013;
Corrales and Pecheny 2010).
In part thanks to change of opinion on same-sex marriage – gradual though it was – driven
in part by the presence of a robust bar scene, large and successful Pride demonstrations, and
political allies in the form of out politicians and elites, LGB SMOs were able to mobilize capacity
domestically and press the Colombian government to address their rights claims on greater
equality. Through their efforts, groups like Caribe Afirmativo and the Santamaria Foundation
helped make Colombia the first country in the world to recognize LGB people as a group as victims
targeted for violence during armed conflict (HRC 2017). Quoting the director of Caribe
Afirmativo,
“Four thousand LGB people and more than 7,000 acts of violence,
including murders, forced displacement and threats, are recognized
in the [peace] process [between the Colombian government and
armed guerrilla rebels]” (HRC 2017).
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However, as important as successes like this are, efforts to get same-sex marriage legalized through
political opportunities failed as they constantly ran up against unified and well-organized pressure
campaigns and lobbying from right wing and religious groups like the Evangelical Confederation
in Colombia.
6.1.3.2 Opportunities for TANs in Colombia
In 1982, when Bogota held its first Pride parade, 30 people took part in the march. In 2019,
that number had swollen to 200,000 according to reported attendance records (Deri 2019), making
it one of the largest in Spanish-speaking Latin America and the second largest in the Modicum
Low countries, behind Mexico which will be examined later in this Chapter. This is of particular
importance for, as repertoires of contention go, Pride celebrations can often be a winning strategy.
To quote Javier Corrales at length on the value of Pride:
Like good old leftists, LGB groups understand the power of a
massive protest, especially in the streets. But their approach to
taking the streets is not to go on strike, interrupt traffic during rush
hour, shut down schools and hospitals, or vandalize private property,
but rather, throw an annual gay pride march. A gay pride march
achieves all the empowering feats that any protest is meant to
achieve, with almost none of the inconveniences. … Protests have
serious negative externalities, but gay pride marches minimize them.
They [occur] only once a year. They are even scheduled on
weekends so as to minimize disruptions. Furthermore, gay pride
marches have a different tone than your traditional protest marches.
… Marchers wear flamboyant costumes or very little costumes, thus
providing entertainment for all tastes. Local fashions and
international trends are on full display. This festiveness and
showiness gives Gay pride marches an intrinsic popular appeal that
other leftist marches lack (Corrales, 2010).
This repertoire pays off. According to Gallup polling, public approval for same-sex marriage
country-wide in Colombia has steadily increased since 2011. Approval for same-sex marriage in
Colombia rose to 46% in 2021 and has been steadily rising for years, with another 21% saying that
same-sex couples should have some recognition other than marriage for their relationships (Ipsos
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2021). In addition, data from this set of polling shows that the Colombian public overwhelmingly
agrees that SMOs and other groups have a right to protest peacefully (74% to 25%), and they
approve in principle of groups that protest peacefully (96% to 3%). But, just as important, Pride
celebrations have high levels of buy-in from LGB persons who are not formally associated with
an LGB SMO – which effectively solves the problem of free-riders faced by all SMOs. For
illustration of that point, a national LGB community survey conducted by Gallup in 2013 in the
United States revealed that 77% of respondents agreed that Pride events increase popular
acceptance of LGB people (Gallup 2013). Though, those same respondents indicated that, while
Pride events were important for increasing acceptance of LGB persons, publicly visible LGB
politicians and officials were even more so, and this potentially translates into increased
opportunities for TANs.
Unfortunately, as we have already seen, Colombian rights SMOs face an oppressive civil
society system. But there are other reasons why SMOs in Colombia (and much of the rest of the
Latin America) tend not to avail themselves of opportunities to engage with western-dominated
LGB TANs. The first is that domestic LGB SMOs in Latin America, including Colombia, began
linking LGB rights to the larger conversation on human rights earlier even than many SMOs in the
United States or Europe – Argentinian SMOs were the first. Secondly domestic LGB SMOs in the
developing world – and this includes Modicum Low countries – tend to make rights claims through
the lenses of domestic value systems which may not be shared by American or European LGB
SMOs like the HRC. Third, it is widely recognized by domestic LGB SMOs in Latin America,
including Colombia, that evangelical and conservative SMOs opposed to LGB rights who are
becoming more and more active in places like Latin America and Africa are very often from the
United States (Encarnación 2016). So, there tends to be a general distrust of outside actors in
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Colombia that is not found in places like Taiwan. As Encarnación put it, “conventional wisdom
[of LGB rights scholars] fails to recognize that external influence is a double-edged sword…” (6).
Based on this, it’s possible that the same RI framework that incorporates TANs on an equal
weighting with mobilization and values may be defensible for the whole universe cases, but not
ideal for Modicum Low Cluster countries or Latin America.
6.1.3.3 Values in Colombia
From a values perspective, Colombia is an interesting case in that, out of all of the countries
that have legalized same-sex marriage to-date, the approval for same-sex marriage in terms of
public opinion in support of same-sex marriage is one of the lowest – only Costa Rica, Ecuador,
and Malta are lower. It also has lower rates of respondents to the World Values Survey who
indicate that homosexuality is “justifiable”, acceptance of gays and lesbians, and support for samesex marriage legalization than Mexico (see Table 6-7). Certainly, these are imperfect measures of
the embrace of Emancipative and Secular Values in Colombia with relation to same-sex marriage.
But they are a start. For better insight, we might examine actual policy outcomes as manifestations
of the acceptance of post-material values by political elites. What we see in Colombia, and indeed
in Mexico as well (though to a lesser extent), is that protections for LGB persons in these countries
are greater even than in some higher-scoring countries in the RI, some of them legalizers (see
Tables 6-5 and 6-6).
Table 6-5: Policy-Driven Outcomes in Colombia and Mexico
PROTECTION
COUNTRY

CONST.

BROAD PROT.

EMPLOY.

Colombia

NO

YES

Mexico

YES

YES

Source: ILGA 2021

RECOGNITION
BAN CONV.
THERAPIES

SAME SEX
MARRIAGE

JOINT
ADOPTION

SECOND
PARENT
ADOPTION

HATE CRIME

INCITEMENT

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

LIMITED

YES

LIMITED

YES

LIMITED

LIMITED

LIMITED

CIVIL UNIONS
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Table 6-6: Policy-Driven Outcomes in Selected RI Countries
PROTECTION
COUNTRY

CONST.

BROAD PROT.

EMPLOY.

HATE CRIME

RECOGNITION
INCITEMENT

BAN CONV.
THERAPIES

SAME SEX
MARRIAGE

CIVIL UNIONS

JOINT
ADOPTION

SECOND
PARENT
ADOPTION

Burkina Faso

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

South Africa

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

Tunisia

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Argentina

NO

LIMITED

LIMITED

YES

NO

LIMITED

YES

YES

YES

YES

Brazil

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Chile

NO

YES

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

Colombia

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

Guatemala

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Mexico

YES

YES

YES

LIMITED

YES

LIMITED

YES

LIMITED

LIMITED

LIMITED

Uruguay

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

LIMITED

YES

YES

YES

YES

Canada

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

LIMITED

YES

YES

YES

YES

United States

NO

LIMITED

YES

YES

NO

LIMITED

YES

LIMITED

YES

YES

Japan

NO

LIMITED

LIMITED

NO

NO

NO

NO

LIMITED

NO

NO

Lebanon

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Philippines

NO

LIMITED

LIMITED

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Thailand

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Vietnam

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Czech Republic

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

France

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

Germany

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

Latvia

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Serbia

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Spain

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

LIMITED

YES

YES

YES

YES

Ukraine

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

United Kingdom

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

Taiwan (China)

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

Source: ILGA 2021
Table 6-7: Values and LGB Rights in Legalizing Countries
Acceptance of
Justifiability of
Gays and
Support for
Homosexuality
Lesbians
Legal SSM
Argentina
36%
72%
73%
Australia
62%
84%
62%
Belgium
na
75%
72%
Brazil
29%
77%
55%
Canada
69%
89%
75%
Colombia
24%
61%
46%
Costa Rica
na
na
35%
Denmark
86%
83%
86%
Ecuador
18%
50%
33%
Finland
63%
82%
64%
France
51%
76%
59%
Germany
68%
71%
68%
Iceland
85%
89%
89%
Ireland
na
80%
66%
Luxembourg
na
81%
83%
Malta
na
85%
41%
Mexico*
24%
65%
63%
Netherlands
80%
91%
84%
New Zealand
57%
83%
50%
Norway
78%
92%
72%
Portugal
26%
71%
59%
South Africa
17%
64%
59%
Spain
60%
88%
76%
Sweden
81%
90%
79%
Taiwan
22%
57%
61%
UK
62%
77%
73%
US
48%
81%
59%
Uruguay
41%
84%
75%
Sources: World Values Survey 2022; Equaldex 2022; Social
Progress Imperative 2022.
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What Table 6-6 shows is that Colombia has more protections for LGB persons than
Argentina, Germany, Mexico, the US, and Taiwan. This despite Colombia being one of the most
religious countries in the Modicum-Low Cluster and in Latin America – only 5% of Colombians
reported no religious affiliation in a Pew Research poll conducted in 2014 (Encarnación 2016).
Figure 6-2 earlier in this Chapter does illustrate that in the RI Mexico is significantly more secular
than Colombia, but that both countries are almost equal in their embrace of the Emancipative
Values of autonomy, choice, equality, and voice. The policy outcomes illustrated in 6-7 bears this
out, if even only in the case of political elites. This would seem to indicate that, at least for the
cases of Mexico and Colombia, Emancipative Values are more important than Secular Values to
the outcome. It also reinforces the possibility that policy outcomes are a better measure of the
degree to which empowering values are embraced by decision-making elites who, having
embraced these values, might be more inclined to legalize same-sex marriage in the face of popular
opposition.
Evidence of this can be found in the fact that Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos
indicated his support for same-sex marriage legalization in 2014 when he said, “Marriage between
homosexuals to me is perfectly acceptable and what’s more I am defending unions that exist
between two people of the same sex with the rights and all of the same privileges that this union
should receive” (Lavers 2014). In the next subsection of this chapter, the role of the courts in
Colombian same-sex marriage legalization is examined, and it is telling that Santos also indicated
that he would move his administration to accept and implement the rulings of the Colombian high
court.
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6.1.3.4 Opportunity Structures in Colombia
In 2007, LGB SMOs came close to realizing their goal of greater equality for same-sex
couples in Colombia. The lower house of the Colombian Congress approved a civil union bill 62
to 43 on Thursday night after a long lobbying effort by gay rights activists, who argued that “gay
couples have a human right to the benefits that heterosexual couples enjoy” (Forero 2007). So
effective had the pressure campaign to get the civil unions bill passed that then Colombian
president Álvaro Uribe, a conservative Catholic, was expected to sign the bill into law. However,
several conservative senators in the upper house abused a procedural formality to defeat the bill in
its final stage (Goodman 2007). Similar, subsequent attempts to pass civil union bills in the
legislature failed.
LGB groups in Colombia, as in other countries, pursued multiple opportunities to press
their claims, including through legal opportunity structures in the judiciary, and to much more
success. On April 28, 2016, Colombia became the fourth country in Latin America to legalize
same-sex marriage, following Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. The country’s Constitutional Court,
by a 6-3 vote, ruled that that “all people are free to choose independently to start a family in keeping
with their sexual orientation … receiving equal treatment under the constitution and the law” (Pew
2019). The Court had already ruled, in 2011, that same-sex couples constituted a family
(Brodzinsky 2016). In fact, in the twenty years between 1991 and 2011, the Colombian
Constitutional Court ruled on the rights of same-sex couples a total of seven times. These seven
cases established the rights of homosexuals as individuals for the first time in Colombian history
and marked a shift in thinking on LGB rights and laid the legal framework for eventual marriage
recognition. It is noteworthy that each of the seven rulings was either unanimous or supported by
a sizeable majority of the Court and were often delivered by otherwise conservative jurists (Bonilla
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2011). These legal victories were necessary for legalization as legislative progress had been
previously blocked. This section will briefly trace the process by which this legalization through
the courts occurred and then analyze how LGB bars and Pride celebrations in Bogota, as well as
out LGB officials may have influenced the Court.
The seven cases that confer basic human rights for same-sex couples fall into three stages:
recognition, consolidation, and expansion (see Table 6-8). In the recognition stage, the Court
establishes that same-sex couples exist as citizens and are therefore entitled to legal recognition
and have rights and obligations like any other. In the consolidation phase, the Court rules in various
cases that same-sex couples may constitute de facto marital unions, even if they are not de jure
recognized as such. In the expansion phase, the Court rules that legal norms governing
heterosexual couples are only constitutional if they are equally applied to homosexual couples
(Bonilla 2011; Bonilla and Ramirez 2014; Corrales and Coombs 2012; Wilson and Gianella-Malca
2019).
Table 6-8: Legal Foundation for Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage in Colombia
Case

Stage

Ruling
Court aknowledges the existence of same-sex couples. Applies
Law 54 to all couples regardless of sex, so that same-sex couples
may form de facto unions. Court states that this decision is
C-075/2007 Recognition limited only to Law 54.
Norms governing heterosexual couples in the healthcare system
C-811/2007 Consolidation also apply to same-sex couples.
C-336/2008 Consolidation Members of same-sex couples are entitled to survivor benefits.
Members of same-sex couples are entitled to receive alimony
C-798/2008 Consolidation after separation.
Tutela ruling indicating that members of same-sex couples may
T-856/2007 Consolidation be affiliated for the purposes of social security.
T-1241/2008 Consolidation Tutela ruling that re-affirms C-336/2008
Ruled that criminal, civil and commercial, social security, and
political norms as well as those relating to armed conflict apply
equally to same-sex couples as they do heterosexual ones. Court
C-029/2009 Expansion
rules for the first time that dignity of person is inalienable.
Source: Bonilla, Daniel. "Same-Sex Couples in Colombia: Models for the Legal and Political
Recognition." 2011
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Before proceeding further, it is necessary to explain a feature of Colombia’s 1991
constitution: the acción de tutela. The tutela is established in Article 40 (6) and Article 241 of the
Colombian constitution, the latter of which reads, in part, that the Court must “decide on the
petitions of unconstitutionality brought by citizens against the laws, both for their substantive
content as well as for errors of procedure in their formation” (Bonilla and Ramirez 2014;
Constitution Project, 2021). In practice, this means that any citizen can petition before the Court
that their constitutional rights have been violated by a specific law, regulation, or action and the
Court can rule in a short amount of time. This is important, and a feature this Chapter will return
to later.
Bonilla argues that there are three different normative models that Colombian judges used
in these seven cases to understand, evaluate, and rule on issues involving same-sex couples: the
model of dignity, the model of equality, and the model of autonomy (112; Bonilla and Ramirez
2014) These normative models form the basis of the basic rights spelled out in the Colombia
constitution: the right to equality, the right to free development of personality, and the right to live
in dignity.
The model of autonomy argues that “issues related to sexual and emotional life concern
only the individuals involved” and that “individuals have the right to be ‘left alone’” (Bonilla 2011,
119). This demands a hard separation between the private and public spheres. The model of
equality demands that like things be treated alike, affirming the basic equality of all human beings.
This model recognizes violations in the weak sense and in the strong sense. Equality is violated in
the weak sense when sexual orientation is used unjustifiably as a criterion for differentiation
among citizens, while equality is violated in the strong sense when the character of same-sex
couples as human beings is denied in a way that does not apply to heterosexual couples. The model
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of dignity implies that all human beings have dignity in that we each have the capacity to define,
modify, and realize life plans by making use of reason and therefore the lives of same-sex couples
are valid in every way when compared with the lives of heterosexual couples (Bonilla 2011). These
models provide a framework to recognize fundamental human rights for LGB persons in ways that
had not been before in Colombia.
The case rulings listed previously are important in that they represent a fundamental shift
in the legal tradition of Colombia, but they also reflect a change in Colombia society. No doubt,
discrimination against non-heterosexuals remains an unfortunate part of life in Colombia for many
same-sex couples. But there is a growing consensus, especially for younger Colombians, that
same-sex couples are entitled to the same rights as heterosexual ones. This consensus does not
occur in a vacuum, however. Nor does the consensus come as a product of law or judicial rulings.
If anything – and as we will see in the Chapter on Taiwan – court decisions in favor of same-sex
couples have a way of galvanizing opposition. But norms are changing, and norms inform law
making and adjudication. The growing consensus around LGB rights, both domestically and
regionally, has benefited Colombian same-sex couples in the long run.

Colombia’s same-sex marriage legalization came about through legal opportunity
structures even as efforts to win relationship equality through legislation had failed. Beginning
in 2007, justices on the Colombian Constitutional Court began changing their country’s legal
recognition of same-sex couples, throwing out nearly two centuries of precedent to the
contrary. While research on influences on judicial opinion-making specific to Colombia and
the cases itemized earlier in this Chapter is lacking, there is ample evidence presented so far
to show that gay bars, Pride celebrations, and out LGB politicians – especially (but not
exclusively) representatives – all have a significantly normalizing effect where LGB politics
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and rights claims are concerned. Discrimination becomes harder when LGB persons come to
be seen as just ordinary people, and visible gay businesses, Pride celebrations, and descriptive
representation humanize members of the community, making equality by any means – political
or judicial – more likely. Gay bars, Pride celebrations, and the advocacy and work of out
politicians and officials help spread the message of the LGB movement that same-sex couples
are equally entitled to have their relationships recognized and respected by the state. Even
though public approval for same-sex marriage in Colombia was at 41% when it was legalized,
this message clearly made an impression on political and judicial elites. Quoting the decision
of the Court in SU-214/16, which resolved six different acciónes de tutela:
“Regarding the fundamental issues, the Court decides that the
principles of human dignity, and individual freedom and equality,
imply that every human being can get married, according to his
or her sexual orientation. The Court considers that celebrating a
civil contract of marriage is a legitimate and valid way to
materialize constitutional principles and values and a way to
ensure the exercise of their right to human dignity, individual
freedom, and equality (Corte Constitutional – translation, 2016).
Up to this point, this Chapter has shown how gay bars, pride, and openly LGB
politicians helped SMOs advocating for equality for same-sex couples overcome opposition to
same-sex marriage legalization and secure victory in Colombia’s highest court.
The visibility and opportunities for early mobilization provided by the proliferation of
gay bars and nightclubs, the pressure created by the international spectacle of Pride
celebrations as repertoires of contention, and the tireless advocacy of brave politicians and
officials who came out as openly LGB to help achieve descriptive representation, helped to
change the culture of political and judicial elites. This allowed activists to be more successful
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as they navigated legal opportunity structures. Now, building on research and data already
presented, this Chapter will turn to Mexico as a contrasting case. For, although Mexico’s LGB
movement has access to similar (in many cases superior) resources, visibility, and advocacy,
activists there have yet been unsuccessful in achieving total access to same-sex marriage rights
despite Mexico’s legalization.
6.1.4 The RI Theory of same-sex marriage Legalization in Mexico
same-sex marriage was approved by Mexico City’s Legislative Assembly in 2009, which
made that city the first city to legalize in Latin America and the Modicum Low cluster. However,
unlike Colombia or Argentina, marriage laws in Mexico are administered by the thirty-two
“federative entities” that make up the country – thirty-one states plus Mexico City (Diez 2015). In
Mexico all the same repertoires of contention, the same tactics, and the same levels of mobilization
capacity can be found as can be in Colombia – and often to a greater degree. And, yet progress
towards same-sex marriage legalization has been unequal in Mexico (see Figure 6-5). The
following sub-sections will examine possible explanations for this unexpected outcome after
briefly detailing legalization efforts and the context within which they were undertaken.
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Note: For the purposes of same-sex marriage legalization, recurso de amparo in Mexico is analogous to acción de tutela in Colombia.

Figure 6-5: Same-Sex Marriage Access Across Mexico
After World War II, Mexico practiced an import substitution strategy which led to
sustained economic and industrial growth from 1954 to 1970 (Kolhi 2004). This period is known
as The Mexican Miracle. Increased levels of prosperity, urbanization, and literacy that
accompanied this economic growth began to produce changes to norms around traditional
morality, sexual freedom, and the patriarchal family. The environment of widespread social
mobilization made it possible for Mexican homosexuals, inspired by the Stonewall Riots in the
U.S., to mobilize and demand equality. Even in Mexico the Stonewall Riots were an exogenous
shock that made coalescence of the LGB rights movement possible. The Homosexual Liberation
Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Homosexual) formed and held meetings to discuss their
shared experiences and their goals for a more equal Mexico (Diez 2011 and 2015). Because
Colombia and Mexico rank and score so closely together in the RI on the three variables of
Mobilization Capacity, Opportunities for Interaction with TANs, and Values; because they share
some common challenges; and because they are both legalizers, the rest of this Chapter will focus
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on potential explanations for why Mexico’s outcome – effective partial legalization – is different
Colombia’s.
6.1.4.1 A Brief History of LGB Rights in Mexico
The Mexican government began a brutal crackdown in 1970, its second in a decade, partly
in response to SMO-led protests and demands for more political and social freedom. Known
collectively as The Dirty War, these crackdowns included torture of, disappearance of, and
sometimes extrajudicial killing of those suspected of being part of or being sympathetic to groups
deemed subversive or dangerous by the government. While the groups targeted most by this
government campaign of repression were primarily student groups and union groups, homosexuals
were also targeted and the risk for them to mobilize was increased as many LGB activists during
this period were also part of student groups or unions (Diez 2015). Exemplifying the institutional
contempt for LGB persons prevalent at the time, President Echeverria said, in his State of the
Union address in 1974, that “among other things that characterized the background of the terrorists
operating in Mexico was high incidents of both masculine and feminine homosexuality” (Diez
2015). Homosexuality was associated with “the enemy.” Tolerance for homosexuality among
Mexicans at that time was exceptionally low.
Part of the reason for this was the legacy of the infamous “dance of the 41,” or el baile de
los cuarenta y uno, in which Mexico City police raided a private party in which nineteen out of
forty-one men in attendance were discovered in drag. This event attracted a large amount of
attention in the Mexican press at the time because several of the attendees were part of Mexico’s
political and economic elite, and none of the attention was favorable (see Figure 6-6).
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Figure 6-6: Two Illustrations of The Dance of the 41, by José Guadalupe Posada
Newspapers deemed the event a “shameless ball” that “amounted to an affront to public
decency and public morals” (Diez 2015). So controversial and scandalous was the event that the
number forty-one was taboo in Mexico for generations – in some places even the buildings have
no 41st floor. However, in part because of the fluidity surrounding the formation of sexual identities
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in Mexico, particularly for men, homosexuality was often tolerated in private, especially among
elite sectors of society, even if it was ridiculed in public. This fluidity is best illustrated in studies
on sexuality in Mexico that revealed that 30% of Mexican males had engaged in same-sex activity
at least once between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five (Carrier 1995; Murray 2010; Diez 2015).
Private sexual proclivities notwithstanding, the Dance of the 41 and the ill will for
homosexuals that was its aftermath created an institutional legacy that would have ramifications
for policy outcomes for decades. As in other countries where homophobia dominates public
discourse on sexuality, homosexuality in Mexico was for many decades characterized as an attack
on the Mexican nation itself – a betrayal of one’s duties and obligations to family and country.
Only recently has the number forty-one been reclaimed by LGB SMOs as a source of pride, in the
same way that the pink triangle – a symbol used by Nazis to identify homosexuals in concentration
camps – has become a global symbol for the movement. In other Latin American countries, like
Colombia, effeminate homosexual men were the victims of constant derision to be sure (Corrales
and Pecheny 2010). But the disdain against homosexual men in Mexico created by the Dance of
the 41 controversy is unique.
After setbacks and a loss of visibility during the AIDS epidemic in Mexico in the 1980s,
the late 1990s were promising for same-sex marriage legalization in Mexico. Democratization in
Mexico and the rise of the left-leaning Party of the Democratic Revolution, or Partido de la
Revolución Democrática (PRD), with which LGB SMOs had allied themselves, were positive
developments that revitalized the movement after the twin tragedies of The Dirty War and the
AIDS pandemic. Mexico City hosted its first Forum on Sexual Diversity and Human Rights,
coordinated by David Sánchez Camacho, one of the first openly gay politicians in Mexico. This
conference provided an excellent opportunity for LGB activists, feminists, academics, lawyers,
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and state actors to strengthen their networks and work together towards common goals. It was
broad-based coalitions like this that helped LGB activists in Mexico City capitalize on political
developments using newly democratized opportunity structures in the early 2000s and win support
for civil union recognition in Mexico City in 2007 and same-sex marriage in 2009 (Murray 2010;
Diez 2015).
The legalization of same-sex marriage in Mexico City kicked off a national debate on the
issue that brought the rights claims of LGB SMOs to the fore. On one side of the debate were a
coalition of LGB activists and SMOs, academics, celebrities and public figures, and PRD
leadership, including the mayor of Mexico City Marcelo Ebrard. Their arguments were steeped in
the language of human rights and democratization – not unlike the models of autonomy, equality,
and dignity discussed previously. On the other side of the debate were right wing social
conservatives, groups like the National Confederation of Christian Evangelical Churches, and the
Catholic Church, represented often in the public debate by Cardinal Norberto Rivera. The
opposition’s arguments centered around one basic message – as we saw in the Taiwan case in the
last Chapter as well – that same-sex marriage would put “the children” in danger, especially if
same-sex couples were permitted to adopt. Insinuations that homosexual men were pedophiles
were not uncommon (Diez 2015). Despite an intense and often personal public pressure campaign
from the right, the first five same-sex couples were officially married on March 11, a short time
after the law came into force (see Figure 6-7).
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Figure 6-7: First Five Same-sex Couples Married in Mexico City, March 2011
But the pressure campaign from same-sex marriage opponents had an effect on the national
debate, and efforts to legalize same-sex marriage nationally in the legislature failed. Conservative
then-president Felipe Calderón challenged Mexico City’s same-sex marriage law in the Mexican
Supreme Court. The governments of six Mexican states; Morelos, Guanajuato, Sonora, Jalisco,
Baja California, and Tlaxcala; likewise lodged constitutional challenges to Mexico City’s samesex marriage law on the grounds that reforms undertaken in Mexico City could have effects on the
legal frameworks of their own states, many of which defined marriage explicitly as being between
one man and one woman (Diez 2015).
6.1.4.2 Fragmented Outcome in Mexico
LGB SMOs assembled a coalition of human rights NGOs, legal scholars, and even faculty
from the Centro de Estudios y Docencia Economicas – one of Mexico’s elite universities – to write
amicus curiae briefs and affidavits supporting same-sex marriage legalization. Partially on the
strength of these arguments, the Mexican Supreme Court upheld Mexico City’s same-sex marriage
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law as being constitutional, and ruled that other states had to recognize same-sex marriages
performed in Mexico City. However, because of Mexican federalism, states governed by rightwing or conservative parties passed laws defining marriage as exclusively between one man and
one woman in states where these laws did not already exist, essentially nullifying the effects of the
Court’s decision in their states. These laws remain in place today, even though the Court ruled in
2015 that such laws were unconstitutional. The result is that same-sex marriage policy in Mexico
is fragmented, meaning that a same-sex couple’s ability to marry depends on their geography
(Archibald and Villagas 2015; Diez 2015).
According to the data in the RI, this fragmentation should not have occurred. Mexico is the
most likely country in the Modicum Low cluster to legalize same-sex marriage, based on RI scores.
In terms of the three key variables for the cluster, Mexico scores higher in two of them – gay bars
in the capital city and Pride attendance. The LGB bar scene is so extensive that Mexico City is
often praised as one of Latin America’s premiere queer tourist destinations (Queer in the World
2020; Travel Gay 2021). RI data puts the number of gay bars in Mexico City at 45, which ranks
the country at 9th out of 96 countries in the RI (see Figure 6-8). Note that while many travel
websites, blogs and guides aimed at the LGB community often list Amsterdam as a gay utopia
with well over 100 gay or gay-friendly establishments in the city, this is including many types of
businesses other than LGB bars and nightclubs, including bookstores, cafes, restaurants, hotels,
shops, spas, saunas, etc. which, though surely important, the RI does not take into account as none
of them have quite the same significance to resource mobilization. Research previously outlined
on the role of gay bars in the LGB movement in the U.S. and other countries strongly suggest that
bars in the Mexico City gayborhood Zona Rosa (pink zone) were early gathering places for LGB
persons in the emergent stage of the movement and played a key role in its coalescence.
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Figure 6-8: Countries Compared by LGB Bars in Most Populous Cities
When it comes to Pride celebrations, Mexico City boasts among the world’s largest. The
first Pride event in 1978 attracted only a handful of marchers, but most recent attendance figures
publicly available put the number of participants in modern Mexico City Pride celebrations at over
500,000 (Insurrectasypunto 2010). For context, this is greater attendance than in cities like Los
Angeles, Montreal, or Sydney. Much like in the case of Colombia, country-specific research on
the effects of Pride on the LGB movement in Mexico is thin. But there is again research detailing
Pride’s importance to the LGB movement and this case study analysis has uncovered no evidence
to suggest that this principle would not hold true in Mexico. Given that, since Mexico City’s Pride
celebration is more well-attended than Bogota’s, it stands to reason that the event is at least as
beneficial. As of 2020, 69% of Mexicans surveyed by Pew Research Center indicated they felt
homosexuality should be accepted by society, so by that measure it is certainly possible that larger
Pride celebrations translate to eventual higher levels of acceptance (see Figure 6-9).
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Figure 6-9: Public Approval of Homosexuality in 2020
Mexico also has similar numbers of out LGB politicians. David Sánchez Camacho was
Mexico’s first openly gay politician – serving on the legislative council of Mexico City federal
district and as a deputy in the Mexican Chamber of deputies. As previously stated, Camacho
organized Mexico City’s first forum on LGB rights as human rights (Diez 2015). Enoé Margarita
Uranga Muñoz is another example of an out politician acting to advance the rights claims of
Mexican same-sex couples. Muñoz, also from Mexico City, is a representative to the Mexican
Congress, where she serves as Secretary of the Commission on Human Rights (Sequera and Bajak
2012; Diez 2015). She was instrumental in getting social security benefits extended to same-sex
couples (Lopez 2018). There are other examples certainly, but it will suffice to say that Mexico
and Colombia have comparable numbers of out politicians advocating for the LGB movement at
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some level. However, the slight edge given to Colombia in this variable, as reported in the RI, is
not enough to explain why Colombia legalized same-sex marriage completely while Mexico still
has not. Since none of these three primarily significant variables can explain the difference in
outcomes between predicted likely and actual legalization, there must be another variable needed.
6.1.5 Potential Crucial Differences in Democracy
Both Colombia and Mexico have legalized same-sex marriage. Both have similar
performance in the RI. Both offer evidence of strong mobilization capacity in the form of gay bars
and out politicians who can serve as allies within the political elite. Both have the largest – and
indeed only internationally significant – Pride celebrations in the Modicum Low cluster. Domestic
LGB SMOs successfully navigated opportunity structures in both countries to accomplish
legalization against the odds. And, in both countries the influence of TANs on the legalization
process has been minimal. So, why then does Mexico still offer only partial access to the right,
even though it should be more likely to legalize than Colombia, according to the RI theory. This
section will explore those possible differences: the degree of democracy, the regime type, the age
of democracy, and federalism.

For progress on rights claims to occur, the opportunity structures in place must be
stable. Returning to the Freedom House rankings in Table 5-3, Colombia ranks 61/100, or
partly free, though it is important to note that Levistky and Way do not list Colombia as a
competitive authoritarian regime (2010). Digging deeper into the Freedom House report on
Colombia from 2020, it is noted that Colombia is among the “longest-standing democracies in
Latin America (Freedom House 2020). The report scores Colombia well on electoral measures
but observes that smaller guerilla groups still active even after the 2016 peace agreement that
ended decades-long conflict may prevent citizens from enjoying their rights in some parts of
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the country. The report also notes that while freedoms of association, press, and speech are all
provided for in the Colombian constitution, in practice the government has at times resorted to
violence to silence protest or dissent and human rights-based NGOs often face interference in
their work (Freedom House 2020). Despite these limitations, there are stable opportunity
structures in place for LGB SMOs to engage in contentious politics, as we have seen. LGB
representatives and their allies were able to press for legislative change. LGB citizens were
able to petition for their rights in Colombian courts. In fact, for most of the 20th and significant
parts of the 21st centuries, Colombia has a higher polyarchy score (liberal democracy) than
Mexico does (see Figure 6-10).

Source: V-Dem 2021
Figure 6-10: Liberal Democracy in Colombia and Mexico Compared
Until the last 30 years or so, Mexico was still classified as competitively authoritarian. That
is to say that democratic institutions served mainly as a means of legitimizing the ruling party as
opposed to providing real competition. When Mexico finally did democratize, this democratization
came about partly because politicians with ties to Western liberal democracies sought reform from
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within the existing party structure due to high levels of linkage52 with the West and the lower levels
of leverage53 that the West had on Mexico. Low levels of leverage are important because it means
that Western democracies must put indirect pressure on competitive authoritarian countries to
liberalize, meaning that progress towards democratization often has more domestic legitimacy as
it is seen as coming from within rather than as being imposed from outside (Levitsky and Way
2010). In addition, echoing the basic tenants of modernization theory, economic development also
played a role in democratization in Mexico. As time went on, Mexican leaders and policy makers
interested in liberal reform were able to establish stable and effective formal institutions normally
associated with liberal and advanced democracies. Figure 6-11 shows the comparative transitions
of Colombia and Mexico from closed authoritarianism to electoral democracy54.

Figure 6-11: Transitions to Democracy

52

Linkage comes in the following categories: economic, diplomatic, technocratic, social, informational,
and non-governmental (Levitsky and Way 2010).
53
Leverage comes from the size and power of the country, the foreign policy goals of the country, and a
lack of “Black Knight” actors capable of limiting or countering democratic pressure (Levitsky and Way 2010).
54
V-Dem defines “electoral democracy” as having free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level
of Dahl’s institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V- Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index
(v2x_polyarchy), but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for
personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive are not satisfied as
measured by V-Dem’s Liberal Component Index (v2x_liberal).
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Then, why does Mexico score as only “partly free” in Freedom House rankings if it has
achieved the status of electoral democracy? In short significant problems with organized crime,
lingering levels of corruption that persist in part because of organized criminal influence, and
problems with consistent rule of law make the enjoyment of full civil and political rights difficult
in large parts of the country (Freedom House 2020). Drug cartels and other affiliated organized
crime groups have significant power to violently confront government forces in response to
attempts to establish rule of law. For example, in 2006 organized criminal groups facilitated or
carried out 2000 political assassinations targeting law enforcement and government officials across
the country, and that number increased to 2,673 in 2007 (Milenio 2007; Bailey and Taylor 2009).
More recent examples include an assassination attempt on the Mexico City chief of police and the
killing of a Mexican federal judge in Colima, both in 2020 and both attributed to the Cartel Jalisco
Nuevo Generación organized crime group (Beitell 2020). The RCII scores Mexico at a 347 out of
a possible 1000 in Security, in large part because of the activities of organized crime and the
corruption, erosion of state of capacity, and breakdown in trust of law enforcement institutions that
comes along with such high levels of organized crime (RCII 2021). Figure 6-12 illustrates
Mexico’s poor performance in this area.
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Figure 6-12: The Effect of Organized Crime in Mexico
Although Mexico still does not have an advanced level of democracy, or possibly even a
liberal level of democracy, as has been listed in this Chapter, political and legal opportunity
structures still exist for LGB SMOs to press their rights claims through contentious politics. Case
study analysis has already shown that SMOs within the LGB movement have had some success in
achieving marriage equality for same-sex couples in much of the country. Lack of success on the
national level may be attributed in part to Mexican federalism but also in part to lower levels of
democracy that limit state capacity and erode public trust making progress more difficult to
achieve. However, the quality of democracy in Colombia and Mexico is not the only aspect of
democratization that matters to this analysis.
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Research on the Mexican and Colombian cases reveal another possible variable of
importance when considering LGB rights in Modicum Low countries. That variable is the age of
democracies. Analysis has already indicated that democratic institutions are important, like
independent judiciaries capable of rendering verdicts at odd with legislative policy or priorities,
for example. Or the ability of citizens to petition courts directly for the protection of their
constitutional rights through the use of amparo or tutela. But both Colombia and Mexico have
these institutions. Though scholars may differ on whether Colombia and Mexico qualify as liberal
or advanced democracies, there is agreement that both qualify as democracies at least in the
procedural sense, and that both offer some protection for some basic civil and political rights. But
the length of time since democratization is important as well. Scholars who study the consolidation
of democracies characterize consolidation as either an avoidance of regression to authoritarianism
or as a deepening of democratic institutions so that persons in a country are more equal under the
law and have a greater enjoyment of their civil and political rights (Schedler 1998). Age of
democracy, or how long a state can be rightly classified as democratic, may be a good proxy for
democratic consolidation. Older democracies have more opportunities to deepen institutions.
Qualitative research suggests that in young democracies, human rights are at the forefront
of the public consciousness in ways that are not typical in older, more established democracies
(Corrales and Pecheney 2010; Diez 2011 and 2015; Encarnación 2016 and others). So, it may not
be unusual to see a young democracy moving faster than anticipated to adopt contested rights
norms. On the other hand, the longevity of a democracy matters too, as longevity often implies
consolidation of democratic norms. Often cited research by Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013, 2018)
assign age to the world’s democracies for the number of years since 1800 for which countries meet
specific criteria, like popularly elected and accountable executives; legislatures that are elected in
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free, fair, and regular elections; and at least universal male suffrage – a procedural definition (see
Appendix C). Using this data, we can see that out of the top ten oldest democracies, nine of them
have legalized same-sex marriage – only Switzerland stands out as the loan country in that list that
has not yet done so (see Table 6-9).
Table 6-9: Age of Democracies and Same-Sex Marriage Legalization – All RI Countries
Age of
SSM
Democracy Legalized
Country
(Years)
(Year)
United States
216
2015
Switzerland
168
Not Legal
New Zealand
159
2013
Canada
149
2005
United Kingdom
131
2013
Luxembourg
126
2014
Belgium
122
2003
Netherlands
119
2000
Norway
116
2008
Australia
115
2017

VARIABLES
Dem_Age
GDPperCapita
Constant

(1)
SSM10
0.0183***
(0.00565)
0.00423***
(0.000883)
3.907***
(0.416)

Observations
96
R-squared
0.485
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6-9 also clearly shows that, even when controlled with GDP per capita, the age of
democracies is statistically significant when testing all countries in the RI. In other words, the older
a democracy is, the more likely it is to have legalized same-sex marriage when all countries in the
RI are included in the regression. Furthermore, as democracies age, the probability of legalization
goes up for each year of age, so that a democracy that is 200 years old or more has a nearly 100%
of legalizing same-sex marriage in a given year (see Figure 6-13).
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Figure 6-13: Probability of Same-Sex Marriage Legalization as Democracies Age
This pattern also holds up when only Modicum Low countries are examined. This suggests
that while conversations about human rights for oppressed minorities may be more common or
more immediate in young democracies with recent experiences of authoritarian repression – like
Mexico’s Dirty War discussed earlier – for those conversations to result in real policy change at
the national level the democracy needs to be more mature. These results strongly suggest that the
age of the democracy may account for Colombia legalizing same-sex marriage before Mexico,
given that Colombia’s democracy is older and more consolidated.
Age matters. A historical institutional approach to examining these two cases would focus
on the role of democratization in same-sex marriage legalization in the Modicum low cluster. The
transitions to democracy in Colombia in the 1950s and in Mexico in the late 1990s and early 2000s
both created policy legacies in that they opened up previously non-existent or inaccessible
opportunity structures through which LGB SMOs could engage in contentious politics.
Colombia’s 1991 constitution establishes the acción de tutela. In Mexico, the recurso de amparo
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serves much the same purpose, with LGB activists using the amparo to file suits to challenge the
constitutionality of laws defining marriage as exclusively between one man and one women.
The tutela and the amparo could represent critical junctures – or institutional innovations
– which allowed for SMOs to advocate for rights claims in ways not possible prior to
democratization. The use of the tutela and amparo create new opportunity structures, in this case
legal opportunity structures, through which SMOs can advocate for their rights. Previous historical
analysis in this Chapter on both Colombia and Mexico indeed shows that, when faced with political
resistance, LGB SMOs had better luck advancing their equality agenda in the courts. This is in
part due to their use of tutela and amparo, respectively. And while Mexico’s amparo was
established in the 1917 Constitution in Articles 103 and 107 and is technically older (Vázquez
2005), the fact that until the early-to-mid 2000s Mexico would have been properly classified as a
competitive authoritarian country indicates that the right of filing amparo was not fully enjoyed
until the country democratized. If this is true, then the age of democracy is clearly an important
factor in explaining why Colombia, democratizing in the 1950s, legalized same-sex marriage first.
However, it should be acknowledged that the age of democracy may well be standing in
for another unknown variable or set of variables, something which further single-case study might
illuminate. For example, as democracies age, more robust opportunity structures may develop as
critical junctures introduce more access and accountability into legal and political institutions. So,
it isn’t so much the age of democracy that could matter if this were the case, but rather the quality
of the opportunity structures available. Additionally, the age of a democracy could also indicate a
more robust set of informal norms that govern the actions of political elites or higher levels of
consolidation making those democracies more electorally responsive, more liberal, and more
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egalitarian, in other words less likely to revert to authoritarianism55. Again, it is beyond the scope
of the dissertation to fully unpack what might really be driving the correlation between age of
democracy and same-sex marriage legalization. For now, it is enough to acknowledge that such a
relationship seems to exist.
Other than the age of democracies, there is one other obvious difference between Colombia
and Mexico that should be investigated which could account for the different outcomes in samesex marriage legalization. That difference is that Colombia’s is a unitary system while Mexico has
a federal system. This means in Colombia, marriage policy is decided at the national level, and if
sub-national units like cities or states choose to make different policy they do so only if the central
government allows them that authority – authority which can be revoked at any time by the central
government. By contrast, as previously discussed, marriage policy in Mexico is made at the subnational level, meaning that it is possible for one city or state to have a different policy on samesex marriage than its neighbor, or than the country. This condition leads to what Diez terms
“fragmented progress.” In doing research for this Chapter, this difference seemed an obvious
possibility to explain Colombia’s legalization and Mexico’s failure to deliver equal access to samesex marriage rights. Further analysis on this potential variable in detail could yield significant
findings.
6.2

Conclusions Drawn for Case-Pair Comparisons
The comparison of Colombia and Mexico confirms the value of mobilization capacity and

the embrace of Secular and Emancipative values, especially since civil society is notoriously more
closed and potentially hazardous to navigate for activists and outside SMOs tend to be met with
skepticism at best, both limiting the effectiveness of TANs in Latin America. It might be fruitful

55

For more on consolidation theory, see Linz and Stepan (1996) or O’Donnell (1996).
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to extend this qualitative analysis to more countries within the Modicum Low Cluster – especially
those outside of Latin America – to determine if this limitation is regionally limited. The
fragmentation of outcomes in Mexico could be due to the unique effect of the Dance of the 41
controversy on public perception of homosexuality. The case comparison of Colombia and Mexico
also suggests that regime type, age of democracy, quality of democracy, and government type
(unitary or federal) could also play important roles in explaining the uneven access to same-sex
marriage in Mexico despite legalization. These variables could be included in future iterations of
the RI to make the theory even more robust and capable of more accurately predicting probability
of legalization based on a measure of friendliness to LGB equality.
6.3

Summary
In this Chapter, we confirmed through qualitative analysis that the theory that a

combination of high mobilization capacity, the embrace of secular and emancipative values, and
opportunities for interaction with TANs allows for LGB SMOs to utilize contentious politics
within existing opportunity structures in order to advocate for the legalization of same-sex
marriage is valid in the Modicum Low Cluster. Several potential variables were identified as
potentially being able to explain variations in outcomes between Mexico and Colombia. These
include youth political engagement, judicial independence, regime type, government type, age of
democracy, and quality of democracy. In the concluding chapter we will examine how these
possibilities might impact future research, and what this might mean for the theory.
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7

CONCLUSION: SOMETHING QUEER

This dissertation set out to test the hypothesis that a combination of empowering values,
mobilization capacity, and opportunities for domestic actors to work with the support of LGB
rights TANs makes it possible for SMOs to navigate domestic opportunity structures in order to
press rights claims and make same-sex marriage legalization more likely. In testing this hypothesis,
the hope was that an answer to the puzzle of why so many states seemed to have legalized samesex marriage in so relatively short a time would emerge. What the findings, detailed in this chapter,
have shown is that the theory holds and is valid across regions and clusters. The findings also show
that it is likely that in each country that has legalized same-sex marriage, there are possible
additional variables that help explain the outcome of same-sex marriage legalization, particularly
when a country legalizes faster than theoretically anticipated. These findings also help to provide
an answer to the puzzle of recent same-sex marriage legalization. That answer can be found
partially in the preconditions of LGB identity formation and democratization that are necessary
for LGB SMOs to take advantage of opportunities presented by the combination of empowering
values, mobilization capacity, and opportunities for domestic actors to work within LGB rights
TANs. Indeed, without LGB identity formation, mobilization isn’t possible. And without
democratization, opportunity structures are likely to be extremely limited or non-existent. It takes
time for all of these factors to fall into place, and that may well be the beginning of the answer to
the puzzle. IN the following sections, the findings presented in the previous chapters will be
summarized and potential future areas of research identified.
7.1

Findings
The overall findings of both the quantitative testing of the hypothesis in Chapter 3 and the

case-study analyses of the Colombian, Japanese, Mexican, and Taiwanese cases in Chapters 4-6
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are that values, mobilization capacity, and opportunities to work with TANs make it more likely
that an LGB rights SMO will successfully navigate existing opportunity structures in pressing
rights claims for access to legalized same-sex marriage. The hypothesis is visualized in Figure 71.

Figure 7-1: The Hypothesis Revisited in Conclusion
What the case studies show us is that this theory holds overall, but that there will be regional,
cluster-based, or even country-specific variations that help explain early legalizers like Taiwan of
Colombia, and in future potentially outlier cases like South Africa, which is the only country to
legalize in Sub-Saharan Africa.
These findings are important because they represent, to the best of my knowledge, one of
the first cross-national studies on same-sex marriage legalization to employ both quantitative and
qualitative analysis to test the hypothesis. In addition, the findings present a possible avenue for a
revision, of sorts, of modernization theory, which potentially fails in explaining outcomes like
same-sex marriage legalization through contentious politics because modernization theory does
not fully take into account the importance of identity, mobilization, and TANs and also has a
conceptualization of post-material values that is less helpful than the Emancipative – Secular
framework. The next few sections will detail the findings for each case.
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7.1.1 Taiwan
Taiwan legalized same-sex marriage first in the Sinic East due to a high degree of LGB
mobilization capacity, which included relatively high levels of LGB power, an open system to
civil society that allowed for TANs to take advantage of opportunities to connect with local SMOs
and advocates though high-profile events like large Pride celebrations, and an embrace of postmaterial Emancipative and Secular values. These factors were made possible by the formation of
a coherent LGB identity after the publication of the novel Crystal Boys in 1983. Empowered by
mobilization capacity and TANs and benefitting from elite embrace of Emancipative and Secular
values, Taiwanese activists and LGB SMOs navigated political and legal opportunity structures to
press their rights claims for same-sex marriage. LGB bars also played a significant role in helping
early LGB SMOs to mobilize, particularly in their early stages of development. And political elites
helped SMOs navigate opportunity structures, advocating on their behalf from time-to-time and
showing their support for same-sex marriage rights.
But Taiwanese LGB SMOs also benefitted from other factors that played a role in moving
the country towards legalization. These are a history of youth political involvement, a liberalization
towards democratic institutions that incorporated human rights discourse from its earliest stages,
multiculturalism, a move to embrace a national identity distinct from the Chinese identity of the
first Nationalist members of the KMT and supporters of Chiang Kai-shek who came to the island
from the mainland, a need to engage in human-rights based asymmetric (queer) diplomacy, and
domestic judicial reform that encouraged high levels of judicial independence. We see examples
of youth political involvement in the student-led protest movements like the Sunflower Movement
and in youth voter turnout in elections like the presidential election of 2020, which saw the
reelection of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) over her KMT opponent who advocated
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friendlier ties to mainland China in the wake of the Chinese crackdown on protests in Hong Kong.
We see examples of human rights discourse in the earliest pro-democracy protests towards the end
of the White Terror – including the student-led Wild Lily Movement that began on the Taipei
campus of NTU. We see examples of multiculturalism in the blending of Taoism and Buddhism
and in the embrace of Confucianist values reimagined along humanist ideals that might be more
expected in the inheritors of the Enlightenment.
Taiwanization, or the process of creating and embracing a national identity that is distinct
from mainland China can be seen throughout the liberalization process but particularly in the rise
of the pro-independence DPP. Because most states in the world recognize the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) and the PRC lays claim to the island of Taiwan, considering it a “renegade
province”, most states do not formally recognize Taiwan, and so the country has had to resort to a
unique approach to diplomacy in which legitimacy on thew world stage is cultivated through the
embrace of human rights, like LGB rights, and value systems of supportive countries like the US.
And, during Taiwan’s liberalization, the judiciary was reformed from within by activist judges in
order to become a more independent body capable of defending human rights against a sometimesreluctant central government. These factors have not been analyzed in as great a detail as variables
that are part of the hypothesis, but they do suggest the possibility to incorporate them into a more
comprehensive of the RI – RI 2.0.
7.1.2 Japan
In the RI, Japan is predicted to be more likely to legalize same-sex marriage than Taiwan.
However, there are several issues which prevent legalization there and help explain why another
country like Taiwan could legalize first. Case study analysis reveals the formation of a cohesive
Japanese LGB identity as a precondition for mobilization is hindered due to a number of cultural
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factors, including the hyper-sexualization of same-sex desire resulting in the partial
dehumanization of LGB persons, and an intense pressure for LGB Japanese to remain closeted to
their families. In addition, Japanese SMOs face significant challenges to mobilization, including
the fact that LGB bars in Japan operate differently than do their counterparts in other countries in
that they tend to cater to very small niche sub-groups of the wider LGB population. There are also
limits on opportunities for LGB SMOs to avail themselves of TANs in a way that would allow
them to challenge the status quo on same-sex marriage, due to the narrowed environment faced by
Japanese civil society organizations. Indeed, Taiwan is the only Asia-Pacific country in which civil
society environment is rated as open by Civicus. Finally, the way in which empowering
Emancipative and Secular values are embraced in Japan liberates only those who conform to
traditional notions of sexuality – in other words these empowering values are viewed almost
exclusively through a heteronormative lens.
Case study analysis also reveals there are also some factors at work in Japan specifically
that could help explain the lag from the expected outcome for same-sex marriage legalization.
Japan has a political culture which discourages youth involvement in politics, and which is
reinforced by institutional pressures on young people to politically disengage and these factors
potentially adds to the challenges faced by LGB SMOs looking to avail themselves of potential
activists to swell their ranks. And the ability of the LDJ to affect a kind of control over an already
conservative judiciary could lessen the chances of SMOs successfully challenging bans on samesex marriage at the highest level for at least the foreseeable future. This is because in Japan the
high court is perceived to rule in favor of the government in cases salient to government interests
about half the time, and the LDJ-dominated government remains opposed to same-sex marriage
legalization.
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The comparison of the Japanese and Taiwanese cases strongly suggests that the addition
of measures of judicial independence and LGB acceptance to a more comprehensive RI 2.0. This
could help the index more accurately predict Taiwan as being more likely to legalize same-sex
marriage than Taiwan. And, given the importance of the preconditions to legalization as shown in
the quantitative and case study analysis, it is likely that the addition of a variable aimed at capturing
the potential cohesiveness of LGB identity is warranted. As we’ll discuss later in this chapter, LGB
acceptance could potentially serve as a proxy for this measure.
7.1.3 Colombia
Colombia legalized same-sex marriage in 2016 following a series of court decisions
affirming the rights of same-sex couples. Analysis of the Colombian case confirms the importance
of both LGB bars and descriptive representation in the form of out LGB politicians to mobilization.
Additionally, the Colombian case shows the importance of gayborhoods as focal points of LGB
power and mobilization and of Pride celebrations as a means of engaging in contentious politics
in a less overtly confrontational manner. But, interestingly for Colombia and for Mexico, Pride
celebrations do not necessarily translate into increased opportunities for SMOs to interact with
LGB TANs in order to help press rights claims. This is because in Latin American cases, case
study research shows that domestic SMOs – or at least domestic LGB SMOs – tend to look with
suspicion on international LGB SMOs for a number of reasons. These reasons include a conception
of LGB identity that does not always fit within the universalist paradigm of American and
Western-European dominated LGB identity discourse and the fact that American anti-same-sex
marriage SMOs are quite active in developing countries attempting to force a backslide on LGB
equality. Additionally, Latin American LGB SMOs were using the language or rights discourse in
pressing for LGB equality in some cases earlier than rights movements in North America and
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Western Europe. While there is not evidence to suggest that these conditions extend to countries
in the Modicum-Low cluster outside of Latin America, it does at least suggest one partial
explanation for a lack of progress on LGB rights in some developing democracies.
The Colombian case, like Taiwan, also shows the importance of the courts. Colombia has
recognized same-sex unions since 2007 and same-sex marriage was legalized in 2016 following a
string of rulings that affirmed the equal rights of same-sex couples on issues ranging from
healthcare, social security, survivor benefits, and alimony. More importantly, the courts
recognized the inherent dignity of LGB persons as a category of person, allowing for crimes
targeting the LGB community to be addressed during peace negotiations with the FARC. Judges
in Colombia used the notions of dignity, equality, and autonomy in considering cases involving
same-sex couples – meaning that the Court ultimately found that LGB persons have the same right
to decide their futures, that their lives are as valid in every way as heterosexuals, that laws banning
same-sex marriage unjustly differentiate rights based on sexuality, and that LGB persons have the
right to be left alone in their own consensual affairs, free from interference from state institutions.
The Colombian case adds to the possibility that some measure of judicial independence as
a measure of the existence of opportunity structures should be added to the index. But the
Colombian case, and indeed the Mexican case as well, also suggests the real possibility that the
influence of TANs is overestimated in the literature. Though, further research would need to be
conducted to ascertain whether this remains true outside of Latin America, so a more robust version
of the RI would, for now, still contain the measures of opportunities of domestic SMOs to avail
themselves of the benefits of support from international LGB rights organizations working within
TANs. In any case Colombia’s legalization of same-sex marriage before Mexico is an unexpected
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outcome based on the current configuration of the RI, and the addition of variables on judicial
independence may help the index more accurately reflect the outcome.
7.1.4 Mexico
The Colombian-Mexican case pair is different from the Japan-Taiwan case pair in that
Colombia and Mexico have both legalized same-sex marriage. But, while the Mexican Supreme
Court ruled in 2015 that laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, the nature of
Mexican federalism meant that some states have taken years to pass legislation codifying the
outcome56. Mexico and Colombia are so close in rank and score in the RI, that analysis on this
case focused on the differences between the pair that might explain Colombia’s full legalization
even as Mexico lagged behind. What is ultimately revealed is that several factors related to the
precondition of democratization may be significant. These include regime type and the age of
democracy. According to case study analysis, Mexico was classified as competitively authoritarian
until 1999 while Colombia achieved the status of competitive democracy in 1957. With age of
democracy can come consolidation of democratic institutions and their accompanying opportunity
structures. Additionally for the Mexican case, problems with perceived corruption and high levels
of organized crime related to the international drug trade have sapped some institutions of their
domestic legitimacy and of their ability to deliver equal rights and protections under the law.
Though, further analysis is warranted to determine if high levels of organized crime and perceived
corruption are significant specifically to the outcome of same-sex marriage legalization.
The Mexican case suggests that age of democracy, in addition to regime type, could be an
important addition to the RI 2.0. Luckily, data on both measures is readily available. But, the
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The Tamaulipas state legislature became the last Mexican state to legalize SSM as of October 27 th, 2022
– but this event is outside the timeframe for the research in this dissertation. So, it is merely noted here for the sake
of factual accuracy.
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Mexican case also suggests that federalism – or the degree to which institutions of the central
government can affect policy change at the sub-national level – would also be helpful to consider.
Unfortunately, data on federalism is harder to come by. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has measures of fiscal federalism which at first seem
promising, but the country-coverage of the data is far too small to be included in the RI – only
OECD member states are included in the data. A more promising measure is the Regional
Authority Index Dataset, which aims to measure federalism on a continuum of autonomy, though
30 countries in the RI are not measured in this index57. It is hoped that this may change in future.
So, measures on federalism will be left for future consideration.
7.2

The Power of the Rainbow Index
As possible additional variables for inclusion into the RI 2.0 have already been discussed,

this would be an appropriate time to circle back to the RCII and the power of the tool in creating
both the original RI and the RI 2.0. As stated previously, the RCII scores and ranks country-level
data as part of a holistic approach to research and analysis. The RCII allows for visualizations of
this data that can help a researcher focus on a particular variable or set of variables as a means of
explaining a particular outcome – in this case same-sex marriage legalization. But the most
significant contribution of the RCII to this dissertation is the ability to construct customized indices
containing data imported by the user. This is previously referred to in Chapter 3 as the BYOI
functionality.
To create the RI, data on measures of mobilization capacity, opportunities for TANs, and
values were imported into the RCII framework. These variables were weighted and organized into
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authority/.

For more, see The Regional Authority Index Dataset: http://garymarks.web.unc.edu/data/regional-
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a coherent structure. The same process can be used to create the RI 2.0, and in future years to
augment the structure with new data as it becomes available, or to enter data for subsequent years
to create a longitudinal measure of friendliness to LGB rights. The value of this ability is obvious
– data visualization of future iterations of the RI can be used to inform continued case study
analysis and even quantitative analysis. With more customization, the RI could also be used to
study other LGB rights outcomes, such as constitutional bans on and/or protections of same-sex
marriage, LGB-antidiscrimination protections, or death penalties for consensual same-sex sexual
relationships. In the next subsection of this chapter, new variables for an RI 2.0 will be reviewed
and the results of the incorporation of these new variables into the RI utilizing the BYOI
functionality of the RCII will be briefly analyzed.
7.3

Potential New Variables and Future Research
As discussed briefly in Chapter 3, based on the case study analysis on Colombia, Mexico,

Japan, and Taiwan, the following variables have been identified for inclusion in the second
iteration of the RI: Regime Type, Age of Democracy, LGB Acceptance, High Court Independence,
and Lower Court Independence. Regime Type was originally identified as a precondition for the
existence of opportunity structures in general, based on the literature review. But case study
analysis indicated that regime type might play a significant role in same-sex marriage legalization.
The addition of these variables should help to capture the level of the preconditions to same-sex
marriage legalization and the degree to which opportunity structures exist for SMOs to engage in
contentious politics. These variables are defined and sourced as follows.
Regime Type is the perceptive classification of political regimes considering the
competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as the degree to which liberal
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principles are institutionalized. This variable is on a ten-point scale, as explained in the
Varieties of Democracy Codebook.
“0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the
legislature.
1: Closed autocracy upper bound: Same as closed autocracy, but the confidence
intervals of the multiparty election indicators overlap the level of electoral
autocracies.
2: Electoral autocracy lower bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the
confidence intervals of one or both of the multiparty election indicators overlap the
level of closed autocracies.
3: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the
legislature but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto
multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl’s institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as
measured by V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy).
4: Electoral autocracy upper bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the upper
bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair and multiparty
elections and the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral
democracies.
5: Electoral democracy lower bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the lower
bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair, or multiparty
or the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral autocracies.
6: Electoral democracy: Free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of
Dahl’s institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V- Dem’s Electoral
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Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy), but either access to justice, or transparent law
enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and
judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured
by V-Dem’s Liberal Component Index (v2x_liberal) (Varieties of Democracy
2021).
7: Electoral democracy upper bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the
confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law
enforcement, and the liberal component index overlap the level of liberal
democracies.
8: Liberal democracy lower bound: Same as liberal democracy, but the confidence
intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement,
and the liberal component index reaches the level of electoral democracies.
9: Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum
level of Dahl’s institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V- Dem’s
Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy) are guaranteed as well as access to
justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for
personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the
executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem’s Liberal Component Index
(v2x_liberal)” (Varieties of Democracy 2021, 288).
Age of Democracy represents the number of years that a country qualifies as a democracy,
based on the classification and assessment by Boix et al. (2013). This is an electoral
definition of democracy, in which democracies are understood here as political systems in
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which political leaders are elected under broad right to vote for men in free and fair
elections.
LGB Acceptance is used here as a proxy, or indirect measure, of the degree to which there
is potential for the creation of a cohesive LGB identity as a precursor to mobilization.
Created by the University of California at Los Angeles School of Law’s Williams Institute,
LGB Acceptance is defined as “the extent to which LGBI people are seen in ways that are
positive and inclusive, both with respect to an individual’s opinions about LGBI people
and with regard to an individual’s position on LGBI policies” (Flores 2021, 5). This
measure is derived through advanced statistical modeling of survey results from questions
included in the World Values Survey and Pew Global on LGB rights issues, including
respondents’ opinions on whether or not homosexuality can ever be justified, whether or
not they would like to have a homosexual as a neighbor, and whether or not homosexuality
should be accepted by society at large. The theoretical justification for the inclusion of this
variable, particularly in light of the Japan case analysis, is that in societies which are more
likely to accept homosexuality, LGB persons may be more likely to come out and
potentially be politically active.
High Court Independence is also taken from the Varieties of Democracy dataset and is a
perceptive measure of the frequency to which high courts “make decisions that merely
reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record.” A response
value of 0 indicates “Always”; 1 indicates “Usually”; 2 indicates “About half of the time”;
3 indicates “Seldom”; and 4 indicates “Never” (Varieties of Democracy 2021, 172).
Lower Court Independence is the same measure with the same response values as High
Court Independence but applied to lower courts.
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The case analysis also suggests that a measure of youth engagement and a measure of
federalism would also be highly valuable to the RI 2.0, however measures with suitable country
coverage are not to be found at present. World Values Survey data would exclude 11 cases from
the RI 2.0, while the Regional Authority Index Dataset would exclude 30 cases. I am hopeful that
these sources will expand their country coverage in future, or that more robust and inclusive
measures can ne found. However, the addition of Regime Type, Age of Democracy, LGB
Acceptance, High Court Independence, and Lower Court Independence already brings the RI more
in line with observed phenomena (See Figure 7-2) in these case studies.

Figure 7-2: Rainbow Index 2.0
The RI 2.0 now predicts Colombia as more likely to legalize same-sex marriage than
Mexico, though just so. The RI 2.0 also still predicts Japan to legalize same-sex marriage than
Taiwan, but again only just so. These outcomes are much more in-line with observed phenomenon.
Additionally, an examination of only same-sex marriage legalizers shows Ecuador to be a clear
global outlier in having legalized same-sex marriage even though it ranks 11 places lower than the
next-lowest-ranking legalizers, South Africa (38th) and Malta (40th), suggesting that Ecuador could
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be a fruitful choice for potential future case study analysis. Interestingly, as shown in Chapter 3,
while court independence does seem to lend some value to analysis of the two case pairs, factor
scoring indicates that these variables may not be valuable to the model for the entire universe of
cases in the RI. Once these variables are dropped out in keeping with the results of factor scoring
in Chapter 3 (3.4.3), Colombia and Taiwan resume similar relationships in scoring to Mexico and
Japan. However, Italy and Japan are the only two countries in the final RI 2.0 version top-20ranked countries that have not legalized, which also suggests potential future case-studies,
including a more in-depth examination of Japan (see Table 7-1).
Table 7-1: Outliers in the RI 2.0

Rainbow Index

United Kingdom
Sweden
Germany
Netherlands
Denmark
France
Canada
United States
Spain
Australia
Austria
Finland
Belgium
New Zealand
Japan
Norway
Brazil
Uruguay
Italy
Iceland

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Score
1000
977
966
952
950
933
925
914
907
894
885
879
862
849
834
811
805
792
790
789

Preconditions
for SSM
Legalization
Rank Score
6
973
3
981
21
855
8
962
13
928
17
901
1
1000
4
980
16
908
9
956
22
851
12
944
14
922
7
969
23
824
11
946
26
801
20
856
18
876
2
991

Mobilization
Capacity

Openness to
TANs

Rank
1
12
2
6
9
4
4
6
14
17
10
23
13
3
18
15
8
32
25
29

Rank
11
1
17
21
3
6
19
1
5
10
14
16
15
34
9
25
8
3
6
31

Score
1000
716
981
802
766
856
856
802
688
662
739
613
710
887
651
667
784
530
600
567

Score
981
1000
971
938
998
991
958
1000
994
986
978
974
976
481
988
496
990
998
991
485

Values
Rank Score
15
803
1
1000
9
838
5
896
4
913
16
796
27
698
26
702
7
874
12
818
11
821
8
841
24
705
10
830
18
762
2
944
46
548
23
708
36
615
3
941

Data visualization in the RI 2.0 also shows that the addition of the new variables to
represent preconditions to same-sex marriage legalization and opportunity structures may help
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explain Taiwan’s and Colombia’s legalization (see Figures 7-3 and 7-4). In the case of Colombia
and Mexico, we see Colombia performing better in the Age of Democracy variable and the Judicial
Independence variables, which case study analysis in the last chapter suggested would be the case
as Colombia’s Constitutional Court declared bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional in 2016.
In the Taiwanese case, again we see that Taiwan outperforms Japan in both Judicial Independence
variables, also confirmed in the case study analysis. This suggests that, at least for these two cases
of Colombia and Taiwan, the addition of the two Judicial Independence variables improved the
analytical power of the RI.

Figure 7-3: Colombia and Mexico Compared in the Rainbow Index 2.0
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Figure 7-4: Japan and Taiwan Compared in the Rainbow Index 2.0
I will leave it to future research to run a full quantitative analysis on the opportunity
structure variables as performing that analysis now would be outside the scope of this dissertation.
But my expectation is that the addition of the variables will prove to add explanatory power to the
index, though the addition of a variable to measure political opportunity structure would also be
helpful. However, this first-glance examination is promising – the RI now accurately predicts the
Colombia-Mexico outcome and Taiwan ranks higher in the overall index, nearly besting Japan.
My suspicion is that the addition of a robust variable to capture youth political involvement would
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tip the balance in favor of Taiwan, if the case study evidence bears out. The hope is that the World
Values Survey Wave 8 will once again ask the question about whether or not people aged 18-29
vote in national elections, and that more countries will be included. As this question appeared in
Waves 6 and 7, this seems a reasonable expectation – all the more so because there doesn’t seem
to be readily available country-level comparative data on youth engagement.
7.4

Final Thoughts
Quantitative and case-study analysis confirms thew hypothesis that a combination of high

mobilization capacity, the embrace of Secular and Emancipative Values, and opportunities for
interaction with TANs allows for LGB SMOs to utilize contentious politics within existing
opportunity structures in order to advocate for the legalization of same-sex marriage. The research
also points to the importance of preconditions to mobilization and engaging in contentious politics,
namely LGB group identity formation and democratization. A second version of the RI with these
variables incorporated as informed by case-study analysis seems more predictive than the initial
version. Future research should endeavor, as a first priority, to confirm that this is the case through
quantitative analysis. But there are a number of other exciting avenues for future research
suggested by this dissertation.
The most obvious choice would be deeper dive into the Taiwanese case, as it is the first
legalizer in the Sinic East – legalizing earlier than the theory operationalized and tested in this
dissertation might suggest. There are a number of promising factors to explore that time, space,
and scope considerations dictated could only be examined here in a limited, though still clearly
informative, way. For example, the exact nature of the relationship between Taiwanese religion
and Taiwanese LGB group identity formation as a precondition for mobilization could be explored.
The role of Taiwanese LGB bars as mobilization facilitators in the lifecycle of the social movement
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could be analyzed in greater detail. The roles of Taiwanization and the need to pursue “queer
diplomacy” in the outcome of same-sex marriage legalization should be examined. And the role
student-led youth movements in the lifecycle of the social movement as participants in the larger
human rights discourse that shaped Taiwan’s transition to democracy could also be analyzed in
greater detail.
Jumping off from the Taiwan case, a region-specific exploration of the Sinic East in greater
detail could help further illuminate additional factors that explain why so many countries in the
region seem so far away from legalization. Japan and South Korea might be the next likeliest cases
in the region to legalize, but case study analysis suggests that legalization of same-sex marriage in
Japan may be far off. Hong Kong, Vietnam, and China seem quite unlikely to legalize (see Table
7-2). Is there a region-specific factor to the Sinic East that explains this outcome? Future research
could shed light on this. And in so doing, this Sinic-East regional analysis could shed further light
on why Taiwan seems so exceptional.

Table 7-2: The Sinic East in the RI 2.0

Japan
Taiwan
South Korea
Hong Kong
Vietnam
China

Rainbow Index
Rank
Score
18
819
19
817
35
660
68
382
77
256
98
81

Preconditions for
Rank
Score
23
836
30
788
35
759
86
234
92
185
96
127

Mobilization
Rank
Score
18
656
19
627
55
390
36
496
42
453
70
242

Openness to TANs
Rank
Score
9
988
11
981
51
451
85
201
89
179
100
1

Values
Rank
Score
18
783
32
684
10
834
18
783
42
598
51
549

Opportunity
Rank
Score
61
689
21
864
21
864
82
441
90
226
96
1

As previously mentioned, the case of Ecuador legalizing same-sex marriage now stands
out as a potential crucial case in future research. In the RI 2.0, Ecuador ranks 51st out of 100 in the
world, 11th out of 15 in the Latin America region, 10th out of 15 in the Modicum cluster, and last
among all legalizers to-date (see Table 7-3). The next-fourteen-higher ranked countries in the RI
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have not legalized. In Latin America Chile58, Guatemala, Trinidad and Tobago, the Dominican
Republic, and Peru have all failed to legalize despite each being ranking better in the region. All
In the Modicum cluster, only Brazil (1st in that cluster) and Ecuador (10th in that cluster) have
legalized. And, as already stated, South Africa and Malta rank 39th and 40th in the world
respectively. Clearly, Ecuador is an outlier that should be explored in case-study or quantitative
analysis.
Table 7-3: Ecuador in the RI 2.0

Japan and Italy are the only two countries in the RI 2.0 top-twenty that have yet to legalize
same-sex marriage. According to case study analysis conducted so far, Japan would not be
expected to legalize same-sex marriage for some time for many reasons, not the least of which are
barriers to group identity formation and mobilization of resources. Analysis of Italy could confirm
whether LGB persons face similar challenges, or if a whole different set of country-specific
variables explain that country’s failure to legalize. And while Japan’s failure to legalize has
already been somewhat explored, Italy clearly presents an interesting case as well. In the Old West

58

Chile legalized SSM in 2022, which outside the scope of consideration for this dissertation.
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region, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Malta have all legalized same-sex marriage despite
lower ranking in the RI 2.0. Likewise, in the Thriving cluster, Iceland has legalized despite a lower
ranking – 19th out of 28 to Italy’s 18th rank in the cluster (see Table 7-4).
Table 7-4: Italy in the RI 2.0

The role of religion in Reformed West countries could also be explored. Out of nine
countries included in the RI region, only Switzerland had not legalized as of the time of this
analysis59. Case study analysis could help ascertain why Switzerland lagged behind Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. Likewise, Latin America,
despite being heavily Catholic, has a very high proportion of legalizing countries to non-legalizing
countries. It is possible that there is something inherent in the religions that inform the value

59

SSM has been legal in Switzerland since July 2022, but this date falls outside the range of analysis
conducted for this dissertation.
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systems of these cultures that could explain such a notable and obvious convergence of outcome.
Complementary region-based studies of the Reformed West and Latin American regions could be
revealing (see Figure 7-5).

Figure 7-5: Map of Same-Sex Marriage Legalizers in the RI as of 2021
The South African case is another obvious choice for future analysis and could be another
critical case for the theory. South Africa is the only country in the sub-Saharan Africa region to
legalize same-sex marriage (see Figure 7-5). Can this be explained through the combination of
mobilization capacity, TANs, and values leading to successful navigation of opportunity
structures? Has South Africa met the precondition of LGB group identity formation? Or is some
other event in South African history that a historical institutional approach to analysis might
reveal? The legacy of Apartheid certainly springs to mind as one contender for such an event. It
could be possible that the legacy of Apartheid informed how SMOs navigated opportunity
structures in the country. Or it could be that the legacy of Apartheid allowed South Africa to
legalize same-sex marriage earlier than it should have.
Another potential puzzle to explore would be why countries in the Orthodox East, the Indic
East, and the Islamic East have remained so resistant to same-sex marriage legalization efforts.
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Activists in India have met with little success, and for a time India recriminalized consensual samesex sexual activity from 2013 – 2018, after Section 377 (India’s colonial-era sodomy law) had
initially been struck down by the Delhi High Court in 2009. The Supreme Court in the Philippines
in 2020 seemed to shut the door on the possibility of same-sex marriage legalization through legal
opportunity structures. These are the two most likely countries in the Indic East to legalize samesex marriage, which is to say, given the aforementioned circumstances, that same-sex marriage
legalization in any country in the Indic East seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Countries in
the Islamic East have some of the harshest punishments imposed on same-sex couples, and LGB
SMOs in that regions two most likely legalizers of Tunisia and Turkey have suffered considerable
setbacks as well. For example, in 2015 Turkey’s largest city Istanbul banned Pride celebrations
altogether. There is some promise in the Orthodox East’s most likely legalizer in Bulgaria as their
high court ruled in 2018 that same-sex couples may be granted legal residency as such in that
country, in compliance with European Court of Justice case law. But same-sex marriage
legalization seems a far-off prospect in Bulgaria as well, though it does rank higher in the RI than
Ecuador.
Finally, analysis in Chapter 3 revealed that the theory of legalization of same-sex marriage
presented here does not predict the outcome of the death penalty for consensual same-sex sexual
relationships for any case, and yet Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Yemen are all countries in the RI in
which the death penalty exists for LGB persons (and non-LGB persons for that matter) who chose
to indulge in non-heteronormative sexual activity. This suggests a whole separate research
question of why countries still institute the death penalty for consensual same-sex sexual
relationships when this is clearly outside the norms of expected outcomes for punishment or
acceptance. Possible explanations could include religion, degrees of authoritarianism, legacies of
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colonialism, poverty, and political instability all spring to mind. Or it could be that mobilization
capacity, opportunities for TANs, and the degree to which empowering values are embraced are
so low as to fall below some threshold which might explain why LGB persons in those countries
are put to death.
In closing, this puzzle is still revealing itself. After 2021 – the analytical cut-off for analysis
in this dissertation, Andorra, Chile, Cuba, Slovenia, and Switzerland have all legalized same-sex
marriage, and an updated RI should take this into account. Analysis has revealed the theory that
the combination of mobilization capacity, TANs, and empowering values provides a compelling
explanation as to why some countries are more likely to legalize same-sex marriage than others.
As the universe of cases expands, the theory for explaining same-sex marriage legalization can be
refined, and even more robust quantitative and qualitative analysis could be undertaken. No matter
which of the potential areas of future research related to same-sex marriage legalization I explore,
it is certain that the RCII will be a valuable tool in that research. And it is equally certain that a
solid grounding in the data will light the way to fruitful case-study analysis. As a mentor of mine
is fond of saying, numbers are where the conversation begins.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: same-sex marriage Legalization by Country, Region, Date, Scope, and Mode
Country
Netherlands
Belgium
Canada
Spain
South Africa
Mexico
Norway
Sweden
Argentina
Iceland
Portugal
Denmark
Brazil
France
New Zealand
The UK
Uruguay
Luxembourg
Finland
Greenland
Ireland
The United States
Colombia
Australia
Germany
Malta
Ecuador
Taiwan

Region
Europe
Europe
North America
Europe
Africa
Latin America
Europe
Europe
Latin America
Europe
Europe
Europe
Latin America
Europe
Oceana
Europe
Latin America
Europe
Europe
North America
Europe
North America
Latin America
Oceana
Europe
Europe
Latin America
East Asia

Date
2000
2003
2005
2005
2006
2009
2009
2009
2010
2010
2010
2012
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2014
2015
2015
2015
2015
2016
2017
2017
2017
2019
2019

Scope
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
Limited
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
Limited
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full
Full

Method
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Court Decision/Legislation
Court Decision/Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Court Decision
Court Decision/Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Referendum
Court Decision
Court Decision
Referendum/Legislation
Legislation
Legislation
Court Decision/Legislation
Court Decision/Legislation
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Appendix B: Rainbow Index Math
The following is a description of the math used by the Rainbow Index to calculate scores
for each country. This math is the same as used in the Robinson Country Intelligence Index (RCII)
and is thus part of the tool’s functionality. The RCII’s approach was developed by Chris Brown
and several graduate students working on the project over several years. The following language
was originally written by one of those graduate students, Camilo Martinez. I have edited it slightly
and reproduced it here with permission from the RCII team.
The following are the steps used by the RCII to calculate a score derived from raw data
inputs for any given variable.
Define Directionality
Addressing the directionality of the data is the first step to start the calculation; whether a
high score is good or bad changes the way we compute the variables. We refer to this as
directionality. There are three defined directionalities.
•

Positive: High levels of the variable are generally desired and should result in a high score
(ex. Aggregate GDP)

•

Negative: High levels of a variable are generally not desired and should result in a lower
score (ex. Unemployment)

•

Absolute: For some variables high positive numbers and high negative numbers are both
negative traits (ex. Inflation)
Transformation
Data for country performance is rarely ever normally distributed. In order to shift the data

to a less skewed, more normal distribution; the RCII uses a logarithmic transformation of the raw
data variables, changing the scale from a decimal scale to logarithmic scale.
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𝑓(𝑥) = −𝐿𝑛(|𝑥| + 1) 𝑥 < 0
𝑓(𝑥) = −𝐿𝑛(|𝑥| + 1) 𝑥 ≥ 0
Standardization
To make variables comparable, the RCII standardizes the data with a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1. Each data point (x) in the variable needs to be standardized with the mean
(𝜇) and standard deviation (𝜎) of the year the data is in using the following formula:
𝑥−𝜇
𝜎
If the directionality is negative (meaning more of the variable is not desired, e.g., pollution)
this result should be multiplied by -1 to guarantee the appropriate result.
Rescale
Finally, to rescale the result to a score between 1 and 1000; the RCII uses the formula:
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 − 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
∗ 999 + 1
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 − 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠

Aggregation
The aggregated variables are computed according to the weights to create the new data.
From that point, the same standardization and rescaling is applied to aggregate variables as to the
raw data variables.
Missing values
Sometimes, data needed to compute aggregate variables can be missing due to data
availability (for example, there is not a lot of publicly available data for Cuba). In this case the
RCII applies a 50% rule. If the number of variables is less than 50% the aggregation cannot be
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computed, otherwise, the RCII calculates the aggregate variable resizing the weight of the
available variables in the same proportion of the missing variables.
𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖 =

𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖
1 − 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠

Outliers
Under the methodology to rank the countries used in the RCII,
we suppose a normal distribution in the data once it has been
transformed. Moreover, we apply a logistic regression to achieve these
normality assumptions. However, in some variables, there are data
points which we consider extreme values because they seriously
change the mean and variance of the data. This would result in a miscalculation of the score that
groups the data points that are not extremes. In order to avoid this problem, we apply an
interquartile range methodology, so we can find a range in which the data makes sense for the
purpose of the calculation methodology.
That is why we use the parameter δ=20 to multiply the interquartile range in order to give
the boundaries of each variable enough flexibility to show the variable distribution but also
allowing the RCII to execute the calculation without being affected by extreme outliers.
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Appendix C: Age of Democracies
Age of Democracies (as of 2020)

country
United States
Switzerland
New Zealand
Canada
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Norway
Australia
Denmark
Sweden
Finland
Iceland
Austria
France
Italy
India
Japan
Tunisia
Colombia
Trinidad and Tobago
Greece
Cyprus
Spain
Bolivia
Argentina
Nigeria
Turkey
Nicaragua
Brazil
Uruguay
Guatemala
Philippines
South Korea
Poland
Bulgaria
Chile
Germany
Hungary
Estonia
Macedonia
Moldova
Romania
Slovenia
Ukraine
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Lithuania
Czech Republic
Slovakia
South Africa
Taiwan
Albania
Ghana
Indonesia
Croatia
Mexico
Peru
Ecuador
Georgia
Montenegro
Serbia

year
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020
2020

Age of
Democracy
(Years)
216
168
159
149
131
119
116
115
115
105
99
98
70
70
70
66
64
60
58
54
42
39
39
34
33
33
33
32
31
31
30
30
28
27
26
26
26
26
25
25
25
25
25
25
24
24
23
23
22
20
19
19
17
16
16
15
13
12
10
10
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Appendix D: Elite Interview Questions
Georgia State University
Queer Series of Events Interview Questions

Title: A Queer Series of Events: A Comparative Examination of Same-Sex Marriage Legalization
Principal Investigator: Dr. Jennifer McCoy, PhD
Student Principal Investigator: Mr. Michael D. Shea, PhD Candidate
Procedural Notes (not shared with interview subjects)
•
Each interview will begin with a few brief questions on background relevant to the subject.
For example, why they got into politics, why the issue of same-sex marriage important to them,
etc.
•
Each interview subject will be asked each of the questions under General Questions.
•
Each group of Elites (Political, Judicial, Activist) will then be asked the questions for their
elite group only. In other words, a Political Elite will not be asked questions intended specifically
for Judicial Elites.

Interview Questions – General Questions
1.
Do you support the legalization of same-sex marriage in (insert country name)?
2.
Follow-Up: Why/Why Not?
3.
What factors do you feel were most important in leading to the legalization of same-sex
marriage in (insert country name)?
4.
How were values important in the legalization of same-sex marriage in (insert country
name)?
5.
What degree do you think a respect, or lack thereof, for traditional institutions of
authority played a role in the legalization of same-sex marriage?
6.
Follow-Up on country-specific institutions of authority and their reaction to same-sex
marriage.
7.
How was religion, or the lack of it, important in the legalization of same-sex marriage in
(insert country name)?
8.
Follow-up on country-specific religious institutions and their support/opposition to samesex marriage.
9.
Would you say that people in your country value imagination, independence, or
obedience more?
10.
Follow up: Is that an important factor in your country’s adoption of same-sex marriage?
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11.
According to the World Values Survey, people in your country value autonomy
(highly/lowly) at (figure). Do you think this played an important role in the legalization of samesex marriage?
12.
Divorce was legalized n your country in (date), abortion in (date), and consensual
homosexual sex in (date). Do you what /if any degree do you think a tolerance for reproduction or
sexual freedom mattered in the legalization of same-sex marriage?
13.
According to the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Report, your country performs
(well/poorly) where gender equality is concerned. Is gender equality important in the legalization
of same-sex marriage?
14.
According to the World Values Survey, people in your country value their freedom of
speech and their ability to influence events in their political, personal, and professional lives. Is
this aspect of personal choice important in the legalization of same-sex marriage?

Interview Questions – Political Elites
1.
For publicly identified LGB political elites only: what made you decide to come out
publicly?
2.
For publicly identified LGB political elites only: to what extent do you feel your being
LGB helped you to advocate for the legalization of same-sex marriage?
3.
For publicly identified LGB political elites only: do you think your membership in the
LGB community gave you political leverage to use in helping to legalize same-sex marriage?
4.
(Percentage) of people in (insert country name) have access to the internet. Was this
important in helping to legalize same-sex marriage?
5.
The internet is increasingly used to help bring marginalized groups together and to help
them find a voice. To what extent do you feel access to the internet helped or hurt the chances of
legalizing same-sex marriage?
6.
According my research, there are (number) of LGB bars in your city. Historically, these
bars have served as gathering spaces for LGB persons and as a way or “normalizing” LGB people
for others outside that community. Do you think this relatively (high/low) number of LGB bars
(helped/hurt) efforts to legalize same-sex marriage in your country?
7.
To what degree, if any, were you lobbied by LGB advocacy networks?
8.
Follow-up: Examples, if any?

Interview Questions – Judicial Elites (not used)
1.
For publicly identified LGB judicial elites only: what made you decide to come out
publicly?
2.
For publicly identified LGB judicial elites only: do you feel your membership in the LGB
community influenced how you viewed (specific case)?
3.
Why do you feel activists in your country felt the need to turn to the courts to help them
secure same-sex marriage rights?
4.
To what degree, if any, were you lobbied by LGB advocacy networks?
5.
Follow-up: Examples, if any?
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Interview Questions – Activists
1.
What made you decide to be an advocate for LGB rights in general and same-sex
marriage rights in particular?
2.
What resources did you mobilize to help you advocate for same-sex marriage?
3.
How did you mobilize those resources?
4.
What tactics did your group employ to help you advocate for same-sex marriage rights?
5.
Were out LGB political/judicial elites important in helping you mobilize resources and/or
accomplish your goals?
6.
Was the internet important in helping you mobilize resources and/or accomplish your
goals?
7.
Were LGB bars important in helping you mobilize resources and/or accomplish your
goals?
8.
Did your group receive any help from LGB advocacy groups outside your country?
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Appendix E: “Vote Yes” Leaflet Translation

290
Appendix F: “Vote No” Leaflets Translation

Anti-gay marriage, Save Taiwan.
Won’t work for the economy, Only stirs controversy. Accept gay marriage, Family will be doomed.
Consequences of passing the bill

Examples from other countries. Are we going to follow?

Would leave children without a father or
mother for life!
Note: The passage of the same-sex marriage bill not
only cut families off but left children without a mother
or a father.

Example from US:
“I love my mother’s same-sex partner, but another mom can never fill the
vacancy of not having a dad” - Heather Barwick (the author of Heather Has Two
Mommies) “The family values promoted by same-sex marriage denies the most
basic needs and desires of our children who desire the company of their fathers
and mothers. At the same time telling our children: you don't need these innate
longings; you will be fine. But we're not fine, we're hurt." Heather said.

The concept of marriage as one husband and
one wife would be threatened!
Note: That's how the term "heteronormative
hegemony" was coined. Actually, in mid 2016, Taiwan
University's Mechanical Engineering Department was
fined 30,000 yuan by the Ministry of Education just
for mentioning "one husband and one wife is natural"
in an exam question.

Example from US:
Massachusetts same-sex marriage has been legal for 14 years since 2003. During
these years, people in the state have not only been persecuted for their personal
freedom, parents’ rights in education, and freedom of worship, but the rights of
children's education have also been threatened. For example, "teachers must talk
to students about gay sex", "teaching homosexuality in elementary schools and
kindergartens", "parents have no right to interfere with the teaching of same-sex
relationships in schools", "more Massachusetts students are beginning to selfidentify as gay", "Public health departments hand out obscene gay pamphlets in
high schools," "Businesses that refuse to serve same-sex couples are charged
with discrimination," "People who publicly express opposition to same-sex
marriage are fired from their companies," and "Opponents of same-sex marriage
are attacked and even set on fire."

By then it will be illegal to take to the streets
to protest again!
Note: Now you go out on the streets to protest against
gay marriage, you could already be tied up and
restrained by the police. In the future, it would be not
only to no avail, but also against the law (because the
law would have been changed) !

Example from France:
In 2013, France passed the same-sex marriage bill. There were very many
protests on the eve of its passage. But after its passage, everything was changed.
In 2013, millions of French people took to the streets to fight against same-sex
marriage. Not only were their demands ineffective, but they were also
suppressed by the riot police. Over a hundred people were arrested. In 2014 and
2015, There were multiple demonstrations with hundreds of thousands of
participants. People held up signs saying, "In 2017, my vote was for family". But
these actions were to no avail.

Would not be able to refuse services to gays!
Note: Religious freedom, conscience freedom, parents’
rights in education, … would all be impacted! even be
fined, convicted and jailed. There’re examples from
other countries! Goddamnit! Gay rights are so mighty,
we’re so scared.

Example from Europe:
2 years ago, a bakery in Northern Ireland was taken to court for refusing to bake
an "I support same-sex marriage" themed cake. The plaintiff accused the store of
discriminating against gays. On October 24, 2016, the latest verdict was
announced - the guilty verdict was upheld, and the bakery had to pay 500 euros
(about 25,000 Taiwan dollars) in damages.
Example from Canada:
The Ontario government requires Catholic schools to regularly hold "joint
gay/straight Sunday schools" (and must use terms like same-sex) and has written
to public schools that they must not rent auditoriums to small churches that "do
not accept same-sex marriage ceremonies".

A British writer said: “The most important lesson learned from history is that human beings are unable to learn any lessons from history.” Gay
marriage is good or bad? Just look at what happened after other countries passed it, we would know the answer. The sexual liberation
proposals from the western countries are invading Taiwan and the Chinese culture, impacting the family ethics and values of the Taiwanese
grass-roots. These countries have tasted the bitter fruit. Do we still want to follow? These countries want to turn back. Do we still want to dive
in?
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Appendix G: Administrative Divisions of Taiwan

Source: Wikipedia – Geography of Taiwan

